Reputation is key in the management in tourism industry. In other words, a company should present favorable corporate image to enhance the trust of the customers and further induce the purchase intention and behaviors so as to enhance the sustainable management of tourism businesses. Customers’ Trust is the support of tourism industry, as it satisfies the basic demands for travel guarantee and safety. Following the promotion of consumer awareness, consumers tend to purchase products or accept services from trusted tourism businesses, which therefore have to present excellent corporate image. Nevertheless, some tourism businesses have neglected Marketing Ethics in the development of market economy because of over-pursuing economic interests. When consumer sovereignty is infringed, consumer satisfaction would be reduced, resulting in declining customer loyalty. By distributing and collecting questionnaires on-site, adult tourists of Lion Travel are sampled as the research subjects. A total of 400 copies of questionnaires were distributed, in which 276 copies were valid, with the retrieval rate of 69%. SPSS is utilized for the data analyses, and Factor Analysis, Reliability Analysis, Regression Analysis, and Analysis of Variance are applied to testing various hypotheses. The research results are concluded as following. 1. Marketing Ethics presents partially positive effects on Service Process in Customer Satisfaction. 2. Marketing Ethics reveals partially positive effects on Service Structure in Customer Satisfaction. 3. Marketing Ethics shows significantly positive effects on Service Outcome in Customer Satisfaction. 4. Individual Attributes appear to have remarkable effects on the correlations between Marketing Ethics and Customer Satisfaction.
Lavigne, M. (1999): The Economics of Transition. From Socialist Economy to MarketEconomy. Second edition. New York: St. Martin's Press.
The Economics of Transition. From Socialist Economy to MarketEconomy
Science is the core sector of present-day knowledge production. Yet, the mechanisms of science as an industry are poorly understood.
The economic theory of science is still in its infancy, and philosophy of science has only sparsely addressed the issue of
economic rationality. Research, however, is costly. Inefficient use of resources consumed by the scientific industry is as
detrimental to the collective advancement of knowledge as are deficiencies in method. Economic inefficiency encompasses methodological
inadequacy. Methods are inadequate if they tend to misallocate time and effort. If one omits the question of how inputs are
transformed into outputs in self-organised knowledge production, this means neglecting an essential aspect of the collective
rationality of science. A self-organised tendency towards efficiency comes to the fore as soon as science is described as
an economy in which researchers invest their own attention in order to obtain the attention of others. Viewed like this, scientific
communication appears to be a market where information is exchanged for attention. Scientific information is measured in terms
of the attention it earns. Since scientists demand scientific information as a means of production, the attention that a theory
attracts is a measure of its value as a capital good. On the other hand, the attention a scientist earns is capitalised into
the asset called reputation. Elaborating the ideas introduced in Franck (1998) and (1999), the paper describes science as a highly developed market economy. Science conceived as capital market
covers the specific conditions under which scientists, while maximising their reputation, optimise output in the eyes of those
competent to judge. Attention is not just any resource. It is the resource whose efficient use is called intelligence. Science,
as an industry transforming attention into cognitive output, is bound to miss the hallmark of rationality if it does not pass
a test of collective intelligence. The paper closes with considering the prospective outcome of such a test.
Authors:Valentina A. Markusova, Vladimir A. Minin, Alexandr N. Libkind, C. N. Margriet Jansz, Michel Zitt, and Elise Bassecoulard-Zitt
The tremendous social and political changes that culminated in the Soviet Union's dissolution had a great impact on the Russian science community. Due to the Russian transformation to a market economy a new model of R&D emerged on the basis of the higher education system (R&D in universities). This paper is part of a project, the main goals of which were to analyse the impact of competitive funding on R&D in provincial universities, the distribution of funding by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, and the level of cross-sectoral and international collaboration. This paper gives a descriptive overview of R&D conducted at the 380 provincial universities, looking at 9,800 applications, 1,950 research projects, 19,981 individuals, and more than 29,600 publications for the period 1996–2001. Our data demonstrated a positive tendency in demographic statistics in the provinces. A map of intra-national collaboration taking place in 1995–2002 in provincial universities situated in different economic regions was designed. Our data show a strong collaboration within the regions, which is an important factor of sustainability. Publication output grew by a factor two or two-and half in six years. The share in output on mathematics was the highest at about 45%, physics and chemistry had equal shares of about 20% each. Researchers from the Ural and Povolzh'e regions were more active in knowledge dissemination than their colleagues from the other nine economic-geographic regions. Bibliometric analysis of more than 1,450 international collaborative publications for 1999–2001 demonstrated a strong shift in collaboration partners from Former East Block and former USSR countries to Western Europe, USA and Japan. Among the regions, Povolzh'e, Ural, Volgo-Vyatsky and Central Chernozem'e demonstrated a stronger tendency to collaborate. This collaboration depends heavily on financial support from foreign countries.
Shortly after the end of the Cultural Revolution, some four decades ago, there were no passenger cars in China when Volkswagen AG started its negotiations inthis country. The country was poor and underdeveloped. Today, the GDP of China reached USD 17.6 billion compared to the US’ 17.4 billion USD. Car production in China is now more than 18 million cars per year, more than in the USA. Today, China is still a socialist country and its economic system is called ‘socialist market economy’ but there are about 50 million private companies, 400 million people are belonging to the middle class and there are about 800 super rich having more than 100 million USD on average. In this ‘sino-marxist’ country, there are even 130 multi billionaires in USD. No wonder that under these circumstances, joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises, especially also in the automotive industry, are welcome.
Volkswagen started its negotiations with its Chinese partner, STAC (Shanghai Tractor and Automobile Investment Corporation), BoC (Bank of China) and CNAIC (China National Automotive Industry Corporation) in 1979. These negotiations ended in 1984 by setting up the ‘Shanghai-Volkswagen’ joint venture which started the production of the Santana in 1985. Some years later, in 1988, Volkswagen started the negotiations with FAW (First Automobile Work) in Changchun. These negotiations lasted much shorter and the second VW joint venture, ‘FAWVW’, started with the production of Jetta and Audi 100, 100, 000 cars per year in 1991.In 2004, the ‘Volkswagen Group China’ (VGC), a wholly VW-owned holding company was set up in Beijing in order to coordinate the VWparticipations, the sales and marketing of its joint ventures, the purchasing, personnel and governmental relations as well as finance. Today, VGC has, including its 16 subsidiaries, 95,000 employees, has built 30 million cars at 30 Chinese production sites and sold them by 5,000 dealers (with 330,000 employees). In 2016, VGC has built about 4 million cars.
Almost each of the political forces and the great majority of the public saw no alternative to Euro-Atlantic integration, that is, accession to NATO and the EC (after 1992 the EU) when Hungary regained its independence in 1990. Membership in both organizations had a number of internal and external implications too. Budapest had to introduce sweeping reforms in practically all walks of life. Thus, for instance, NATO-membership required the establishment of a parliamentary democracy, a functioning market economy, and the observance of civil and human rights. At the same time, Hungary had to sign so-called basic treaties with three of its neighbors in which it again committed itself to peaceful relations and the renunciation of any attempt to regain territories it had lost to the countries affected after the First and the Second World Wars. EU-membership needed even more extensive restructuring of the various Hungarian institutions from law enforcement through finances to social services. In addition, Budapest expected that one of the major dilemmas of reconciling the so-called “Hungarian-Hungarian” question with the “good neighbor” policy would be settled within the framework of European integration. The expectations on behalf of the two sides have only been partially realized yet. Thus, Hungary consistently spends much less on defense than the required level within the Atlantic Alliance; Budapest has been trying to compensate with a relative prominent presence in foreign missions. As for the EU, the threat of a “second class membership” has not disappeared; in fact, after the beginning of the economic recession in 2008 it has even become a more realistic perspective; in reality, Hungary has had to accept a relative loss of power even in Central and Eastern Europe. However, Hungary has a vested interest in a “Strong Europe” (this was the official slogan of Hungary’s EU-Presidency during the first six months of 2011) in which “more Europe” should not exclude the country’s closer relations with other regions in the world.
Is the text of a lecture, delivered by the author, acting as president of the Commission for Art History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences on a conference of art historians in November 2012. This preliminary text of the official report, which was submitted to and discussed by the Class for Philosophical and Historical Sciences of the Hungarian Academy, is a summary from the personal point of view of the author. It is focused mainly on three points of the analysis of the evolution of art history in the one and a half decades between 1996 and 2011. 1) The criteria of the valuation of scientific activities in art history mainly prefer classical art history and its publication forms in the same time as scientific (but not published) activities of museum keepers and curators as well as publications of curators and art critics not corresponding to scientific publication criteria do not acknowledged enough. 2) There is a remarkable swift in the character of publications in the overlooked period: manuals, lexica and scientific catalogues of collections — all team works — became rarer and monographic studies, exhibition catalogues as well as individual works are dominating. 3) The period between 1996 and 2011 bears the traits of a transitional period in the historiography of art. The changes were determined by the introduction of market economy and its impact in Hungary, by the changing of finances of art historical research and the changes of the institutions — from the Universities (“Bologna-system”) through the transformation of the Research Institute of Art History of the Academy of Sciences to the fusion of leading Art Museums of the Country and the dissolution of the National Office of the Cultural Heritage. So, in course of official measures of the year 2012 the whole institutional background of the Hungarian art history was transformed.
A legutóbbi válság megvilágította a közgazdaságtan és a politikatudomány fő áramlatainak gyengeségeit, amelyek a szűklátókörűségből és ideológiai elfogultságokból, vagyis a holisztikus, történeti és kritikai szemléletmód hiányából fakadnak. A válság feltételezett okait vizsgáló és a válság leküzdésére vagy egy újabb megelőzésére gazdaságpolitikai módszereket ajánló legtöbb közgazdász csak a részpiacokra összpontosít, de szem elől veszíti a világgazdaságnak azokat a visszatérő globális válságokban megnyilvánuló alapvető egyensúlytalanságait, amelyek a társadalmi és nemzetközi egyenlőtlenségek növekedéséből származnak. És negligálja a válságok kulturális, politikai és morális aspektusait is. Míg a nemzeti társadalmaknak éppúgy, mint a világtársadalomnak nagy szüksége lenne valódi demokratizálódásra és mind a piacok, mind az államok fölötti hatékony ellenőrzésre, a politikatudomány sok művelője hajlamos a demokrácia értelmezését a képviselet jogi és szervezeti kérdéseire leegyszerűsíteni. A válságok megelőzése és a globális katasztrófák elkerülése szükségessé teszi egy demokratikus globális kormányzás és egy globális ökoszociális piacgazdaság kifejlesztését, ami megköveteli a nemzetközi intézmények lényeges reformját, a civil társadalom globális szervezeteinek befolyásos szerepét és egy „Új Felvilágosodás” eljövetelét is.