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- Author or Editor: Wang Yukun x
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Abstract
The adsorption-exchange equilibrium time and the adsorption isotherms of UO2 2+,137Cs,169Yb and HPO4 2− on modified peat have been investigated by batch experiments. The effect of pH on the adsorption-exchange percentage (E) and the distribution coefficients (K d) was also examined. It was found that the adsorption-exchange of UO2 2+ and169Yb on the modified peat was described well by Freundlich isotherm, whereas the adsorption-exchange of137Cs and HPO4 2− on modified peat corresponded to a Langmuir isotherm and the maximum adsorption capacities of the modified peat for137Cs and HPO4 2− ions were 4.4 and 4.1 μg/g respectively. The optimum pH for the adsorption-exchange of UO2 2+,137Cs,169Yb and HPO4 2− on the modified peat was 7.0 at 25°C.
Abstract
Our previous paper reported the effect of acidity and temperature on uranous-uranil isotope exchange reaction in sulphuric acid solution.1 It was found that the half-life of the isotope reactiont 1/2 is around 10 seconds, when the acidity and the temperature of the reaction system are reasonably selected. However, when the uranium isotopes are enriched by ion exchange the single separation factor could be 1.001. Thus, the half-life,t 1/2 is less than one second for potential industrial application.
Abstract
Though tax amnesties (TAs) are considered as a policy tool to increase revenue for governments, they have generated some puzzles. To solve the puzzles of TA we should not ignore the behavioural aspects of delinquent taxpayers. In this paper, we focus on a relatively neglected but important area of the TA literature. Considering that people who participate in tax amnesty policy (TAP) may not honestly report the whole amounts of evaded tax, thus they commit a secondary tax evasion. We indicate that even considering the risk of abstaining from TA and incurring possible uncertainty of tax evasion penalties, participating in a TA provides a higher level of utility for the delinquent taxpayers. Also, due to a secondary tax evasion usually accompanying with TA, we show that during the initial assessment period of a TAP the tax revenue drastically increases and when the assessment period is approaching the tax revenue stably declines and ultimately converges to a fixed value. Furthermore, we show that if delinquent taxpayers participate in the TAP and the penalties are larger than the expected tax revenue of the government, it increases the tax revenue without reducing the welfare of other taxpayers, so as to achieving Pareto improvement.
