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): Beyond the SGP. Features and Effects of EU National-level Fiscal Rules . In: Deroose , S. – Flores , E. – Turrini , A. (eds): The Role of Fiscal Rules and Institutions in Shaping Budgetary Outcomes . Proceedings from the ECFIN Workshop, Brussels
an impact on the outcome of the competition, yet which the athlete has no control over ( Sterbenz et al. 2014 ; Csurilla – Sterbenz 2018 ). According to Mauboussin (2012) , luck, skill and the combination of the two determine almost everything in
replicating the outcome of competitive government bids. It seemed that the winning ticket had been assigned more often to the highest (or most generous) bidder, i.e. the organisation which had offered the highest bribe and which, simultaneously, had been often
and management literature explaining the causes of inferior-to-expectations outcomes of firms' digitalisation initiatives (or elaborating on the contingencies of success), is therefore no surprise (see e.g., Sony – Naik (2020) for a survey). Studies
impact of price changes on output, with regard to export performance and import substitution? Empirically verified answers will help policymakers take stock of the outcomes of austerity, which is still not over in some parts of the currency union. (Just
We look at the soft budget constraint literature in the context of the state-led restructuring of state-owned enterprises (SOE) in which institutions are both regulators charged with constraining SOE restructuring outcomes and part owners of the SOEs concerned. Such institutional agents constitute a set of what we term “owner—regulators (OR)”. These economic agents may have political problems as regulators — as suggested by the Chicago School approach to economic regulation. They can also have ownership problems — here defined by literature on the theory of the firm and on vertical structure. In this light the incentives associated with the imposition of hard budget constraints may be by themselves insufficient to radically change owner—regulator behaviour. If the implementation of such constraints does not take into account the factors highlighted by this paper, hard budget constraints are likely to be either counterproductive or irrelevant.
altering initial endowments, we can reach efficiently whatever outcome we may wish to achieve. 7 We feel that this is a reading of market socialism with which Mario would have been uncomfortable. He was certainly
., 105 , March. Balcerowicz , L. ( 1994 ): Poland: the Economic Outcomes. Economic Policy, December
individuals, civil society could not exist. A rational and selfish individual living within a large-scale polity would recognize her inability to significantly influence the outcome of an election, so a society composed exclusively of such individuals would at
, have perfect foreknowledge of each outcome, and have a complete, well-ordered preference ranking of each state ( Weintraub 2002 ). At a minimum, neoclassical rationality requires agents to have “unbiased” expectations of possible future outcomes, ranked
