Mihalyi , P. – Szelényi , I. ( 2016 ): Two Different Sources of Inequalities: Profits and Rents in Advanced MarketEconomies. Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences , Discussion Papers , MT
): Enlarging the Varieties of Capitalism: The Emergence of Dependent MarketEconomies in East Central Europe . World Politics , 61 ( 4 ): 673 – 685 .
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
a sense of the vulnerabilities of system. A finer comprehension of the liquidity flow's direction would allow policymakers to fine-tune the current regulation regime. Empirical papers of the field focus on large, developed marketeconomies, with
Chinese officials, some on various aspects of the working of a marketeconomy, and some on the specifics of the relations between an IMF member country and the IMF. The latter included annual visits to China by IMF staff, provision of data by China to the
moved immediately to the stage of adapting the product to their own needs and adding their own intellectual thought, and finally, also without delay – to mass production of such an advanced product. In the classical marketeconomy and traditional Western
Mature market economies have thrived on very diverse systems of corporate governance. Transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe have entered the market economy with a special historical inheritance, and critical political decisions of key institutions that have a bearing on the new systems of governance evolving in the region. In this paper, I use an analytical stakeholder approach (different from a normative approach) to identify how the specific conditions in countries in transition have influenced the evolution of specific governance structures, and how this influences the workability of the system. I employ a broad definition of enterprise governance that incorporates fixed, residual and appropriated rights among a broad range of different stakeholders. The governance system is a function of the markets that the firm operates in, by state regulation, and by other specific firm and stakeholder conditions. Based on this definition, I analyse some general determinants behind the governance structure in a market economy, focussing on the distribution of rights among stake- holders. Governance systems in Western countries are used as a benchmark to explore the specific conditions for governance structures in economies in transition. Governance structures changed over different stages in the transition process, with privatisation being the single most important determining factor. Consequently, the role of different stakeholders varies across countries, and has evolved considerably over time. The specific conditions of the transition process have favoured insider ownership mostly in the form of management ownership, but in some cases, also broader employee ownership. However, the relative strength of insiders, especially employees, has declined considerably in later stages of the transition.
learning opportunities from others when operating in a dependent marketeconomy. This seems plausible as MNEs learning routines are often driven from the home base of these companies, outside the host economy ( Nölke – Vliegenthart 2009 ). However, our
of marketeconomy with winners and losers distributed over the whole social hierarchy without posing the question whether this will be “capitalism,” or a “transition to democracy” will have to follow the transformation. Hence, we do have here an
Authors:Marija Petrović-Ranđelović, Tamara Rađenović, Bojan Krstić, and Vladimir Mićić
marketeconomy. Such changes in the economy accelerate the pace of development through overcoming structural imbalances and disharmony accumulated during the previous development period. In addition to direct technology transfer through FDI, that goes