View More View Less
  • 1 Please ask the editor of the journal.
  • | 2 Russian-European Centre for Economic Policy (RECEP) Potapovsky per 5 str. 4, 101000 Moscow, Russia
Restricted access

Purchase article

USD  $25.00

1 year subscription (Individual Only)

USD  $700.00

Based on panel data from 1995.1997, the paper focusses on the impact of ownership concentration on the performance of Russian non-financial privatised companies that constitute the group of .blue chips. of the country.s stock market. We consider three indicators of company performance . labour productivity, profitability, and Tobins.s q . and employ instrumental variables technique to correct regression results for endogeneity of ownership. We find that ownership concentration positively affects labour productivity, but has a negative impact on Tobins.s q. The relationship between ownership concentration and profitability follows a U-shaped pattern with the turning point at 56% concentration. These findings imply that ownership concentration results in higher technical efficiency of enterprises, but the benefits from productivity improvements do not accrue to all shareholders. This is consistent with the expropriation hypothesis that large owners use their power to extract private benefits of control.

  • Baltagi, B. (1995): Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. Chichester: Wiley.

    Econometric Analysis of Panel Data , ().

  • Barclay, M. and Holderness, C. (1989): Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 25.

    'Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations ' () 25 Journal of Financial Economics .

    • Search Google Scholar
  • Buck, T., Filatotchev, I., Wright, M. and Zhukov, V. (1999): Corporate Governance and Employee Ownership in an Economic Crisis: Enterprise Strategies in the Former USSR. Journal of Comparative Economics, 27.

    'Corporate Governance and Employee Ownership in an Economic Crisis: Enterprise Strategies in the Former USSR ' () 27 Journal of Comparative Economics .

    • Search Google Scholar
  • Burkart, M., Gromb, D. and Panunzi, F. (1997): Large Shareholders, Monitoring and the Value of the Firm. Quarterly Journal of Economics112: 3.

    'Large Shareholders, Monitoring and the Value of the Firm ' () 112 Quarterly Journal of Economics .

    • Search Google Scholar
  • Claessens, S. and Djankov, S. (1999): Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance in the Czech Republic. CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 2145.

  • Claessens, S., Djankov, S. and Pohl, G. (1996): Ownership and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Czech Republic. World Bank Working Paper, No. 1737.

  • Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K. (1985): The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences. Journal of Political Economy, 93.

    'The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences ' () 93 Journal of Political Economy .

    • Search Google Scholar
  • Earle, J. S. (1998): Post-Privatisation Ownership Structure and Productivity in Russian Industrial Enterprises. Paper presented at the ACES-ASSA meetings, Chicago.

    'Post-Privatisation Ownership Structure and Productivity in Russian Industrial Enterprises' , , .

    • Search Google Scholar
  • Edwards, J. and Weichenrieder, A. (1999): Ownership Concentration and Share Valuation: Evidence from Germany. CESifo Working Paper, No. 193.

  • Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. (1983): Agency Problems and Residual Claims. Journal of Law and Economics, 26.

    'Agency Problems and Residual Claims ' () 26 Journal of Law and Economics .

  • Frydman, R. and Rapaczynski, A. (1994): Privatisation in Eastern Europe: Is the State Withering Away? Budapest: Central European University Press.

    Privatisation in Eastern Europe: Is the State Withering Away , ().

  • Hansmann, H. (1990): When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination and Economic Democracy. The Yale Law Journal, 99: 8.

    'When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination and Economic Democracy ' () 99 The Yale Law Journal .

    • Search Google Scholar
  • Holmstrom, B. and Tirole, J. (1993): Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring. Journal of Political Economy, 101.

    'Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring ' () 101 Journal of Political Economy .

  • Jensen, M. (1997): The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit and the Failure of Internal Control Systems. In: Studies in International Corporate Finance and Governance Systems: A Comparison of the U. S., Japan and Europe. Oxford University Press.

    The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit and the Failure of Internal Control Systems , ().

    • Search Google Scholar
  • Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. (1976): Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Cost and Capital Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3.

    'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Cost and Capital Structure ' () 3 Journal of Financial Economics .

    • Search Google Scholar
  • Kapelyushnikov, R. (2000): Krupneyshie i dominiruyushchie sobstvenniki v rossiyskoy promishlennosti: svidetelstva monitoringa REB (The Largest and Dominant Owners in Russian Industry: Evidence from REB Monitoring). Voprosy Economiki, 1.

    'Krupneyshie i dominiruyushchie sobstvenniki v rossiyskoy promishlennosti: svidetelstva monitoringa REB (The Largest and Dominant Owners in Russian Industry: Evidence from REB Monitoring) ' () 1 Voprosy Economiki .

    • Search Google Scholar
  • Krueger, A. (1990): Government Failures in Development. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4.

    'Government Failures in Development ' () 4 Journal of Economic Perspectives .

  • McConell, J. J. and Servaes, H. (1990): Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value. Journal of Financial Economics, 27.

    'Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value ' () 27 Journal of Financial Economics .

    • Search Google Scholar
  • McKinsey Global Institute (1999): Unlocking Economic Growth in Russia. Moscow.

    McKinsey Global Institute , ().

  • Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1988): Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20.

    'Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis ' () 20 Journal of Financial Economics .

    • Search Google Scholar
  • Mundlak, Y. (1978): On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Sectional Data. Econometrica, Vol. 46.

    'On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Sectional Data ' () 46 Econometrica .

  • Perotti, E. and Gelfer, S. (1998): Investment and Financing in Russian Financial-Industrial Groups. RECEP Working Paper, No. 1.

  • Shapiro, C. and Willig, R. (1990): Economic Rationales for the Scope of Privatisation. In: Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatisation. London: Westview Press.

    Economic Rationales for the Scope of Privatisation , ().

  • Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1994): Politicians and Firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics109: 4.

    'Politicians and Firms ' () 109 Quarterly Journal of Economics .

  • Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.(1997): A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance52: 2.

    'A Survey of Corporate Governance ' () 52 Journal of Finance .

  • Stulz, R. (1988): Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate Control. Journal of Financial Economics, 20.

    'Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate Control ' () 20 Journal of Financial Economics .

    • Search Google Scholar
  • Vickers, J. and Yarrow, G. (1988): Privatisation: An Economic Analysis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Privatisation: An Economic Analysis , ().

  • Xu, X. and Wang, Y. (1997): Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and Firm's Performance: The Case of Chinese Stock Companies. World Bank Working Paper, No. 1742.

  • Zeckhauser, R. and Pound, J. (1990): Are Large Shareholders Effective Monitors? An Investigation of Share ownership and Corporate Performance. In: Hubbard, R. G. (ed.): Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance and Investment. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Are Large Shareholders Effective Monitors? An Investigation of Share ownership and Corporate Performance , ().

    • Search Google Scholar
  • Bergloef, E. and von Thadden, E. L. (1999): The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: Implications for Transition and Developing Countries. Paper presented at the annual World Bank conference on development economics, Washington, D. C.

    'The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: Implications for Transition and Developing Countries' , , .

    • Search Google Scholar
  • Berle, A. and Means, G. (1932): The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York: Macmillan.

    The Modern Corporation and Private Property , ().

  • Bevan, A., Estrin, S. and Schaffer, M. (1999): Determinants of Enterprise Performance during Transition. CERT Discussion Paper, No. 3.

  • Black, B., Kraakman, R. and Tarassova, A. (2000): Russian Privatisation and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong? Stanford Law Review, 52.

    'Russian Privatisation and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong ' () 52 Stanford Law Review .

    • Search Google Scholar
  • Brown, D. and Earle, J. (2000): Privatization and Restructuring in Russia: New Evidence from Panel Data on Industrial Enterprises. RECEP Working Paper, No. 1.

Submit Your Manuscript
 
The author instruction is available in PDF.
Please, download the file from HERE.

 

The description of the refereeing procedure is available in PDF.
Please, download the file from HERE.

 

 

Senior editors

Editor(s)-in-Chief: Prof. Dr. Mihályi, Péter

Editor(s): Ványai, Judit

Editorial Board

  • Ádám Török (Chairman) / University of Pannonia; Budapest University of Technology and Economics
  • Edina Berlinger / Corvinus University of Budapest, Department of Finance
  • Péter Halmai / Budapest University of Technology and Economics; National University of Public Service
  • István Kónya / Institute of Economics Centre for Regional and Economic Studies, University of Pécs
  • János Köllő / Institute of Economics Centre for Regional and Economic Studies
  • István Magas / Corvinus University of Budapest, Department of World Economy; University of Physical Education, Department. of Sports and Decision Sciences
 

Advisory Board

  • Ǻslund, Anders, Institute of International Economics, Washington (USA)
  • Kolodko, Grzegorz, Kozminski University, Warsaw (Poland)
  • Mau, Vladimir, Academy of National Economy (Russia)
  • Messerlin, Patrick A, Groupe d’Economie Mondiale (France)
  • Saul Estrin, London School of Economics (UK)
  • Wagener, Hans-Jürgen, Europa Universität Viadrina (Germany)

Corvinus University of Budapest
Department of Economics
Fővám tér 8 Budapest, H-1093, Hungary

Indexing and Abstracting Services:

  • EconLit
  • Elsevier GEO Abstracts
  • GEOBASE
  • International Bibliographies IBZ and IBR
  • JEL
  • Referativnyi Zhurnal
  • RePEc
  • SCOPUS
  • Social Science Citation Index
  • Index Copernicus

 

2020  
Total Cites 275
WoS
Journal
Impact Factor
0,875
Rank by Economics 325/377 (Q4)
Impact Factor  
Impact Factor 0,534
without
Journal Self Cites
5 Year 0,500
Impact Factor
Journal  0,38
Citation Indicator  
Rank by Journal  Economics 347/549 (Q3)
Citation Indicator   
Citable 37
Items
Total 37
Articles
Total 0
Reviews
Scimago 13
H-index
Scimago 0,292
Journal Rank
Scimago Economics and Econometrics Q3
Quartile Score  
Scopus 225/166=1,4
Scite Score  
Scopus Economics and Econometrics 392/661 (Q3)
Scite Score Rank  
Scopus 0,668
SNIP  
Days from  289
sumbission  
to acceptance  
Days from  447
acceptance  
to publication  

2019  
Total Cites
WoS
212
Impact Factor 0,914
Impact Factor
without
Journal Self Cites
0,728
5 Year
Impact Factor
0,650
Immediacy
Index
0,156
Citable
Items
45
Total
Articles
45
Total
Reviews
0
Cited
Half-Life
3,9
Citing
Half-Life
9,5
Eigenfactor
Score
0,00015
Article Influence
Score
0,052
% Articles
in
Citable Items
100,00
Normalized
Eigenfactor
0,01891
Average
IF
Percentile
28,437
Scimago
H-index
12
Scimago
Journal Rank
0,439
Scopus
Scite Score
214/165=1,3
Scopus
Scite Score Rank
Economics and Econometrics 355/637 (Q3)
Scopus
SNIP
0,989

 

Acta Oeconomica
Publication Model Hybrid
Submission Fee none
Article Processing Charge 900 EUR/article
Printed Color Illustrations 40 EUR (or 10 000 HUF) + VAT / piece
Regional discounts on country of the funding agency World Bank Lower-middle-income economies: 50%
World Bank Low-income economies: 100%
Further Discounts Editorial Board / Advisory Board members: 50%
Corresponding authors, affiliated to an EISZ member institution subscribing to the journal package of Akadémiai Kiadó: 100%
Subscription fee 2021 Online subsscription: 588 EUR / 732 USD
Print + online subscription: 688 EUR / 860 USD
Subscription fee 2022 Online subsscription: 600 EUR / 750 USD
Print + online subscription: 704 EUR / 880 USD
Subscription Information Online subscribers are entitled access to all back issues published by Akadémiai Kiadó for each title for the duration of the subscription, as well as Online First content for the subscribed content.
Purchase per Title Individual articles are sold on the displayed price.

Acta Oeconomica
Language English
Size B5
Year of
Foundation
1966
Publication
Programme
2021 Volume 71
Volumes
per Year
1
Issues
per Year
4
Founder Magyar Tudományos Akadémia
Founder's
Address
H-1051 Budapest, Hungary, Széchenyi István tér 9.
Publisher Akadémiai Kiadó
Publisher's
Address
H-1117 Budapest, Hungary 1516 Budapest, PO Box 245.
Responsible
Publisher
Chief Executive Officer, Akadémiai Kiadó
ISSN 0001-6373 (Print)
ISSN 1588-2659 (Online)

Monthly Content Usage

Abstract Views Full Text Views PDF Downloads
May 2021 19 1 0
Jun 2021 22 0 0
Jul 2021 30 4 2
Aug 2021 53 0 0
Sep 2021 51 0 0
Oct 2021 24 0 0
Nov 2021 0 0 0