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Módszertani tapasztalatok a VoltEgySzer prevenciós alkalmazás pilot kutatásának eredményei alapján
Methodological Experiences of a Pilot Study Assessing the Efficacy of the Once Upon a High Prevention Application
Intervention for College Student Marijuana Use: A Randomized Clinical Trial. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors , Vol. 24. No. 2. pp. 265–273. 12 Schwarzer, R. & Jerusalem, M. (1995
A 14–24 év közötti fiatalok szerencsejáték-használati kockázatának csökkentésére irányuló általános prevenciós programok szisztematikus áttekintése
Systematic Review of Gambling Prevention Programs for Youth between the Age of 14–24
) Modifying Youths’ Perception toward Pathological Gamblers. Addictive Behaviors , Vol. 30. No. 2. pp. 351–354. 20 Ladouceur, R., Goulet, A. & Vitaro, F. (2013) Prevention
Magyarországi tendenciák az iskolai prevenció területén
Hungarian Trends in School Based Prevention
) Approaches to Substance Use Prevention Utilising School Curriculum Plus Social Environment Change. Addictive Behaviours , Vol. 25. No. 6. pp. 861–885. 15 Gee, R. L., Espiritu, R
A rendészeti felsőoktatás hallgatóinak dohányzási szokásai
Smoking habits of law enforcement college students
.12.1 11 Ebbert, J. O., Patten, C. A. & Schroeder, D. R. (2006) The Fagerström Test for Nicotine Dependence-Smokeless Tobacco (FTND-ST). Addictive Behaviors, Vol. 31. No. 9. pp. 1716
Starting with the typology of action as conceived by Max Weber the explication of the terms introduced by him shows that these concepts are by far too crude and that he omitted several important types of action. On the one side, affective behaviour and emotional action have to be differentiated since the latter is by no means irrational. Fritz Heider for example spoke of a "logic of emotions" decades ago. On the other side, rationality in the sense of "Zweckrationalität" has to be conceived as a from of addictive behaviour. It is true, as Gary S.Becker has shown, That we can speak of rational addiction", but it is clear that if person becomes totally dependent on a drug or an ideological goal, his behaviour becomes selfdestructive and this can hardly be named "rational". A third serious problem of Weber's typology of action is that he never made quite clear what a "value rational" ertrational) action means. On the basis of the so called "pattern variables", defined by Talcott Parsons, and this theory os socialisations an attempt is made in this article to delver an explication of the term of "Wertrationalität" (value-rationality). On the basis of the 5 pattern variables, each being conceived as consisting of five dichomoties, 32 possible action orientations are dervied, and some of these can be identified as different types of rationality. If we conceive "Wertrationalität" and Zweckrationalität" on this basis, we find that "value rationality" always implies a more complicated calculation than "Zweckrationalität". Furthermore, it implies often enough, that not all the means should be used , even if a person could dispose of them. Seen on the short run, "value-rational" orientation therefore implies a handicap if a person has to compete with a "zweckrational" actor. Therefore one schould expect an evolutionary process by wich "value-rational" actors are omitted from the social system as "loosers". A detalied analysis shows, however, that persons with a universalistic value orientation have a superior chance to from common value systems with those who are also universalistically oriented, if they act in a value-rational way, and that they therefore have superior chances in the competition with "zweckrational" actors on the long run. A second very serious disadvantage of "zweckrational" actors was detected already by Max Weber himself: "Zweckrationalität" itself becomes in its purest form an addiction. Success is sought in this case only because it is successful. If success is the ultimate goal of "zweckrational" orientation for its own sake (as a thrill), action becomes totally irrational. This will be the consequence, because no material goals exist anymore, and the ultimate goal of action gets a formal character. Therefore the final result of "zweckrational" action is a basically nihilistic orientation.
