Society and Economy
Volume/Issue:
Volume 35: Issue 4
Progressive managerial bonuses in a spatial Bertrand duopoly
Authors:
Barna Bakó Corvinus University of Budapest MTA-BCE “Lendület” Strategic Interactions Research Group Budapest Hungary

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and
András Kálecz-Simon Corvinus University of Budapest Budapest Hungary

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Pages:
531–538
Online Publication Date:
15 Mar 2013
Publication Date:
01 Dec 2013
Article Category:
Research Article
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1556/socec.2013.0004
Keywords:
strategic delegation; managerial incentives; D21; L13
Restricted access

The relationship of managerial bonuses and profit maximization is interesting both from an economic and a managerial viewpoint. Our contribution to this literature is showing that progressive managerial bonuses can increase profits in a spatial Bertrand competition, and furthermore they can help collusion.

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Cover Society and Economy
Society and Economy
Print ISSN:
1588-9726
Online ISSN:
1588-970X

Editor-in-chief: Balázs SZENT-IVÁNYI

Co-Editors:

  • Péter MARTON (Corvinus University, Budapest)
  • István KÓNYA (Corvinus University, Budapest)
  • László SAJTOS (The University of Auckland)
  • Gábor VIRÁG (University of Toronto)

Associate Editors:

  • Tamás BOKOR (Corvinus University, Budapest)
  • Sándor BOZÓKI (Corvinus University Budapest)
  • Bronwyn HOWELL (Victoria University of Wellington)
  • Hintea CALIN (Babeş-Bolyai University)
  • Christian EWERHART (University of Zürich)
  • Clemens PUPPE (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology)
  • Zsolt DARVAS (Bruegel)
  • Szabina FODOR (Corvinus University Budapest)
  • Sándor GALLAI (Corvinus University Budapest)
  • László GULÁCSI (Óbuda University)
  • Dóra GYŐRFFY (Corvinus University Budapest)
  • György HAJNAL (Corvinus University Budapest)
  • Krisztina KOLOS (Corvinus University Budapest)
  • Alexandra KÖVES (Corvinus University Budapest)
  • Lacina LUBOR (Mendel University in Brno)
  • Péter MEDVEGYEV (Corvinus University Budapest)
  • Miroslava RAJČÁNIOVÁ (Slovak University of Agriculture)
  • Ariel MITEV (Corvinus University Budapest)
  • Éva PERPÉK (Corvinus University Budapest)
  • Petrus H. POTGIETER (University of South Africa)
  • Sergei IZMALKOV (MIT Economics)
  • Anita SZŰCS (Corvinus University Budapest)
  • László TRAUTMANN (Corvinus University Budapest)
  • Trenton G. SMITH (University of Otago)
  • György WALTER (Corvinus University Budapest)
  • Zoltán CSEDŐ (Corvinus University Budapest)
  • Zoltán LŐRINCZI (Ministry of Human Capacities)

Society and Economy
Institute: Corvinus University of Budapest
Address: Fővám tér 8. H-1093 Budapest, Hungary
Phone: (36 1) 482 5406
E-mail: balazs.szentivanyi@uni-corvinus.hu

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2023  
Scopus  
CiteScore 1.5
CiteScore rank Q2 (Sociology and Political Science)
SNIP 0.496
Scimago  
SJR index 0.243
SJR Q rank Q3

Society and Economy
Publication Model Gold Open Access
Submission Fee none
Article Processing Charge 900 EUR/article with enough waivers
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World Bank Low-income economies: 100%
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Society and Economy
Language English
Size B5
Year of
Foundation		 1972
Volumes
per Year		 1
Issues
per Year		 4
Founder Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem
Founder's
Address		 H-1093 Budapest, Hungary Fővám tér 8.
Publisher Akadémiai Kiadó
Publisher's
Address		 H-1117 Budapest, Hungary 1516 Budapest, PO Box 245.
Responsible
Publisher		 Chief Executive Officer, Akadémiai Kiadó
ISSN 1588-9726 (Print)
ISSN 1588-970X (Online)

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