This paper develops two stylised models of the transition economy that challenge, to some extent, the conventional approach to policy reforms. In the first model, the absence of market-oriented institutions is responsible for the occurrence of a non-cooperative equilibrium, where the amount of public services provided by the state is too low, which, in turn, adversely affects the global performance of the economy. In the second model, a benevolent government will choose a taxation level that pushes too many firms out of the market; hence global supply falls below its optimal level. In both models, disruptions specific to transitional systems lead to abnormal responses to standard fiscal policy.
In the late eighties, many developing countries followed the example of the most advanced countries and opened their capital account (K.A.) in an attempt to reap new gains from increased integration with the world economy. Currently, after the wave of financial and currency crises that hurt the global economy over the last decade, enthusiasm about K.A. liberalization has greatly faded. First, the relationship between development and capital account liberalization did not come out to be as solid as initially expected; second, the greater capital mobility has brought about new forms of financial instability. This paper points to some risks that might be associated with undifferentiated deregulation of international movements of capital in connection with developing economies. It argues in favor of proper sequencing: liberalization should proceed in parallel with progress when it comes to macroeconomic stability, building market competition and the creation of a sound, internal financial system. A separate section analyzes this issue in the special context of transition economies.