While informal relations between economic and political actors are prevalent in post-communist economies, proper tools for their quantitative measurement are lacking. This paper is a starting point for thinking about this issue. Relying on previous research (Magyar – Madlovics 2020), we elaborate the concept of ‘relational economy,’ and discuss the problem of measuring its peculiar phenomena by existing direct and indirect data. Towards a set of indices for relational economy, we consider the use of proxies in three ways: (1) a radar chart composed of specific company data; (2) ‘moments of truth’ when property movements reveal an actor's de facto ownership status; and (3) ‘moments of truth’ when adoption to or exclusion from the informal patronal network is accompanied by a significant change in financial situation. Illustrations to each of the three methods are provided from the case of Hungary after 2010.
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