The article focuses on the relationship between economic growth and financial intermediation, with special focus on the process of catching up in three Central and Eastern European economies: Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland (CEC-3). The depth of financial intermediation and economic growth exhibit a close, direct relationship with each other. According to recent studies the relationship is causal and the level of financial development is a good indicator of future economic growth. Examining the relationship between the two factors is especially important for these Central and Eastern European economies, where the level of financial intermediation is very low compared to that of developed countries. The lack of financial deepening is even more pronounced taking into consideration that there is a significant catching-up process in every other areas of the economy. The initial proposition here is that in order to these countries catching up, their economic growth must necessarily be accompanied by a marked financial deepening, without which long-term economic growth is impossible. It is absolutely necessary that in the future the role of bank loans in these economies increases significantly and that a period characterised by a lending boom follows. The lending boom should occur in CEC-3 is not an unequivocal sign of imprudent lending or a supply-side expansion of bank loans - on the contrary, it should be viewed as complementary to the economic development at the given economic stage.
During the present financial crisis, the focus of the regulation and supervision of financial institutions has shifted from being institution-based (microprudential) towards the systemic level (macroprudential). A special element of the macroprudential regulatory and supervisory toolkit is the issue of macroprudential warnings. Prior to the crisis, both the international and the domestic authorities issued warnings concerning the emergence of system-wide risks in the financial sector. However, these warnings did not result in significant changes in the behaviour of the banks, which were the main addressees of the warnings. The article analyses the practice and effectiveness of macroprudential warnings in relation to the European Central Bank and the competent Hungarian authorities. The subject matter is particularly topical, taking into account that one of the very first steps in changing the institutional framework of financial supervision, as a response to the financial crisis, has been the establishment of an institutional framework for issuing macroprudential warnings.
Although the macroprudential regulation only became a central topic of bank regulation after 2008, recognising and analysing risk, what now we call macroprudential, has formed part of the thinking about banking risk for a long time. A real turn of events was caused by the Global Financial Crisis. Since then, as a consequence of the huge taxpayers’ burden and the mutual reinforcing effect of sovereign and banking crises, the main course of bank regulation has become the elaboration and implementation of regulation with a macroprudential perspective. This article reviews the history of the international evolution of macroprudential regulation from the perspective of both the regulation’s motivations and its conceptual and practical developments. Its main focus is the development of the ideas of a macroprudential perspective on prudential policy and the way these ideas eventually led to concrete experiences with macroprudential regulatory tools. As a conclusion, the author raises the question of whether the financial system has become more stable by implementing the current form of macroprudential regulation.
A key observation of the endogenous money theory is that banks create deposits (money) by lending. This means that banks apparently face soft budget constraint in responding to demand for credit. However, there are several limiting factors, which can make the banks' money creation somewhat constrained, and can thus harden their budget constraint. Such factors include the need to preserve banks' profitability and the bank regulations (the capital and liquidity requirements). Previous literature on soft budget constraint (SBC) in banking mentioned government bailouts, central banks lender-of-last-resort policies, or the poorly informed depositors who over-finance banks, as reasons for the SBC for banks. Taking the endogenous money theory as a starting point, we use a different approach. We analyze whether the tools that aimed to keep the bank's budget constrain hard are appropriate for this purpose. Our analysis, as well as lessons from several recent bank crisis episodes suggest, that under current banking regulation SBC is an inherent feature of banking.
Az alacsonynövés, microcephalia, veleszületett kardiális anomália és
intellektuális deficit társulása minden esetben felveti kromoszómaaberráció oki
szerepének lehetőségét. Amennyiben G-sávozással kromoszóma-rendellenesség nem
azonosítható, array komparatív genomikus hibridizáció (array CGH) végzése
szükséges szubmikroszkopikus kópiaszám-változások kimutatása céljából. A szerzők
egy hatéves gyermek esetét mutatják be rövid irodalmi áttekintéssel, akinél a
fenti tünetek hátterében egy 4,1 Mb nagyságú deletio állt a 15q26.2–26.3
régióban. A szindróma jellegzetessége az inzulinszerű növekedési faktor 1-re
fennálló rezisztencia, amit a deletált szakaszban helyet foglaló receptor
magyaráz, és amely fontos differenciáldiagnosztikai támpont a hasonló betegek
azonosításában. Orv. Hetil., 2014, 155(9), 362–364.