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Abstract
János Kornai published an interesting and important paper in 2000 about the “system paradigm”, and another in 2016 about the “system paradigm revisited”. In the last one he made a theoretical approach for differences between democracies, autocracies and dictatorships; made a typology for the most important elements for characterization of different political systems. In the second half of the 2010’s a debate has started among political analysts, public intellectuals and journalists, how we can characterize the new political system of Hungary led by Viktor Orbán. We can read detailed analyses about “hybrid regime”, “limited democracy”, “illiberal democracy”, “plebiscite leader democracy” etc. In this paper I would like to deal with the question of different political systems in general, and – on the experiences of the debates about the current Hungarian system – I would like to think further – the Kornai's model. Kornai pointed out 10 elements for characterization of it (the questions of removable governments, opposition parties in parliaments, elections, civil society, freedom of press, etc.) – I would like to differentiate 10 new potential elements, especially from the side of the political ideas, historical backgrounds and other viewpoints.
Abstract
Both the level and composition of public expenditures and revenues have implications for economic development, as argued by the ‘fiscal multiplier’ and the ‘quality of public finance’ literature. Public finance decisions also influence the distribution of income. By reviewing the literature, I argue for a fair distribution of income as reflected in low income inequality, not particularly because of the impact of income inequality on long-term growth (which is a controversial issue), but primarily because income inequality typically implies inequality of opportunity. European Union countries have very diverse public finance structures and different levels of effectiveness, and there is room for improvement in growth and equality impacts in all countries. A general guideline would be that the most effective approach comprises progressive taxes and inheritance taxes, spending on education, health and public infrastructure, and better government effectiveness. At the height of the 2008 global and the subsequent European financial and economic crises, the fiscal consolidation strategies of EU countries largely relied on cutting public investment and social spending (except pensions), which is the opposite of what is suggested in the literature. Better fiscal rules and good fiscal institutions are needed to safeguard growth- and distribution friendly expenditures in a crisis.
Abstract
Are governments able to continuously boost economic growth by spending for decades? Can the state be a more efficient user of income by improving the structure of public spending? The paper analyses the correlation between various types of public expenditures and GDP growth in different countries of the EU. The database was composed from the Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG) classification of public spending, which contains data of 25 EU economies in the period 1996–2017. Three econometric models were applied in accordance with the empirical practice found in the literature: first-differences general method of moment (GMM), fixed effects panel and ordinary least squares (OLS) models. The expenditures on social protection proved to have a negative, statistically significant and robust impact on GDP growth. The results are similar for general public spending, and while spending on public order also has a significant and robust coefficient, its sign is ambiguous. The novelty of the article relate to the findings on lagged education and health spending, which have a positive impact on GDP growth.
Abstract
In the 1990s and early 2000s, comparison of transition strategies of China versus those in Central and Eastern Europe raised controversies in the economic and political science literature. However, differences between China and the countries of the former Soviet bloc in their transition strategies resulted not necessarily from a deliberate political choice but from different initial conditions. Low-income and largely rural China, after its first radical step (de-collectivisation of agriculture in 1978), could move more gradually due to its under-industrialisation and retaining administrative control over the economy. The over-industrialised Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and former Soviet Union (FSU) countries where the previous command system of economic management spontaneously collapsed at the end of 1980s, did not have such an option. They had to conduct market-oriented reforms as quickly as they could, with all the associated economic and social pain. Regardless of speed and strategy of transition, almost all previously centrally-planned economies, including China, completed building basic foundations of a market system by the early 2000s although the quality of economic and political institutions and policies differ between the sub-regional groups and individual countries.
weekly summary of the daily time spent on the smartphone. In the yellow circle is the total duration (8 h 50 min) for the day (March 19), while the lower part of the screenshot reveals the total duration of each day of the past week. The smartphone
.00 550 °C (12 h) 50.00 MoO 3 , + 50.00 In 2 (MoO 4 ) 3 6 75.00 25.00 Stage II: In 2 (MoO 4 ) 3 a
– ∞ ) ng/mL*h 324.1 ± 54.2 176.1 ± 19.7 b MRT (0– t ) h 5.0 ± 0.8 3.1 ± 0.2 b
were singleton, low-risk healthy pregnant women, or those without routine gestational diabetes screening test at our hospital with a 1-h 50 g oral glucose challenge test (GCT) at 24–28 gestational ages, and willing to participate in a clinical trial
found (ng mL −1 , mean ± SD) Precision (%RSD) Accuracy (%) Bench top (up to 9 h) 5.0 4.7 ± 0
chromatography separation, limonin (C 26 H 30 O 8 ) and β-sitosterol (C 29 H 50 O) were extracted from the seeds and pulp of Citrus suavissima Hort. ex Tanaka , respectively [ 5 ]. Their structures were identified by spectral analysis ( 1 H NMR, 13 C NMR, DEPT
