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  • 1 Kharkov National University of Radioelectronics, Lenin’s av. 14, Ukraine, Kharkov
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The modified method of estimation of the resistance of block ciphers to truncated byte differential attack is proposed. The previously known method estimate the truncated byte differential probability for Rijndael-like ciphers. In this paper we spread the sphere of application of that method on wider class of ciphers. The proposed method based on searching the most probable truncated byte differential characteristics and verification of sufficient conditions of effective byte differentials absence.

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