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  • 1 University of Debrecen Department of Economics Kassai u. 26 H-4028 Debrecen Hungary
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This paper attempts to contribute to the understanding of how democracy and individual rights associated with it affect economic development. The market process approach to innovation (and entrepreneurship) is combined with the stationary bandit approach to property rights to derive a proposition concerning how the lack of exogenous constraints on the government can retard innovation. According to this, a credible commitment to secure property rights through respecting individual or human rights becomes an important factor for the process of catching up for those countries that are relatively close to the most developed ones in terms of technology and thus income. The proposition is tested on cross-country panel data using a measure of civil rights as a proxy for the commitment to secure individual rights. This argument provides one possible explanation for the fact that there is a strong correlation between democracy and income while the correlation between democracy and growth is weak.

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Senior editors

Editor(s)-in-Chief: Prof. Dr. Mihályi, Péter

Editor(s): Ványai, Judit

Editorial Board

  • Ádám Török (Chairman) / University of Pannonia; Budapest University of Technology and Economics
  • Edina Berlinger / Corvinus University of Budapest, Department of Finance
  • Beáta Farkas / Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, University of Szeged
  • Péter Halmai / Budapest University of Technology and Economics; National University of Public Service
  • István Kónya / Institute of Economics Centre for Regional and Economic Studies, University of Pécs
  • János Köllő / Institute of Economics Centre for Regional and Economic Studies
  • István Magas / Corvinus University of Budapest, Department of World Economy; University of Physical Education, Department. of Sports and Decision Sciences
 

Advisory Board

  • Ǻslund, Anders, Institute of International Economics, Washington (USA)
  • Kolodko, Grzegorz, Kozminski University, Warsaw (Poland)
  • Mau, Vladimir, Academy of National Economy (Russia)
  • Messerlin, Patrick A, Groupe d’Economie Mondiale (France)
  • Saul Estrin, London School of Economics (UK)
  • Wagener, Hans-Jürgen, Europa Universität Viadrina (Germany)

Corvinus University of Budapest
Department of Economics
Fővám tér 8 Budapest, H-1093, Hungary

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2020  
Total Cites 275
WoS
Journal
Impact Factor
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Rank by Economics 325/377 (Q4)
Impact Factor  
Impact Factor 0,534
without
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Impact Factor
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Rank by Journal  Economics 347/549 (Q3)
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Citable 37
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Total 0
Reviews
Scimago 13
H-index
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Scopus 225/166=1,4
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2019  
Total Cites
WoS
212
Impact Factor 0,914
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without
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5 Year
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Immediacy
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Cited
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214/165=1,3
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Acta Oeconomica
Language English
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1966
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2021 Volume 71
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ISSN 0001-6373 (Print)
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