The core of codification is invariably the idea of a system in the law's composition and structuring, doctrinal reflection and conceptual building up, including judicial reference to codal definitions as well. Or, codification is (1) an exclusive body of law (2) implementing unity in its regulatory field (3) with logical coherence and consequentiality. The dream of a common European codification penetrates into the very heart of the law, presupposing the unification of all the intellectuality and underlying approach that has ever distinguished Civil Law and Common Law. The more the advancement of the European unification progresses, the more inverse the assessment of European codification becomes, making us its past trends, values and regulatory techniques reconsidered. That is, as if we on the Continent had not so much become statal national units unified by a sequence of national laws but, being too conceited of our most promising collective heritage within the transitory phase of an infantile disorder, became rather fragmented in national isolation from one another, which now comes eventually to a final end.
After the classical heritage of both Civil Law and Common Law is characterised, their
as professional deontology is reconstructed in parallel with their respective assumptions in theory formation. As to the nature of legal process, the moment of concealment is identified in both types with the final conclusion reached that humans’ individual activity and personal responsibility is hidden in the machinery. Civil Law is defined by rules enacted as the sole embodiment of the law, treated conceptually in a linguistico-logical way so as to be suitable to lead to mechanical application within the range of a meta-level dogmatic system. The interplay between logical subsumption and volitional classificatory subordination is analysed in order to show what legal ascriptivity is and why it ends with the artificial construction of legal force. Accordingly, Civil Law ideology is imbued with analogies as if cognition were at stake, in contrast to Common Law openly undertaking fiction to explain in what manner the judicial deliberation on facts whilst reconstruing the whys and hows of past instances can result in ascertaining what the law has allegedly ever been. The law’s understanding-theorised in the former and pragmatised in the latter case-is part of its applying as an ontic component of the very existence of the complex social phenomenon called law.
A kész szövegátvételben végződő joghatások kérdése globalizálódó korunkban egyre általánosodó jelenséggé válik, miközben tudományos feldolgozása alig tart ezzel lépést. Nemcsak fogalmi kerete, gyakorlati tapasztalatainak levonása, s így mögöttesen megbúvó törvényszerűségei és tanulságai levonása, eszményeinek megfogalmazása hiányzik, de még terminológiája is tisztázatlan. Recepció, octroi, jogexport, jogátvitel, jogkölcsönzés, jogátültetés, jogi segítségnyújtás; diszciplínaként pedig a jog és fejlődés, jog és modernizáció amerikai mozgalmai, a franciáknál pedig a fejlesztés joga - mindezek eltérő vonásokat eltérő nézőpontokból fogalmiasítanak. Kritikai áttekintésük és elemzésük (1. Terminusok) lehetőséget teremt elméleti alapok kidolgozására, a jogi mintaadás ontológiájának vázlatos megrajzolására (2. Technikalitás). A legfontosabb tanulság ebben a jogot szabályként azonosító szűkkeblű pozitivisztikus szemlélet meghaladása egy a jogban tételezés, jogértelmezési közeg, egy egész mögöttes jogi kultúra konglomerátumát láttató totalitás-szemlélet javára. Kétségtelen sikerek mellett ez erőteljes kudarcoktól kísért folyamatként érzékeli az elmúlt fél évszázad joghatásra irányuló törekvéseit (3. Kontrasztok a jogátvitelekben és megítélésükben). Figyelemmel a háttérben megbúvó érdekek makacs önérvényesítésére, sokat jelez már maga a kérdésfeltevés élessége is, hiszen társadalompolitikai magasságokba emelkedve egyre inkább a globalizáció természetére irányul. Nevezetesen, magunkból indulunk-e ki vajon, hogy saját hagyományunkat másokra erőltessük, avagy tudunk-e önzetlenül másokat csupán abban támogatni, hogy önmaguk fejlesztésének útját megleljék? Vagyis narcisztikusan önmagunkra ügyelő hataloméhségünket, avagy segíteni akarásunkat szolgálja-e érdeklődésünk? Végső soron melyik mintát választjuk hát a cirkuszi idomár akaratátviteli mutatványa és a kertésznek mindenkor másra figyelő alázata közül? Hiszen önáldozattal jár az előbbi kísértését elkerülni, ám csakis egy saját tapasztalatok tanulságaihoz visszavezető út lehet hosszú távon sikerre vezető. Mert végül úgyis a célzott rendszer kiválasztó erején múlik minden, miközben a nem-jogi környezet meghatározhatja a jog sorsát. Egy, a természet emberi kultiválásából vett hasonlattal élve, jobb hát lassan megtudni, hogy mit is akar a föld és élő környezete, és utána jöjjön csak a kertész.
By the fall of Communism, also the past of Central and Eastern Europe is mostly hold eradicated, albeit it cannot but steadily survive in sublated mentality. On the field of l aw, this is expressed by the continuity of text-centrism in approach to law, with the law’s application following the law’s letters in a quasi-mechanical way. Consequently, what used to be legal nihilism in the Socialist regime has turned into the law’s textual fetishism in the meantime. This is equal to saying that facing the dilemma of weighing between apparently contradictory ideals within the same Rule of Law, justice has in fact been sacrificed to the certainty in/of the law in the practical working of the judiciary. Especially, constitutional adjudication mostly works for the extension of individual rights while the state as the individuals’ community is usually blocked in responding challenges in an operative manner. Situation in Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Baltic Republics, as well as Croatia is surveyed through a series of case studies in order to show degrees and variations of worsening. Softening the law by activating juridical inventiveness was used to be pressed on the region during her preparation to accession, a practice that has now been counteracted by stiffening hard law anew. In either case, on the last resort, phase-lag of juridical mentality in the region may have been at stake, preserved at the stage what Western Europe could develop into when reconstruction after the end of WWII started. For post-war West’s new joiners in approach and methodology — like (1) natural law considerations; (2) balancing among interests through assessing them in light of general principles and clauses, either of the law or implied by its underlying legal culture; as well as (3) constitutionalisation of issues — have remained mostly esoteric ideas, alien in mass to the region in question. The damage this condition may cause by cumulation is an added burden on the popular receptivity of catch-words heralded, among other ideals, by the Rule of Law.
Since the waning of the world concept offered by classical physics, law is seen as embodied less by material objects any longer than in a specific way of thinking. Consequently, the normativist perspective of legal positivism is also getting replaced by the comprehension of law in context of culture and tradition.In its own context, any of the terms of 'system', 'family' or 'culture' can be applied independently from each other but it is to be noted that 'tradition' is at the same time both a part and a given path of culture. In legal thought, concrete and generalising (abstract) ways of thinking are equally recoursed to, just as types which search for a solution either in the case's terms in its entirety or in the exclusive bounds of the given normative conceptual framework. It is only Western law that has become differentiated out of the rest, when individualism advanced and thinking in term of subjective rights grew into a dominant pattern, contrasted to our primitive (albeit surviving) approach to law which also expects, in addition to external conformity, the realisation of the law's internal ethos based on own initiative. English law, however, has revealed its face only gradually, as it has factual decisions made through an only-processually-arranged laic (jury) process while it has bound the declaration of what the law is to such facts of the cases among which no logical relationship can be established. In Civil Law, the treatment of adjudication as argumentation, and in Common Law, as practical reasoning, led the judicial process into a sphere only smoothly controllable by logic. Jewish and Islamic laws accept contradictory arguments from the outset. As to Indian and Far-Eastern cultures, they reject even the underlying questionto be raised. This way, in legal problem-solving the assessment of the merits of the caseandthe recourse to a reductive procedure can complement one another on the basis of some compromise. Institutionalisation itself is, as it channels the legal problem-solving to givenpaths, a function of a previously formed idea of order, of a given mentality. Our legaltheorising today is built mostly separatedly either on the classification and interpretation of facts or on the re-conventionalisation of the philosophical generalisation of concepts, with little interaction between the two types of approaches and research attitudes. Therefore, in order to encourage debate and commensurability, it is important that notions of law, at least tacitly assumed to substantiate their choices of subject, are clarified.
After the relationship between form and content in art and law is surveyed and the axiomatic approach to systemicity in both philosophy and law of both the classic and modern ages is scrutinised, the want of axiomatisability-in presence of correlations between axiomatism and law notwithstanding-is established. The very nucleus of any axiomatic system is that in some set of building blocks there are few foundation stones from which one given overall building can be built up in one given form and with the inherent necessity of that the operation, in the security of reaching the same end result, can be repeated by any actor at any future time. However, the relationship amongst the constituents of legal systems is not such as to allow to make up their edifice in exclusively one form, only if the procedure is defined and some constituents as foundation stones are designated. For legal systems are truly dynamic systems thoroughly built on substantive interconnections. Therefore they resist- albeit idealise-axiomatisation. In consequence, exclusively the heuristic value of the axiomatic ideal can be fully implemented and scholarly realised in the domain of law.
Lawis characterised by a fundamental gap between its social embeddedness and theapparently formal automatism it operates, which gap is basically bridged by thelaw's ultimate practicality under the guise of its mere logicity. This seemingcontradiction is resolved by judicial decisions as responsible and responsivepractical actions which are to result from the necessary conceptualtransformation(s) of the law's wording in the course of its officialapplication, which does involve a necessary jump in logical derivation. This isto say that on final analysis and inpractical terms, law is what gets actualised through the actual uses of it. Black-box effect such as this is helped by thevariety-and owing to the magical transforming effects-of legal techniques.Eventually, it is legal culture that provides a medium in which legaltechniques can at all be selected and used. On a conceptual plane, one of thefilters is offered by legal dogmatics. This very complex includes dialectics aswell, for there is no motion without counter-motion, therefore, it is notrealistic to pursue any human ambition without some safety valves inserted. Or,regarding, e.g., law, no homogenisationis feasible without some re-heterogenisation at the same time. Paradoxicallyspeaking, while modern formal legal development went in the direction tomechanise the judge, the realisation was also made that law had ever been tooserious an undertaking to be just left alone to the logification by someimpersonally formalistic apparatus. Therefore, simultaneously with the veryfirst act of formalisation, law has ever built in its scheme the possibility ofde-formalisation as well.
A scale of globalisation is witnessed in the present case study as exemplified by (1) the transformation of the role of precedents; (2) the multicultural and multifactorial search for a common solution instead of any law-based administration of justice; (3) dissolving definition by and conclusion from the law in the name of a legal socio-positivist approach; accompanied with (4) some new prerogatives acquired by courts through a) unfolding statutory provisions through principles in judicial actualisation, (b) constitutionalisation of issues, as well as c) the Supreme Court imposing upon the nation as its supreme moral authority. In both cases, the main point is to re-consider the law's normative material in a way somewhat released from nationally positivated self-restriction when searching for a kind of trans-national cultural community. By gradually eliminating the law's substantivity, legal self-identity is mostly preserved in a rather procedural sense.
Megvilágítandó különbség áll fenn a jogi néprajz és a jogi
antropológia között, továbbá az utóbbi és a jogi etnológia s a jogi
pluralizmus, valamint a bennszülött jogok kutatása közt. Az első három tárgya
alapjában a nem jogi diszciplínák jogi vonatkozásaiból__