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  • Author or Editor: Pál Pritz x
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After June 4, 1920 the objective was nevertheless the restoration of Saint Stephen's Hungary. How can such a program be implemented? There are three things that are definitely needed. 1. A relevant political force in the country. 2. An international situation conducive to the aims and a foreign policy that can make the most of it. 3. Hungary's former national minorities should be willing to return into Saint Stephen's empire. 1. The losers of the treaty of Trianon probably supported the recovery of the lost territories. This discontent supported and at the same time stifled the revisionist movement. The leaders of the country too strengthened the illusion that Trianon was a result of the revolutions of 1918 and 1919. 2. No great powers supported the restoration of Saint Stephen's Hungary. The Germans showed the most receptive attitude, but neither the Weimar Republic, nor Hitler's Germany was willing to follow Bismarck's policy, who had considered it important to maintain a strong Hungary. Mussolini - even if he had wanted - could not have a say in this matter. 3. The Compromise of 1867 with the House of Habsburg maintained the Hungarian empire for another fifty years, but its hour struck in 1918. This is despite the fact that in the demise of Hungary the entente powers's intent, which was proved strong by history, was as important as the desire of the national minorities to secede. These questions are fully analysed in the study, which then states: in theory it would have been possible to follow a way different from the actual event, but in fact the tragedy of Hungary in the Second World War had to happen as inevitably as it actually did.

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L’Entente victorieuse ne bénéficiait pas des forces militaires nécessaires pour contrôler la situation en Europe centrale. Elle usa donc de différents stratagèmes pour affaiblir la position de la Hongrie de Béla Kun et de Gyula Peidl qui s’opposait ou risquait de s’opposer à sa politique. D’autre part, au sein même du Conseil suprême de la Conférence de la Paix, les éléments favorables aux Etats successeurs employèrent parfois des approximations dans leurs communications afin d’obtenir l’approbation des membres qui hésitaient à adopter une position résolument anti-hongroise (les Américains, en particulier). Le résultat fut que la Roumanie fut en mesure d’occuper une grande partie de la Hongrie sans résistance et sans protestation vigoureuse des grandes puissances.

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