The series of adverse shocks of both economic and political character that Europe has suffered since 2008, the last of them coming from the Brexit referendum, revealed numerous institutional gaps and asymmetries in the EU integration architecture. They originate from the voluntary nature of the EU project and the necessity to obtain unanimous approval of all member states to take new integration steps. To increase the resilience of the EU project against current and future shocks, its major institutional gaps and asymmetries should be addressed as quickly as possible. In this paper, we use the theory of fiscal federalism and subsidiarity principle to set the agenda of the EU reform. This includes the identification of areas such as completing the EMU and Schengen projects, foreign, security, and defence policies, environmental and climate change policies where further integration can offer substantial returns to scale and better provisions of global and pan-European public goods. On the other hand, there are also areas such as agriculture policy, products, services and labour standards, and fiscal surveillance rules, where deregulation in favour of market forces could ease business environment and make EU regulations less bureaucratic. Developing integration beyond the traditional economic sphere will also have an impact on the size of the EU budget, balance of power between the EU governing bodies (a bigger role of the European Parliament) and the democratic legitimacy of the EU project.
Adebahr, C. (2016): A Flexible Europe after the Brexit Vote. Carnegie Europe, Carnegie Europe, Brussels, September 1, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=64447
Balcerowicz, L. (2014): Euro Imbalances and Adjustment: A Comparative Analysis. Cato Journal, 34(3) (Fall), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2014/9/cj34n3-1.pdf
Berglof, E. – Eichengreen, B. – Roland, G. – Tabellini, G. – Wyplosz, C. (2003): Built to Last: A Political Architecture for Europe. Monitoring European Integration, vol. 12, London, Center for Economic Policy Research.
Bofinger, P. – Soros, G. (2011): Only Way to Stop the Run on Eurozone Debt. Financial Times, November 21, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4f29ab54-1431-11e1-85c7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1gRCoxjhP
Bordo, M. D. – Markiewicz, A. – Jonung L. (2011): A Fiscal Union for the Euro: Some Lessons from History. NBER Working Paper, No. 17380, September, http://www.nber.org/papers/w17380.pdf
Briani, V. (2013): Armaments Duplication in Europe: A Quantitative Assessment. CEPS Policy Brief, No. 297, July 16, https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/PB%20297%20Briani%20Duplication% 20in%20EU%20armed%20forces%20-.pdf
Bureau, J. C. (2012): Where Is the Common Agricultural Policy Heading? Intereconomics, 47(6): 316–321, November/December, http://archive.intereconomics.eu/year/2012/6/the-commonagricultural-policy-after-2013/
Cohen, B. (2008): Monetary Unions. In: Whaples, R. (ed.): EH.Net Encyclopedia, February 10, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/monetary-unions/
Cottarelli, C. (2012a): European Fiscal Union: A Vision for the Long Run. Presentation at the Gerzensee Conference, November 1–2, IMF Fiscal Affairs Department, https://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2012/110112.htm
Cottarelli, C. (2012b): Fiscal Federations: Lessons for the Design of a European Fiscal Union. Presentation for the ECB–IMF Conference in Frankfurt, December 13, IMF Fiscal Affairs Department, https://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2012/121312.htm
Dabrowski, M. (2015a): Greece: from Default to Grexit? Bruegel blog, June 28, http://bruegel. org/2015/06/greece-from-default-to-grexit/
Dabrowski, M. (2015b): Monetary Union and Fiscal and Macroeconomic Governance. European Economy Discussion Paper, No. 013, September, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/eedp/pdf/dp013_en.pdf
Darvas, Zs. – Wolff, G. (2015): Choices after the Greferendum. Bruegel blog, July 6, http://bruegel. org/2015/07/choices-after-the-greferendum/
De Grauwe, P. (2006): On Monetary and Political Union. CESifo Forum, No. 4/2006, http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/forum4-06-focus1.pdf
De Grauwe, P. (2013): Pool Debt, or Face Dangerous Upheavals across Europe. Europe’s World, Spring, http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/22076/language/en-US/Default.aspx
De Grauwe, P. (2016): Why the European Union will Benefit from Brexit. Ivory Tower, February 22, http://escoriallaan.blogspot.be/2016/02/why-european-union-will-benefit-from.html
Delpla, J. – Von Weizsaecker, J. (2010): The Blue Bond Proposal. Bruegel Policy Brief, 2010/3, May.
Deo, S. – Donovan, P. – Hatheway, L. (2011): A Brief History of Break-ups. UBS Research: Global Economic Perspectives, October 11, www.ubs.com/economics
Draghi, M. (2015): Stability and Prosperity in Monetary Union. Project Syndicate, January 2, http://www.project-syndicate.org/print/ecb-eurozone-economic-union-by-mario-draghi-2015-1#
European Commission (2012): A Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine EMU. Launching a European Debate. Communication from the European Commission, COM (2012) 777, November 28, http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-2014/president/news/archives/2012/11/pdf/blueprint_en.pdf
European Commission (2015): Commission Work Programme 2016: No Time for Business as Usual. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2015) 610 final, Strasbourg, October 27, http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/cwp_2016_en.pdf
European Commission (2016): EU–Turkey Agreement: Questions and Answers. European Commission, Press Release Database, March 19, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-963_en.htm
Eyraud, L. – Gomez Sirera, R. (2014): Constraints on Sub National Fiscal Policy. In: Cottarelli, C. – Guerguil, M. (eds): Designing a European Fiscal Union: Lessons from the Experience of Thirteen Federations. London: Routledge.
Feldstein, M. (1997): EMU and International Conflict. Foreign Affairs, 76(6): 60–76, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/1997-11-01/emu-and-international-conflict
Feldstein, M. (2012): The Failure of the Euro. Foreign Affairs, January/February, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2011-12-13/failure-euro
Frieden, J. (2016): Lessons for the Euro from Early US Monetary and Financial History. Bruegel Essay and Lecture Series, May 25, http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/essay_frieden_may16.pdf
Fuest, C. – Peichl, A. (2012): European Fiscal Union: What Is It? Does It Work? And Are There Really ‘No Alternatives’? IZA Policy Paper, No. 39, March, http://ftp.iza.org/pp39.pdf
Grabbe, H. – Lehne, S. (2016): How to Build a More Flexible EU After Brexit? Carnegie Europe, Brussels, September 8, http://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/09/08/how-to-build-more-flexible-euafter-brexit/j531
Gros, D. (2013): Banking Union instead of Fiscal Union? In: Allen, F. – Carletti, E. – Gray, J. (eds): Political, Fiscal and Banking Union. European University Institute, Florence –Wharton Financial Institutions Center University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, US.
Gros, D. (2015): Schengen and European Security. Project Syndicate, December 10, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/schengen-open-borders-help-security-by-daniel-gros-2015-12
Heinen, N. (2011): EU Net Contributor or Net Recipient. Just a Matter of Your Standpoint? Deutsche Bank Research, http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000273546.pdf
Henning, C. R. – Kessler, M. (2012): Fiscal Federalism: US History for Architects of Europe’s Fiscal Union. Bruegel Essay and Lecture Series, January 10, http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/imported/publications/essay_fiscfed_web_01.pdf
Issing, O. (2013): The Case for Political Union Isn’t Convincing. Europe’s World, Summer, http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/ArticleView/ArticleID/22139/language/en-US/Default.aspx
Juncker, J-C. et al. (2015): Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union. European Commission, June 22, http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/economic-monetary-union/docs/5-presidentsreport_en.pdf
Kartnitschnig, M. – Hirst, N. (2016): A Long, Costly and Messy Divorce. Politico, March 2, http://www.politico.eu/article/brexit-eu-divorce-uk-cameron/
Krugman, P. (2012a): European Crisis Realities. The New York Times, February 25, http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/european-crisis-realities/
Krugman, P. (2012b): Europe’s Austerity Madness. The New York Times, September 27, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/opinion/krugman-europes-austerity-madness.html?_r=0
Krugman, P. (2013): Austerity Europe. The New York Times, February 23, http://krugman.blogs. nytimes.com/2013/02/23/austerity-europe-2/
Layard, R. (2012): The Tragic Error of Excessive Austerity. VoxEU.org, July 6, http://voxeu.org/vox-talks/tragic-error-excessive-austerity
Marzinotto, B. – Sapir, A. – Wolff, G. (2011): What Kind of Fiscal Union? Bruegel Policy Brief, No. 2011/6, November, http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/imported/publications/111124_pb_2011-06_.pdf
McKinnon, R. (1963): Optimum Currency Areas. American Economic Review, 53(4): 717–725.
Mortensen, J. (2004): Economic Policy Coordination in EMU: What Role for the SGP? CEPS Working Document, No. 202, June, https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/book/1127.pdf
Mota, P. R. – Costa Fernandes, A. L. – Nicolescu, A. G. (2015): The Recent Sovereign Debt Crisis in the Eurozone: A Matter of Fundamentals? Acta Oeconomica, 65(1): 1–25.
Mundell, R. (1961): A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas. American Economic Review, 51(4): 657–665.
Oates, W. E. (1999): An Essay on Fiscal Federalism. Journal of Economic Literature, 37(3): 1120–1149.
OECD (2007): OECD Economic Surveys: European Union. 2007/11, September.
Solana, J. (2016): European Defense Integration Now. Project Syndicate, September 20, https://www.project-syndicate.org/print/european-defense-integration-now-by-javier-solana-2016-09
Soros, G. (2012): Germany’s Reticence to Agree Threatens European Stability. Financial Times, June 24, http://www.georgesoros.com/articles-essays/entry/germanys_reticence_to_agree_threatens_european_stability/
Swidlicki, P. – Kullmann, A. – Persson, M. (2012): Seizing the Moment: Aligning the EU Budget with Europe’s Economic Needs. Open Europe, June, http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Content/Documents/Pdfs/2012EUbudget.pdf
Vimont, P. (2016): Migration in Europe: Bridging the Solidarity Gap. Carnegie Europe, Brussels, September 12, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Vimont_Migration_fulltext.pdf
Warleigh, A. (2002): Flexible Integration: Which Model for the European Union? London –New York: Sheffield Academic Press.
Wolff, G. B. (2012): A Budget Capacity for Europe’s Monetary Union. Bruegel Policy Contribution, No. 2012/22, December, http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/imported/publications/pc_2012_22_EA_budget_final.pdf
Wolff, G. B. (2016): The Economic Consequences of Schengen. Bruegel blog, February 2, http://bruegel.org/2016/02/the-economic-consequences-of-schengen/
Wyplosz, C. (2007): Has Europe Lost Its Heart? In: Åslund, A. – Dabrowski, M. (eds): Europe After Enlargement. Cambridge University Press, pp. 6–28.
Wyplosz, C. (2013): Europe’s Quest for Fiscal Discipline. Economic Papers, No. 498, European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, April http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/2013/pdf/ecp498_en.pdf
Wyplosz, C. (2015): The Centralization–Decentralization Issue. European Economy Discussion Paper, No. 014, September, ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/eedp/pdf/dp014_en.pdf