Principles of the thorium-230 dating method were applied to the study of thorium and uranium isotopes in a series of rain samples collected at Fayetteville (36°N, 94°W), Arkansas, since 1980. The results indicate that the rainwater contains volcanic ash materials with a wide variety of ages, which were blown up onto the upper stratosphere from the 18 May 1980 eruption of Mount St. Helens and the 28 March 1982 eruption of E1 Chichón. These volcanic materials seem to have stayed airborne for a number of years and profoundly affected the global atmospheric inventories of thorium and uranium isotopes.
Radiochemical measurements of239,240Pu were carried out for a total of 57 individual rain and snow samples collected at Fayetteville (36 °N, 94 °W), Arkansas, during the period between November 1984 and June 1986. The results indicate that the fallout of plutonium observed during the past three years is due, primarily, to the nuclear debris originating from the 7 February 1983 burn-up of the nuclear-powered Soviet satellite Cosmos-1402.
Increasing trends of the concentrations of234U,235U and238U in rain observed during the period between April 1984 and June 1985 at Fayetteville (36°N, 94°W), Arkansas, and peak concentrations of234U and235U observed in a number of rain samples collected during the months of May and June 1985 appear to be the effects of delayed fallout from the 1982 eruption of El Chichón volcano and the 1983 fall of the nuclear-powered satellite Cosmos-1402, respectively.
In this paper we describe use of the Aquila active well neutron coincidence counter for nuclear material assays of 235U in multiple analytical techniques at Savannah River Site (SRS), at the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), and at
Argonne West National Laboratory (AWNL). The uses include as a portable passive neutron counter for field measurements searching
for evidence of 252Cf deposits and storage; as a portable active neutron counter using an external activation source for field measurements searching
for trace 235U deposits and holdup; for verification measurements of U-Al reactor fuel elements; for verification measurements of uranium
metal; and for verification measurements of process waste of impure uranium in a challenging cement matrix. The wide variety
of uses described demonstrate utility of the technique for neutron coincidence verification measurements over the dynamic
ranges of 100–5000 g for U metal, 200–1300 g for U-Al, and 8–35 g for process waste. In addition to demonstrating use of the
instrument in both the passive and active modes, we also demonstrate its use in both the fast and thermal neutron modes.
The Savannah River Site (SRS) Burial Ground had a container labeled as Box 33 for which they had no reliable solid waste stream designation. The container consisted of an outer box of dimensions 48″ × 46″×66″
and an inner box that contained high density and high radiation dose material. From the outer box Radiation Control measured
an extremity dose rate of 22 mrem/h. With the lid removed from the outer box, the maximum dose rate measured from the inner
box was 100 mrem/h extremity and 80 mrem/h whole body. From the outer box the material was sufficiently high in density that
the Solid Waste Management operators were unable to obtain a Co-60 radiograph of the contents. Solid Waste Management requested
that the Analytical Development Section of Savannah River National Laboratory perform a γ-ray assay of the item to evaluate
the radioactive content and possibly to designate a solid waste stream. This paper contains the results of three models used
to analyze the measured γ-ray data acquired in an unusual configuration.
Gamma-ray holdup measurements of a Mossbauer spectroscopy instrument are described and modeled. In the qualitative acquisitions
obtained in a low background area of Savannah River National Laboratory, only Am-241 and Np-237 activity were observed. The
Am-241 was known to be the instrumental activation source, while the Np-237 is clearly observed as a source of contamination
internal to the instrument. The two sources of activity are modeled separately in two acquisition configurations using two
separate modeling tools. The results agree well, demonstrating a content of (1980 ± 150) μCi Am-241 and (110 ± 50) μCi of
Authors:R. A. Dewberry, S. R. Salaymeh, V. R. Casella, and F. S. Moore
This paper contains a summary of the holdup and material control and accountability (MC&A) assays conducted for the determination
of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in the deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) of the Reactor Fuel Fabrication Facility at
the Savannah River Site (SRS). The facility was used to fabricate HEU fuel assemblies, lithium-aluminum target tubes, neptunium
assemblies, and miscellaneous components for the SRS production reactors. The facility operated for more than 35 years. During
this time thousands of uranium-aluminum alloy (U-Al) production reactor fuel tubes were produced. After the facility ceased
operations in 1995, all of the easily accessible U-Al was removed from the building, and only residual amounts remained. The
bulk of this residue was located in the equipment that generated and handled small U-Al particles and in the exhaust systems
for this equipment (e.g., chip compactor, casting furnaces, log saw, lathes A & B, cyclone separator, FreonÔcart, riser crusher,
…, etc). The D&D project is likely to represent an important example for D&D activities across SRS and across the Department
of Energy weapons complex. The Savannah River National Laboratory was tasked to conduct holdup assays to quantify the amount
of HEU on all components removed from the facility prior to placing in solid waste containers. The 235U holdup in any single component of process equipment must not exceed 50 g in order to meet the container limit. This limit
was imposed to meet criticality requirements of the low level solid waste storage vaults. Thus, the holdup measurements were
used as guidance to determine if further decontamination of equipment was needed to ensure that the quantity of 235U did not exceed the 50 g limit and to ensure that the waste met the Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) of the solid waste storage
vaults. Since HEU is an accountable nuclear material, the holdupassays and assays of recovered residue were also important
for material control and accountability purposes. In summary, the results of the holdup assays were essential for determining
compliance with the Waste Acceptance Criteria, Material Control & Accountability, and to ensure that administrative criticality
safety controls were not exceeded. This paper discusses theg-ray assay measurements conducted and the modeling of the acquired
data to obtain measured holdup in process equipment, exhaust components, and fixed geometry scrap cans. It also presents development
work required to model new acquisition configurations and to adapt available instrumentation to perform the assays.
Authors:R. Dewberry, D. Williams, R. Lee, D. Roberts, L. Arrigo, and S. Salaymeh
In this paper, the setup, calibration, and testing of the F-Area Analytical Labs active well neutron coincidence counter (HV-221000-NDA-X-1-DK-AWCC-1)
in SRNL are described for use in the Savannah River Site (SRS) transuranium metal production facility to enable assay of mixed
uranium/plutonium metal product. The instrument was required within a three-month window for availability upon receipt of
LANL uranium oxide samples into the SRS facility. Calibration of the instrument in the SRNL nuclear nondestructive assay facility
in the range 10–400 g HEU is described. We also report qualification and installation of the instrument for assay of the initial
suite of product samples.
Authors:R. Dewberry, V. Casella, R. Sigg, S. Salaymeh, F. Moore, and D. Pak
Visual Examination (VE) gloveboxes are used to remediate transuranic waste (TRU) drums at three separate facilities at the
Savannah River Site. Noncompliant items are removed before the drums undergo further characterization in preparation for shipment
to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Maintaining the flow of drums through the remediation process is critical to the
program’s seven-days-per-week operation. Conservative assumptions are used to ensure that glovebox contamination from this
continual operation is below acceptable limits. Holdup measurements using cooled HPGe spectrometers are performed in order
to confirm that these assumptions are conservative. 239Pu is the main nuclide of interest; however, 241Pu, equilibrium 237Np/233Pa and 238Pu (if detected) are typically assayed. At the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) facility 243,244,245Cm are also generally observed and are always reported at either finite levels or at limits of detection. A complete assay
at each of the three facilities includes a measure of TRU content in the gloveboxes and HEPA filters in the glovebox exhaust.
This paper includes a description of the γ-PHA acquisitions, of the modeling, and of the calculations of nuclide content.
Because each of the remediation facilities is unique and ergonomically unfavorable to γ-ray acquisitions, we have constructed
custom detector support devices specific to each set of acquisitions. This paper includes a description and photographs of
these custom devices. The description of modeling and calculations include determination and application of container and
matrix photon energy dependent absorption factors and also determination and application of geometry factors relative to our
detector calibration geometry. The paper also includes a discussion of our measurements’ accuracy using off-line assays of
two SRNL HEPA filters. The comparison includes assay of the filters inside of 55-gallon drums using the SRNL Q2 assay system and separately using off-line assay with an acquisition configuration unique from the original in-situ acquisitions.
Authors:R. L. Brodzinski, R. A. Craig, S. D. Fink, W. K. Hensley, N. O. Holt, M. A. Knopf, E. A. Lepel, O. D. Mullen, S. R. Salaymeh, T. J. Samuel, J. E. Smart, M. R. Tinker, and D. D. Walker
An online monitor has been designed, built, and tested that is capable of measuring the residual transuranic concentrations in processed high-level wastes with a detection limit of 370 Bq/ml (10 nCi/ml) in less than six hours. The monitor measures the (α,n) neutrons in the presence of gamma-ray fields up to 1 Sv/h (100 R/h). The optimum design was determined by Monte Carlo modeling and then tempered with practical engineering and cost considerations. A multiplicity counter is used in data acquisition to reject the large fraction of coincident and highly variable cosmic-ray-engendered background events and results in an S/N ratio ~1.