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  • 1 BUESPA, Department of Public Service H-1093 Budapest, Fővám tér 8, Hungary
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The article is based on Aaron Wildavsky's famous model of culture to interpret responsibility. In this model (1) fatalism leads to universal irresponsibility; (2) an individualistic culture values personal responsibility; (3) hierarchical cultures produce hierarchical responsibility; and (4) egalitarian culture generates collective responsibility. The author argues that the only acceptable form of responsibility is the personal one. A higher autonomy of public servants implies a greater degree of accountability and also responsibility. This new type of personal responsibility does not separate public servants into two categories: politicians with responsibility and bureaucrats without it. Personal responsibility presupposes persons who are able to make decisions and can find the balance between their self-interest and a public interest.

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