Elmeolvasó készségünk teszi lehetővé, hogy mások mentális állapotait — észleleteit, szándékait, vélekedéseit — leképezzük, és saját hasonló állapotainktól megkülönböztessük. Ezt a teljesítményt közel negyven éve sajátosan emberi készségnek tételezzük. Az utóbbi évtizedben egyre több bizonyíték szól amellett, hogy a vélekedésolvasás készségének létezik egy implicit formája, melyen automatikus kognitív működéseket értünk. Ugyanakkor kétséges, hogy az automatikus folyamatok során valóban mentális állapotokat reprezentálunk-e. Az implicit működések jelenleg főként viselkedéses mérésen keresztül ragadhatóak meg. Egyes viselkedéses változók pedig nemcsak a vélekedésolvasás lehetséges kifejeződéseként, hanem egyúttal a készség birtoklásának fontos bizonyítékaként is értelmezhetőek. Ugyanakkor eddig kevés figyelem irányult ezen viselkedések lehetséges funkcióinak feltárására. Jelen tanulmányunkban azt a célt tűztük ki, hogy funkcionális értelmezési lehetőségeket kínáljunk az implicit elmeolvasó paradigmákban megjelenő két spontán viselkedésre: a viselkedésjósló szemmozgásra és a közbeavatkozó-korrigáló viselkedésre. Alkalmazott módszerünk a szelektív irodalomelemzés, melynek során az implicit vélekedésolvasás erős bizonyítékait vizsgáljuk meg közelebbről. Eredményeink szerint a viselkedésjósló szemmozgások a szelf és a másik perspektívájának és szándékának az egyesítését, míg a korrigáló-közbeavatkozó viselkedés a saját és a másik reprezentációinak a különválasztását erősítik. Megbeszélésünkben kitérünk a spontán viselkedések szerepére az elmeolvasás atipikus működése terén.
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