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economic sanctions may deter aggression and escalation, compel de-annexation, and defeat adversaries. The potency of sanctions partly depends on transgressors' attitudes. Foes may be blasé, conciliatory or intransigent. The Kremlin sometimes is
According to the common sense, experts, backed up by scientific methods, describe the “possible states of the world” in a value-neutral way. Then, in the political arena, delegates build on these proposals, but also consider values and interests. The present paper attempts to revise such an understanding of local economic development (LED) and argues that many of the deficiencies deriving from such a view can be remedied by deliberative participation, which is not merely a theoretical necessity, but also a practical possibility.With regard to the issue of public participation and deliberation, the paper identifies two main approaches in the LED literature: the “political” and the “apolitical”, of which the latter is mainly characterised by economic theorising. We take a closer look at the “apolitical” approach and demonstrate that in fact it is very much political. Therefore, we call for the transgression of the borderline between politics and expertise in LED, and suggest a joint democratisation of these interrelated terrains. We argue that deliberative participation is able to contribute to the quality of both the expert proposals and the working of the politics.
In the European Union the statutory principle of the single market of the pertinent EU Treaties applies. Especially if national norms run contrary to the realisation of EU goals, the member states are required to act unitarily and coordinated. In particular, measures effecting the unequal treatment of domestic and foreign actors can often transgress the principle of the unitary European single market and thus have to be discarded. The ambit of indirect taxation according to article 93 of the EC Treaty clearly is subject to a requirement of harmonisation, which is not existent in the ambit of direct taxation. Nevertheless, it appears that EU influence on direct taxation regarding harmonisation goals is the rule rather than the exception. The legislative competence of the member states to achieve supranational goals leads to a characteristic and inefficient legislation. Within the scope of this paper the nature of the inefficient legislation as well as the reasons of its decades-long survival will be discussed. In order to accomplish this, the eminent importance of corporate income taxation will be expounded, first in quantitative and second in qualitative terms. The characterisation of the quantitative and qualitative importance for the EU as well as for the member states will disclose how the current legislation came about. In this context the European Court of Justice will play a major role, which surpasses mere power of jurisdiction and results from an adverse distribution of competencies. On that note the logic behind the proposals of the European Commission can be examined. The paper concludes by suggesting an approach for reform based on the propositions of the European Commission.
Transactions That Transgress the Spheres of Justice. Political Psychology 18(2): 255–297. Tetlock P. E. Taboo Trade-offs: Reactions to Transactions That Transgress the Spheres of Justice
