This paper offers a few remarks on the so-called heterodoxy commentaries of recent times (e.g. Bod 2013, Csaba 2011). In accordance with the growing popularity of unusual economic policy actions, a set of “tools” is emerging that aims to exert its effects breaking with instrumental actions. Outlining a special framework of the history of mainstream economics, it will be argued that economic policy only gradually has become capable of applying this system. In our view, both the emergence of symbolic economic policies mentioned above and the rise of heterodoxy are on the same level, since certain governments can only operate through giving signals. Although it is not the time to formulate ultimate and eternal generalised statements, it may perhaps be stated that symbolic economic policies can make some room for manoeuvring available as a last resort. In other words, the possibility of a certain kind of economic policy “tools” can be derived from theoretical considerations, and this set has become highlighted recently by some constraining changes in the macroeconomic environment. Our theoretical framework will be filled sporadically with some episodes from the last few years of the economic policy of Hungary.
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