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  • 1 Department of Comparative Studies, Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw, Poland
  • | 2 Department of Institutional Economics, University of Lodz, 41/43 Rewolucji 1905 St., 90-214, Lodz, Poland
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Abstract

In our paper we use an institutional perspective to define the concept of the quality of remuneration policy. Traditional perspective focuses on pay-per-performance relationship between top executives' remuneration and companies' performance. This study is based on the assumption that the acquisition of normatively defined compensation practices and structures is more important for the successful organization than the practices which enhance efficiency defined on the basis of input (compensation) – output (company's performance) relationship. We examine the relationship between the quality of executive remuneration policy and corporate governance standards in banks with a controlling blockholder. Based on the sample of a hand-collected data on corporate governance characteristics, executive remuneration, and financial results of all public banks in Poland from 2005 to 2015, we find that the effective implementation of sound corporate governance practices should be rooted in the form of obligatory normative acts. Consistent with other studies we find a positive and statistically significant relationship between the corporate governance measures and the quality of remuneration policy. In particular, our study shows the significant role of two institutional factors positively determining the efficiency of incentive contracts: remuneration committees and institutional ownership. We also find that the banks controlled by foreign corporations, especially the US–UK–Ireland financial institutions, have a significantly more effective compensation policy than the banks controlled by domestic investors.

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Senior editors

Editor(s)-in-Chief: Prof. Dr. Mihályi, Péter

Editor(s): Ványai, Judit

Editorial Board

  • Ádám Török (Chairman) / University of Pannonia; Budapest University of Technology and Economics
  • Edina Berlinger / Corvinus University of Budapest, Department of Finance
  • Beáta Farkas / Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, University of Szeged
  • Péter Halmai / Budapest University of Technology and Economics; National University of Public Service
  • István Kónya / Institute of Economics Centre for Regional and Economic Studies, University of Pécs
  • János Köllő / Institute of Economics Centre for Regional and Economic Studies
  • István Magas / Corvinus University of Budapest, Department of World Economy; University of Physical Education, Department. of Sports and Decision Sciences
 

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  • Ǻslund, Anders, Institute of International Economics, Washington (USA)
  • Kolodko, Grzegorz, Kozminski University, Warsaw (Poland)
  • Mau, Vladimir, Academy of National Economy (Russia)
  • Messerlin, Patrick A, Groupe d’Economie Mondiale (France)
  • Saul Estrin, London School of Economics (UK)
  • Wagener, Hans-Jürgen, Europa Universität Viadrina (Germany)

Corvinus University of Budapest
Department of Economics
Fővám tér 8 Budapest, H-1093, Hungary

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2020  
Total Cites 275
WoS
Journal
Impact Factor
0,875
Rank by Economics 325/377 (Q4)
Impact Factor  
Impact Factor 0,534
without
Journal Self Cites
5 Year 0,500
Impact Factor
Journal  0,38
Citation Indicator  
Rank by Journal  Economics 347/549 (Q3)
Citation Indicator   
Citable 37
Items
Total 37
Articles
Total 0
Reviews
Scimago 13
H-index
Scimago 0,292
Journal Rank
Scimago Economics and Econometrics Q3
Quartile Score  
Scopus 225/166=1,4
Scite Score  
Scopus Economics and Econometrics 392/661 (Q3)
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Scopus 0,668
SNIP  
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2019  
Total Cites
WoS
212
Impact Factor 0,914
Impact Factor
without
Journal Self Cites
0,728
5 Year
Impact Factor
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Immediacy
Index
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Citable
Items
45
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Articles
45
Total
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0
Cited
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Citing
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in
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Normalized
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Scimago
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Scimago
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Scopus
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214/165=1,3
Scopus
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Economics and Econometrics 355/637 (Q3)
Scopus
SNIP
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Acta Oeconomica
Language English
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1966
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2021 Volume 71
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