Journal of Evolutionary Psychology
Volume/Issue:
Volume 5: Issue 1
Critical points in current theory of conformist social learning
Authors:
K. Eriksson Mälardalen University, Sweden

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M. Enquist Stockholm University, Sweden

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S. Ghirlanda University of Bologna, Italy
Stockholm University, Sweden

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Pages:
67–87
Online Publication Date:
01 Mar 2007
Publication Date:
01 Mar 2007
Article Category:
Research Article
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1556/jep.2007.1009
Keywords:
social learning; conformist transmission; gene-culture coevolution
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Abstract

Existing mathematical models suggest that gene-culture coevolution favours a conformist bias in social learning, that is, a psychological mechanism to preferentially acquire the most common cultural variants. Here we show that this conclusion relies on specific assumptions that seem unrealistic, such as that all cultural variants are known to every individual. We present two models that remove these assumptions, showing that: 1) the rate of cultural evolution and the adaptive value of culture are higher in a population in which individuals pick cultural variants at random (Random strategy) rather than picking the most common one (Conform strategy); 2) in genetic evolution the Random strategy out-competes the Conform strategy, unless cultural evolution is very slow, in which case Conform and Random usually coexist; 3) the individuals’ ability to evaluate cultural variants is a more important determinant of the adaptive value of culture than frequency-based choice strategies. We also review existing empirical literature and game-theoretic arguments for conformity, finding neither strong empirical evidence nor a strong theoretical expectation for a general conformist bias. Our own vignette study of social learning shows that people may indeed use different social learning strategies depending on context.

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Cover Journal of Evolutionary Psychology
Journal of Evolutionary Psychology
Print ISSN:
1789-2082
Online ISSN:
2060-5587

Journal of Evolutionary Psychology 
Language English
Size  
Year of
Foundation		 2007 (2003)
Publication
Programme		 changed title
Volumes
per Year		  
Issues
per Year		  
Founder Akadémiai Kiadó
Founder's
Address		 H-1117 Budapest, Hungary 1516 Budapest, PO Box 245.
Publisher Akadémiai Kiadó
Publisher's
Address		 H-1117 Budapest, Hungary 1516 Budapest, PO Box 245.
Responsible
Publisher		 Chief Executive Officer, Akadémiai Kiadó
ISSN 1789-2082 (Print)
ISSN 2060-5587 (Online)

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