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Almost each of the political forces and the great majority of the public saw no alternative to Euro-Atlantic integration, that is, accession to NATO and the EC (after 1992 the EU) when Hungary regained its independence in 1990. Membership in both organizations had a number of internal and external implications too. Budapest had to introduce sweeping reforms in practically all walks of life. Thus, for instance, NATO-membership required the establishment of a parliamentary democracy, a functioning market economy, and the observance of civil and human rights. At the same time, Hungary had to sign so-called basic treaties with three of its neighbors in which it again committed itself to peaceful relations and the renunciation of any attempt to regain territories it had lost to the countries affected after the First and the Second World Wars. EU-membership needed even more extensive restructuring of the various Hungarian institutions from law enforcement through finances to social services. In addition, Budapest expected that one of the major dilemmas of reconciling the so-called “Hungarian-Hungarian” question with the “good neighbor” policy would be settled within the framework of European integration. The expectations on behalf of the two sides have only been partially realized yet. Thus, Hungary consistently spends much less on defense than the required level within the Atlantic Alliance; Budapest has been trying to compensate with a relative prominent presence in foreign missions. As for the EU, the threat of a “second class membership” has not disappeared; in fact, after the beginning of the economic recession in 2008 it has even become a more realistic perspective; in reality, Hungary has had to accept a relative loss of power even in Central and Eastern Europe. However, Hungary has a vested interest in a “Strong Europe” (this was the official slogan of Hungary’s EU-Presidency during the first six months of 2011) in which “more Europe” should not exclude the country’s closer relations with other regions in the world.
: Librairie Plon . Ozanam , Didier 1955 . ‘La disgrâce d’un premier commis: Tercier et l’affaire de l’Esprit (1758–1759).’ Bibliothèque de l’école des chartes 113 : 140 – 170 . Rice , Geoffrey W . 2010 . ‘British Foreign Policy and the Falkland
Határon túli magyar oktatási támogatások 2010 és 2022 között
Hungarian Educational Cross-border Support System between 2010–2022
A tanulmány a határon túli magyar oktatástámogatási rendszert, annak irányait tekinti át a 2010 és 2022 közötti időszakban. A tanulmány célja bemutatni, hogy a vizsgált periódus alatt melyek voltak a határon túli magyar oktatástámogatási prioritások és ezek milyen intézkedésekben, programokban és fejlesztésekben nyilvánultak meg. Vizsgálódásunk alapján arra a következtetésre jutottunk, hogy a határon túli magyar oktatástámogatási rendszer léte és fejlesztése mind anyagilag, mind szimbolikus, kisebbségpolitikai értelemben kiemelt fontosságú a határon túli magyar oktatási intézmények és azok szereplői számára. E támogatási rendszer fejlesztési lehetőségét egy belső és külső monitoringra épülő minőségbiztosítási rendszer kiépítésében látjuk.
– the finding of a fresh formula for the transatlantic alliance. Josep Borell – the EU Foreign Policy Chief – in an interview with Euronews in mid-May 2020, was asked – in view that President Trump does not have confidence in China, does he himself
The Hungarian War of Independence was widely reported in the American press. Kossuth hoped to bring about a fundamental change in U.S. foreign policy: to convince the country that the time came for taking an active role in international affairs. Sixty-six years later, the U.S. came to act exactly along the lines advocated by Kossuth. Ninety years later the Atlantic Charter came to embody the very principles first expressed by the Hungarian leader.
This paper examines the foreign policy of the Galician-Volhynian prince Roman Mstislavich. Roman became the main military ally of the Byzantine Empire in the early 13th century. Byzantium was going through a severe political crisis caused by the Serbian and the Bulgarian uprisings and by the crushing raids of the Cumans. According to Niketas Choniates, the nomads’ aggression could have been stopped only thanks to the aid of the Galician prince Roman. The circumstances and the time of Roman’s campaign in Choniates’ account are the same as in the Russian chronicles reporting the steppe campaigns of the Galician-Volhynian prince.
This study concerns itself with the first Imperial Envoy Gerard Veltwijck (ca. 1500–1555), who negotiated with the Ottoman Sultan Süleymān. Using newly discovered as well as recently published sources, it will focus on the part this diplomat of Charles V played in the negotiations with the Sub-lime Porte and on the considerable problems the French King and his representatives in Istanbul experienced during the talks. The Most Christian King thus became a victim of his ambivalent foreign policy while his alliance with the Sultan experienced a severe crisis. Finally, this study tries to demonstrate the impact of a diplomatic sojourn in the Levant for the envoy, as such a mission was very often followed by a considerable and far from only financial reward.
The formation of the Rouran khaganate was generated by the regional ternary structure in Inner Asia comprising the Song state (in southern China), the semi-nomadic buffer empire Toba Wei (in northern China) and the Rouran imperial confederation (in Outer Mongolia). The khaganate was characterised by an administrative-political system that was typical of the nomadic empires of Eurasia, specifically, a structure of core and periphery, distant exploitation of agrarian societies, two wings and a military hierarchy based on the decimal principle, title of khagan. The foreign policy of the Rouran khaganate was based on the traditional principles of the Inner Asian nomads. Out of several classical strategies concerning the neighbouring agricultural nations (plunder, distant exploitation, tribute, migration with subsequent assimilation), they chose the method of applying distant pressure on Chinese domains, alternating raids with periods of peaceful extortion of rich gifts.
This paper examines the changes that took place in the image of the Ottoman Turks in Hungary during the 19th century. Though the Ottoman attacks in the 15th and 16th centuries destroyed the medieval Kingdom of Hungary and the following 150 years of the Ottoman rule in Hungary had considerable negative consequences, by the end of the 19th century negative sentiments regarding the Turks shifted, and during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 there were enthusiastic pro-Turkish demonstrations in Budapest. The paper analyses the causes of this turn in Hungarian historical thinking and demonstrates, e.g. through the themes of the most popular historical paintings of the 19th century, that more recent anti-Habsburg and anti-Russian sentiments among the Hungarians led to active support for the Turks, if only in a peaceful way, since the foreign policy of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy remained neutral.
Dual-use items, including software and technology, can be used for both civil and military purposes. Export control of such items is an important constituent part of security policies of exporter states. These measures are aimed at avoiding proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.1 The nature of dual-use goods intrigues imposition of control over exporting them to unfriendly countries or those ‘sensitive’ in terms of their ambiguous considerations of foreign policies.2 Some category of goods may be banned for export, whilst others are legitimate products that further technological development and strengthen international economic ties. The aim of the exporter states is to seek balance between safeguarding security objectives whilst not undermining competitiveness of local businesses. The paper explores the EU framework for regulating exports of dual-use goods as well as the EU participation in the international export controls regimes.
