Search Results

You are looking at 11 - 20 of 46 items for

  • Author or Editor: Csaba Varga x
  • Refine by Access: All Content x
Clear All Modify Search

Megvilágítandó különbség áll fenn a jogi néprajz és a jogi antropológia között, továbbá az utóbbi és a jogi etnológia s a jogi pluralizmus, valamint a bennszülött jogok kutatása közt. Az első három tárgya alapjában a nem jogi diszciplínák jogi vonatkozásaiból__

Restricted access

Surveying the ways—along with the whys and hows—of connecting law and philosophising, as contrasted to the appearances of modern formal law, it is concluded that in the final analysis law is a façon de parler—a specific communication, or game carried out in an open scene—, an actual event, if one played by humans practicing whilst simultaneously referencing it. The contemporary outcome of reflection upon its developments is (1) the reduction of legal philosophising to discourse-reconstruction, in terms of which instead of the issue of “what is it?”, “all that notwithstanding: how can it be achieved?” is usually raised; (2) the unresolved enigma of natural law, calling for axiology to define at least some foundational standards as stepping stones (albeit without a claim that any statement has genuinely concluded from them or been subordinated to them, as in the classical era when natural law and positive law were at odds); and (3) positive law without legal positivism, according to which a new synthesis and correlation amongst humans’ natural, societal and intellectual worlds is expected to be reached. At the same time, flourishing at the peripheries, a genuine foundation is coming to the fore, in order to suitably respond to global challenges.

Full access

A diktatúra utáni átmenetnek két modellje alakult ki: totális legyőzetés katonai ellenőrzéssel, melynek során a múlt kontinuitását megtörik, hogy az eddig folytatott gyakorlat újraszerveződését megakadályozzák, miközben a társadalomnak a demokráciára történő újraneveléséről intézményes formában gondoskodnak (ez történt a II. világháború után), vagy bizonyos időponttól kezdve egyszerűen egy addigra már teljes fegyverzetében kiépített jogállamiságnak a puszta kinyilvánításával és könyörtelen kikényszerítésével járnak el (mint a kommunizmus bukása után újraépülő államokban). Felfogását illetően a jogállamiság szintén kétféle lehet: mai nyugat-európai–atlanti – kolonizáló – változatában kategorikusan abszolút s kimerítően kodifikált követelmények halmaza (azaz absztrakt-univerzalizáló) ez, miközben teoretikus rekonstrukciója szerint más nem lehet, mint pusztán egy tiszteletreméltó eszmény, amelyet adott formájában/formáiban valamikor valahol valakik saját átérzett, konkrét történelmi kihívásaikra válaszul önnön múltbéli feltételeik közt magukból kiszenvedtek (tehát olyan, aminek történelmi hic et nunc partikularitását eleve vállalták). Lényegi üzenete a jogállamiságnak eszerint az egymással ütköző értékek közt az éthoszának megfelelő egyensúlyozás művészete és mestersége; olyan törekvés, amely sohasem zárul le és ér véget. Örökös tanulási folyamatot feltételez, mert új kihívások folyvást felmerülve folyvást új válaszokat kényszerítenek ki, új összefüggésekben mutatva a jogállami igény kiegyenlítő arculatát. Következésképpen a jogátvitelek vezérlésében szintén különbség teendő egyfelől a cirkuszi idomár, másfelől a kertész magatartásmintája között: az egyiknek egyetlen célja, hogy saját külső akaratot kényszerítsen rá tárgyára, míg a másik csakis tárgya eredendő természetére ügyel empátiával, hogy segítse az abban rejlő tulajdonságok jó irányban való kibontakozását. A globalizáló kényszer irányok jellemzője, hogy a múlt jognihilizálását saját jogimportja fetisizálásával váltja fel. Ez destruktív mind önmagában, mind továbbgyűrűző hatásában. Merthogy növeli a célországoknak merő mintakövetéstől való függőségérzetét, egyúttal rombolva saját felelősségvállalásukat, ami nélkül sikeres újraépülés aligha képzelhető.

Restricted access

Taxonomy of law and legal mapping

Patterns and limits of the classification of legal systems

Acta Juridica Hungarica
Author: Csaba Varga

Attempts from the 17th century onward anticipate the 20th-century mood of legal mapping. They classify legal arrangements by languages, races and genetic roots, then by their ideologies and technicalities. Later on they do so by separating the Western from the Soviet/socialist law, by their correspondence to underlying general cultures, as well as according to legal families. It is the insufficiency of resorting to dichotomy contrasting the Western “Us” to any differing Eastern “Others” that has recently resulted in typologising in terms of the dynamism and directions of legal development in the duality of professionalism and traditionalism or in the cross-reference of what is established/stable and unestablished/instable, and of what is drawn from Western and non-Western sources. Material taxonomy cannot be accomplished in law through genuine class-concepts. Characterisation through concepts of order can be achieved at most. In want of any meta-system, cultures formed to idealise and hypostasise ideas of order by independent principles can provide no common basis of division for law. Accordingly, only some division to major and minor sets and subsets can be achieved. The own arrangement will be better cognised by other schemes’ understanding. The gradual transcendence of rule-fetishism by identifying law with some specific culture may prevent the coming “clash of civilizations” from reaching aggressive self-assertion and care for the sustainability of the laws’ diversity.

Full access

Does the legal system have a structure (according to sources and branches of law, general and special parts of codes, principles, rules and exceptions in regulation, etc.), or structuring is taken into it from the outside? And providing that it is taken, whoever is taking it? For neither principles, nor rules are given in themselves, separated from each other in a way classified in terms of the law's taxonomic systemicity as bearing their own separate meaning. All this can be but the result of a constitutive act. Based upon legal doctrines, it is judicial practice that builds different propositions into either principles or rules. Or, it is not logic itself that labels anything as a structuring element identified as either principle or rule but we, who ponder the mode of how to construct a sequence of distinction, deduction and justification conclusive enough to convince those controlling the issue we propose in the procedural hierarchy. Therefore the structuring features in law are construed and construing, constructed and constructing at the same time, for they do not and cannot exist in and by themselves at all.

Full access

Anglo-American and French, as well as German, Spanish and Hungarian variations to “Law and Literature” are surveyed for that as to the nature of the discipline some conclusions can be formulated. Accordingly, “Law and Literature” recalls that which is infinite in fallibility and which is not transparent in its simplicity, that is, the situation confronted that we may not avoid deciding about despite the fact that we may not get to a final understanding. What is said thereby is that “Law and Literature” is just a life-substitute. Like an artificial ersatz, it helps one to see out from what he/she cannot surpass. What it is all about is perhaps not simply bridging the gap between the law’s proposition and the case of law, with unavoidable tensions confronting the general and the individual, as well as the abstract and the concrete. Instead, it is more about live meditation, professional methodicalness stepped back in order to gain further perspectives and renewed reflection from a distance, so that the underlying reason for the legal (and especially judicial) profession can be recurrently rethought. In a fictional form, literature is the symbol and synonym of reflected life, a field where genuine human fates can be represented. Thereby, at the same time it is a substitute for theology, rooted in earthly existence as a supply to foster feeling kinds of, or substitutes to, transcendence.

Full access

The fate of Marxism in the Soviet Union and the people’s democracies as the former’s extension owing to post-WWII occupation was from the beginning sealed by Bolshevism, that is, the politico-ideological domination and use of the scholarly domain as well, made to self-close in a merely justificatory role. There may have been attempts at opening, even if only conceivable within—i.e. preserving at the same time—this framework function. In the present conspectus, the limiting positions are occupied by the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, completed by after-1968 Czechoslovakia, as well as Yugoslavia and pre-1968 Czechoslovakia, representing the substitute-to-religion dogmatic side, exclusively politically motivated in the former and subordinated to a humanising tendency in the latter case, on the one hand, and Poland, dedicated to a purely analytical approach, in which Marxism has simply no relevance, on the other. Hungary, treated in an earlier paper by the author, was in-between, taking Marxism seriously but mostly as a methodology, and thereby able to foster live debates. All that notwithstanding, there has been quite a few progressive moves also in Romania and Bulgaria in this specific academic field. Turning topoi of the discussions were, chronologically but recurrent transubstantiatedly, the exclusivity of Vyshinsky’s socialist normativism, the consequences ensuing from the law’s superstructural nature, the discontinuity vs. continuity of law in historical development, and, in the background, the dilemma of the ontological/epistemological understanding of Marxism, the latter standing for a rigid Leninist reducibility of law to its material substratum as the product of sheer reflection, and the former enabling to develop the law’s relative autonomy as in Lukács’ posthumous ontology. On the final analysis, all these forced paths made a whole region’s efforts to be belated as compared to international developments, the fact notwithstanding those outstanding achievements were born especially on the fields of legal ontology and sociology, as well as the legal methodology and particularly that of the comparison of laws.

Full access

The law’s homogeneity

Challenged by heterogenisation through ethics and economics

Acta Juridica Hungarica
Author: Csaba Varga

The Atlantic civilisation has over the past centuries been composed of two definitely diverging ethoses and social philosophical inspirations, differing also by their very foundations. The contrasts are perhaps most conspicuous today as to be seen in the difference between approaches to life as a struggle and to law as a game within it. No doubt, on the one hand, there prevails the rest of (1) a European Christian tradition, characterised by communal ethos, with provision of rights as counter-balanced by obligations, in which priority is given to the peace of society and a traditional culture of virtues is promoted to both circumvent excesses and acknowledge human rights, with a focus on prevention of and remedy to actual harms. It is such an environment within which homo ludens as a type of the playful human who is at the same time dutiful and carefree-entirely joyful-constitutes a limiting value. If and insofar as struggle appears at all on the scene, it is mostly recognised as a fight for excellence. As a pathologic version, the loneliness of those staying away from participation may lead to psychical disorders which require subconscious re-compensation, the symbolic sanctioning of which was once accomplished by the psycho-analysis. On the other, there has also evolved (2) an Americanised individualistic atomisation of society, expecting order out of chaos, with absolutisation of rights ascribed to individuals, all closed back in loneliness. As an outcome, obligations are circumvented by entitlements, and unrestrained struggle becomes a part of any normal course of life with the deployment of human rights just to neutralise (if not disintegrate) communitycentred standards. “Life is struggle”-the hero of our brave new world enunciates the words as a commonplace with teeth clenched, convinced that life is barely anything but fight against anybody else (as an improved version, hailed as civilisatory advancement as re-actualising-under the pretext of maximising the chances of-the ominous bellum omnium contra omnes, formulated once in early modern England). Starting from the common deployment of some symbolical “cynical acid” in foundation of modern formal law but developing through differentiated ways of how to search for reason and systemicity in law, the conceptual and methodical effect of this very division is shown in the paper within the perspectives for curing malpractice in law and also in the role of ethics in economy.

Full access

Legal theorising

An unrecognised need for practicing the European law

Acta Juridica Hungarica
Author: Csaba Varga

As a legal philosophical overview of the operation of European law, the paper aims at describing the mentality working in it by also answering the query whether the European law itself is to be regarded as the extension of some domestic laws or it offers quite a new and sui generis structure built upon all member states’ laws. In either option, the connection between the European law and the composing national laws recalls the embodiment of post modern clichés, as the former’s actual working (both purposefully and through its by-effects) exerts a destructive impact upon the bounds once erected by the latter’s anchorage in the traditions of legal positivism. In addition, the excellence in efficacious operation of the European law is achieved by transposing the control on its central enactments to autonomous implementation and jurisdiction by its member nations. According to the conclusions of the paper, (1) the (post) positivism as the traditional domestic juristic outlook is inappropriate to any adequate investigation of the reality of European law. As part of the global post modernism itself, the European law stems from a kind of artificial reality construction (as the attempted materialisation of its own virtuality), which is from the outset freed from the captivity of both historical particularities and human experience, i.e., of anything concretely given hic et nunc. At the same time, (2) by its operation the European law dynamises large structures, through which it makes to move that what is chaos itself. For it is the reconstructive human intent solely that may try to arrange its outcome according to some ideal of order posteriorly-without, however, the operation itself (forming its construct and assuring its daily management) striving for anything of order (or ordered state and systemicity). This is the way in which the European law can be an adequate reflection upon the (macro) economic basis to which it forms the superstructure. Accordingly, (3) the whole construct is frameworked (i.e., integrated into one working unit and also mobilised) by an artificially animated dynamism. Concludingly, no national interest can be asserted in it without successful national self-positioning ready to launch it.

Full access