Hungary's intention with both NATO and the European Union was to “anchor” the country institutionally as soon as possible to the West. This institutional anchoring was important because we badly wanted the international investment community to understand that Hungary is part of the western structures, so businessmen have nothing to fear when they come to Hungary to invest or to be part of privatization.
After June 4, 1920 the objective was nevertheless the restoration of Saint Stephen's Hungary. How can such a program be implemented? There are three things that are definitely needed. 1. A relevant political force in the country. 2. An international situation conducive to the aims and a foreign policy that can make the most of it. 3. Hungary's former national minorities should be willing to return into Saint Stephen's empire. 1. The losers of the treaty of Trianon probably supported the recovery of the lost territories. This discontent supported and at the same time stifled the revisionist movement. The leaders of the country too strengthened the illusion that Trianon was a result of the revolutions of 1918 and 1919. 2. No great powers supported the restoration of Saint Stephen's Hungary. The Germans showed the most receptive attitude, but neither the Weimar Republic, nor Hitler's Germany was willing to follow Bismarck's policy, who had considered it important to maintain a strong Hungary. Mussolini - even if he had wanted - could not have a say in this matter. 3. The Compromise of 1867 with the House of Habsburg maintained the Hungarian empire for another fifty years, but its hour struck in 1918. This is despite the fact that in the demise of Hungary the entente powers's intent, which was proved strong by history, was as important as the desire of the national minorities to secede. These questions are fully analysed in the study, which then states: in theory it would have been possible to follow a way different from the actual event, but in fact the tragedy of Hungary in the Second World War had to happen as inevitably as it actually did.
Hungarian foreign policy from the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in November 1918 to the Peace Treaty of Trianon of June 1920 concentrated on maintaining Hungary's integrity and finding ways to break out of the international isolation in which the newly independent state found itself. Such were the aims of the regimes that followed each other in succession, and which are identified with the names of Mihály Károlyi, Béla Kun, and Miklós Horthy.
János Kádár came into power in 1956 and remained in office until 1988. He has left his stamp on all aspects of Hungarian life. This paper will show that Kádár, despite the circumstances of his coming into power, lack of domestic support, and being an international outcast, he emerged as an effective political leader and an internationally respected statesman.
The paper intends to determine Garašanin’s position between Vernacular Serbian and Old Church Slavonic vocabulary and his contribution to the standardization of Serbian literary language.
: Librairie Plon . Ozanam , Didier 1955 . ‘La disgrâce d’un premier commis: Tercier et l’affaire de l’Esprit (1758–1759).’ Bibliothèque de l’école des chartes 113 : 140 – 170 . Rice , Geoffrey W . 2010 . ‘British Foreign Policy and the Falkland
Almost each of the political forces and the great majority of the public saw no alternative to Euro-Atlantic integration, that is, accession to NATO and the EC (after 1992 the EU) when Hungary regained its independence in 1990. Membership in both organizations had a number of internal and external implications too. Budapest had to introduce sweeping reforms in practically all walks of life. Thus, for instance, NATO-membership required the establishment of a parliamentary democracy, a functioning market economy, and the observance of civil and human rights. At the same time, Hungary had to sign so-called basic treaties with three of its neighbors in which it again committed itself to peaceful relations and the renunciation of any attempt to regain territories it had lost to the countries affected after the First and the Second World Wars. EU-membership needed even more extensive restructuring of the various Hungarian institutions from law enforcement through finances to social services. In addition, Budapest expected that one of the major dilemmas of reconciling the so-called “Hungarian-Hungarian” question with the “good neighbor” policy would be settled within the framework of European integration. The expectations on behalf of the two sides have only been partially realized yet. Thus, Hungary consistently spends much less on defense than the required level within the Atlantic Alliance; Budapest has been trying to compensate with a relative prominent presence in foreign missions. As for the EU, the threat of a “second class membership” has not disappeared; in fact, after the beginning of the economic recession in 2008 it has even become a more realistic perspective; in reality, Hungary has had to accept a relative loss of power even in Central and Eastern Europe. However, Hungary has a vested interest in a “Strong Europe” (this was the official slogan of Hungary’s EU-Presidency during the first six months of 2011) in which “more Europe” should not exclude the country’s closer relations with other regions in the world.
The Hungarian War of Independence was widely reported in the American press. Kossuth hoped to bring about a fundamental change in U.S. foreign policy: to convince the country that the time came for taking an active role in international affairs. Sixty-six years later, the U.S. came to act exactly along the lines advocated by Kossuth. Ninety years later the Atlantic Charter came to embody the very principles first expressed by the Hungarian leader.
This paper examines the foreign policy of the Galician-Volhynian prince Roman Mstislavich. Roman became the main military ally of the Byzantine Empire in the early 13th century. Byzantium was going through a severe political crisis caused by the Serbian and the Bulgarian uprisings and by the crushing raids of the Cumans. According to Niketas Choniates, the nomads’ aggression could have been stopped only thanks to the aid of the Galician prince Roman. The circumstances and the time of Roman’s campaign in Choniates’ account are the same as in the Russian chronicles reporting the steppe campaigns of the Galician-Volhynian prince.
This study concerns itself with the first Imperial Envoy Gerard Veltwijck (ca. 1500–1555), who negotiated with the Ottoman Sultan Süleymān. Using newly discovered as well as recently published sources, it will focus on the part this diplomat of Charles V played in the negotiations with the Sub-lime Porte and on the considerable problems the French King and his representatives in Istanbul experienced during the talks. The Most Christian King thus became a victim of his ambivalent foreign policy while his alliance with the Sultan experienced a severe crisis. Finally, this study tries to demonstrate the impact of a diplomatic sojourn in the Levant for the envoy, as such a mission was very often followed by a considerable and far from only financial reward.