Since the waning of the world concept offered by classical physics, law is seen as embodied less by material objects any longer than in a specific way of thinking. Consequently, the normativist perspective of legal positivism is also getting replaced by the comprehension of law in context of culture and tradition.In its own context, any of the terms of 'system', 'family' or 'culture' can be applied independently from each other but it is to be noted that 'tradition' is at the same time both a part and a given path of culture. In legal thought, concrete and generalising (abstract) ways of thinking are equally recoursed to, just as types which search for a solution either in the case's terms in its entirety or in the exclusive bounds of the given normative conceptual framework. It is only Western law that has become differentiated out of the rest, when individualism advanced and thinking in term of subjective rights grew into a dominant pattern, contrasted to our primitive (albeit surviving) approach to law which also expects, in addition to external conformity, the realisation of the law's internal ethos based on own initiative. English law, however, has revealed its face only gradually, as it has factual decisions made through an only-processually-arranged laic (jury) process while it has bound the declaration of what the law is to such facts of the cases among which no logical relationship can be established. In Civil Law, the treatment of adjudication as argumentation, and in Common Law, as practical reasoning, led the judicial process into a sphere only smoothly controllable by logic. Jewish and Islamic laws accept contradictory arguments from the outset. As to Indian and Far-Eastern cultures, they reject even the underlying questionto be raised. This way, in legal problem-solving the assessment of the merits of the caseandthe recourse to a reductive procedure can complement one another on the basis of some compromise. Institutionalisation itself is, as it channels the legal problem-solving to givenpaths, a function of a previously formed idea of order, of a given mentality. Our legaltheorising today is built mostly separatedly either on the classification and interpretation of facts or on the re-conventionalisation of the philosophical generalisation of concepts, with little interaction between the two types of approaches and research attitudes. Therefore, in order to encourage debate and commensurability, it is important that notions of law, at least tacitly assumed to substantiate their choices of subject, are clarified.
Property reparation programs undertaken in Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the communist regimes fail to fulfill ‘the promises of the rule of law’. Reparation schemes do not have an exclusively reparative nature, moreover, reparation was deliberately linked with structural reform, and due to this duality, the scheme features a mixed distributive-reparative character. This resulted in two troublesome aspects: on one hand, there is no evidence of a compelling argument, which justifies the mitigation of past property deprivations at large. On the other hand, it can not be satisfactorily demonstrated why property-related injustices enjoy a privileged status when it comes to reparations, in comparison to other types of losses. Further, bearing in mind the Hayekian objection towards distributive justice, even those who had been placed in an equal situation—i.e. all suffered past property injustices—are not offered an objectively equal opportunity to claim redress. Due to the fact that the schemes addressed reparations—at least in part—from a distributive perspective (which resulted in an attempt to create a substantive equality between victims), the result that they achieved was objective inequality, as everyone was entitled to reparation between the same limitations, while everyone suffered losses of different extent. These differences in treatment between various former owners are mostly arbitrary, and in certain cases deliberately introduced so as to produce inequalities, and thereby meet the Hayekian concerns as far as they produce results that conflict with the idea of the rule of law. The analyzed provisions of the reparation schemes lead in practice to the creation of winners and losers of reparations, to a breach of the idea of formal equality before the law. In the conditions in which reparation schemes fall short from a thick conception of the rule of law (justice, rights or objective equality) it worth investigating, whether requirements of a thin reading-focusing on foreseability, clarity and consistency—are still met by post-communist property redistribution. Unfortunately at least under three aspects—valuation, time limits and probation—the reparation schemes’ provisions are not beyond criticism. The complexity of tasks that transition societies had to face is obvious and uncontested. Transitional law, according to Teitel, is a sui generis paradigm, a vehicle of social, political and ideological transformation. The amendments to the rule of law ideal, justifiable in the context of transition can go as far as—for example—to allow governments to decide upon the concrete form of the reparation, the type of wrongs it want to address, the period in time intended to be covered. But they may not create winners and losers; they may not distinguish between those placed in the same situation.
Rules of origin mechanism used to determine the origin of a product. Rules of origin serve many purposes such as collecting data on trade flows, implementing preferential tariff treatment, and applying anti-dumping duties. Rules of origin can be divided into preferential and non-preferential rules. Preferential rules of origin are used to determine whether a product originates in a preference-receiving country or trading area and hence qualifies to enter the importing country on better terms than products from the rest of the world. Non-preferential rules of origin are used for all other purposes, including enforcement of product- and country-specific trade restrictions that increase the cost of, or restrict or prevent, market entry. Preferential rules of origin differ from non-preferential ones because they are designed to minimize trade deflection. With rapid increase of bilateral and regional trade agreements, the role of rules of origin has become more evident. In the context of bilateral and regional trade agreements, rules of origin prevent free-riders from enjoying the benefits negotiated between the countries concerned. In other words, once the origin of a product is known, a country can extend the benefit of its free trade agreement to its trading partners thus excluding non-partners. In principle, rules of origin are supposed to be straightforward and easy-to-follow methods used to determine origin especially when a product is manufactured in one country, which rarely happens in reality. However, more than often, rules of origin are complex and protectionist method used a barrier to trade. As another case study, the purpose of this article is to examine rules of origin in the U.S.-Arab countries free trade agreements (FTAs). The article begins with a brief discussion of the concept of free trade, its evolution through the GATT and then the WTO, and the recently concluded FTAs between the U.S. and Arab countries. Then, in section three, the article analyzes in details rules of origin in the U.S.-Arab countries FTAs. The analysis includes, among other things, substantial transformation and value-added tests, product specific processes, and other relevant rules of origin. Sections four and five address the documentations and procedures required to prove origin and the costs involved in this process. Finally, the article provides a set of conclusions.
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