Over the last few decades, several countries have entrenched a special subcategory of law, which is adopted by stricter procedural rules than the requirements of the ordinary legislative process. These laws are enacted by qualified majority, by the consent of the two chambers of the legislation, and are subject to mandatory constitutional review before their promulgation, or additional safeguards are implemented in the ordinary legislative process. It is beyond doubt that this legal instrument influences the prevalence of the separation of powers and the constitutional principle of democracy in a remarkable way; therefore, it might be an important tool for populist politicians to concrete their preferences for the long term. In this study, my aim is to conceptualize the most highly contested issues regarding the legal nature of qualified laws, and to provide a deeper understanding of the interdependence between qualified laws and the separation of powers. This analysis might also clarify how qualified laws may serve the ambitions of populist political groups in certain specific circumstances. My contribution provides general theoretic considerations, and does not outline the particular constitutional frameworks in detail. I would rather just use the specific examples to demonstrate how the mechanism of qualified law works in practice as an instrument of constitutional law.