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  • 1 Center for Social and Economic Research, Al. Jana Pawła II 61b, Warsaw, Poland
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Abstract

Despite significant advances in economic literature on the relationship between graft and economic growth, the consensus in nowhere in sight. The current paper enriches the extant literature on the subject by: 1) extending econometric techniques in an attempt to quantify and model institutional development; and 2) providing novel results on the dynamics between non-standardised and standardised institutional metrics. Utilising a new dataset compiled for 423 publicly quoted Czech, non-financial companies with macroeconomic and institutional metrics, we fashion a dynamic model approximating the interactions between the country's institutional development and firm profits as well as examining the relationship between the Czech corruption and the national institutional framework in the years of 2007–2016. The economic property rights appear to contribute to firm accounting profits- and cash flow-based profitability metrics. As regards the anti-corruption policies, the study's outcomes indicate that improvement in economic property rights could have propelled the positive impact of lax anti-corruption government action and inefficient judiciary on firm profits.

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Senior editors

Editor(s)-in-Chief: Prof. Dr. Mihályi, Péter

Editor(s): Ványai, Judit

Editorial Board

  • Ádám Török (Chairman) / University of Pannonia; Budapest University of Technology and Economics
  • Edina Berlinger / Corvinus University of Budapest, Department of Finance
  • Péter Halmai / Budapest University of Technology and Economics; National University of Public Service
  • István Kónya / Institute of Economics Centre for Regional and Economic Studies, University of Pécs
  • János Köllő / Institute of Economics Centre for Regional and Economic Studies
  • István Magas / Corvinus University of Budapest, Department of World Economy; University of Physical Education, Department. of Sports and Decision Sciences
 

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  • Ǻslund, Anders, Institute of International Economics, Washington (USA)
  • Kolodko, Grzegorz, Kozminski University, Warsaw (Poland)
  • Mau, Vladimir, Academy of National Economy (Russia)
  • Messerlin, Patrick A, Groupe d’Economie Mondiale (France)
  • Saul Estrin, London School of Economics (UK)
  • Wagener, Hans-Jürgen, Europa Universität Viadrina (Germany)

Corvinus University of Budapest
Department of Economics
Fővám tér 8 Budapest, H-1093, Hungary

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2020  
Total Cites 275
WoS
Journal
Impact Factor
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Rank by Economics 325/377 (Q4)
Impact Factor  
Impact Factor 0,534
without
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Impact Factor
Journal  0,38
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Rank by Journal  Economics 347/549 (Q3)
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Citable 37
Items
Total 37
Articles
Total 0
Reviews
Scimago 13
H-index
Scimago 0,292
Journal Rank
Scimago Economics and Econometrics Q3
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Scopus 225/166=1,4
Scite Score  
Scopus Economics and Econometrics 392/661 (Q3)
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2019  
Total Cites
WoS
212
Impact Factor 0,914
Impact Factor
without
Journal Self Cites
0,728
5 Year
Impact Factor
0,650
Immediacy
Index
0,156
Citable
Items
45
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Articles
45
Total
Reviews
0
Cited
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Citing
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Scimago
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Scopus
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214/165=1,3
Scopus
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Economics and Econometrics 355/637 (Q3)
Scopus
SNIP
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Acta Oeconomica
Language English
Size B5
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1966
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2021 Volume 71
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Founder Magyar Tudományos Akadémia
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ISSN 0001-6373 (Print)
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