The statement of the defence delivered in the criminal action (causa publica) of Aulus Cluentius Habitus-Cicero’s longest actually delivered speech left to us-is from 66, that is, the year when Cicero was praetor. In certain respect, it is the precious stone of Cicero’s ars oratoria since its narrative is vivid, full of turns like a crime story; events, scenes, planes of time replace one another boldly, sometimes seemingly illogically but, being subordinated to the effect the orator means to attain, in an exactly premeditated sequence. Cluentius was charged, on the one hand, with poisoning his stepfather, Statius Albius Oppianicus. The other part of the charge was founded on the criminal proceedings under which eight years before Cluentius charged Oppianicus with poisoning attempt against him, as a result of which Oppianicus was compelled to go into exile-in the current lawsuit, however, the prosecution brought it up against him that the former court of justice declared Oppianicus guilty purely because Cluentius had bribed the judges. Lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis of 81 served as basis for judging crimes that provide grounds for the charge of poisoning; however, the prohibition of bribing judges applied to the order of senators only, and Cluentius belonged to the order of knights. First, we intend to outline the historical background of the oration, so to say, the historical facts of the case (I.); then, we turn our attention to the opportunity of applying statutory facts of the case, i.e. lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis. (II.) Finally, we examine the rhetorical tools of Cicero’s strategy to explore how the orator handled, modified or distorted the system of the charges and chronology-to support the argument, which can be considered brilliant with a lawyer’s eyes, too. (III.)
In the present paper we analyse the state of facts of robbing of a grave in German folk laws. We pay special regard to the issue to what extent the impacts of Roman law and the Church and primarily German customary law can be demonstrated in the system of state of facts and sanctions of specific laws. This investigation requires the analysis of the legal source base as well as some examination in the history of language, which allows a comparative analysis of the issue and helps to highlight the various layers of the norms of German folk laws by the example of this state of facts.
This paper intends to analyse the Bavarian linguistic elements of Lex Baiuvariorum,2 the written Bavarian Volksrecht3 created between 737 and 743 from philological aspects and draw further conclusions from findings for legal history considerations. First we will examine expressions where the active predicate in first person plural reveals that the Bavarians assisting in making the law inserted them in relevant passages as words of their own folk language. (I) After that, we will analyse phrases accompanied by active predicate in third person plural and passive predicate in third person singular or plural either naming Bavarians as the subject or not where the text makes it clear that these words were used by Bavarians to express the given meaning. (II) Atfer analysing Bavarian personal names, primarily names of genealogiae (III), we will discuss Bavarian/South German expressions in the text of the Bavarian law that apparently correspond to or overlap the relevant loci of Lex Alamannorum (IV). In the light of all these, the paper will make an attempt to arrive at some deductions on the usage of Lex Baiuvariorum that can be supported by proofs and go beyond hypothesis.
After the battle of Thapsus that took place on 6 April 46 Caesar kept delaying his return to Rome for a long while, until 25 July — he stopped to stay on Sardinia — and this cannot be attributed fully to implementing measures and actions necessary in Africa since they could have been carried out by his new proconsul, C. Sallustius Crispus too. The triumph held owing to the victory in Africa — in which they carried around representations of the death of M. Petreius, M. Porcius Cato and Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica — must have further grated on the nerves of the aristocracy of Rome, because it was meant to symbolise Caesar’s victory both over Iuba and the senate. It was after that that Cicero broke his silence and delivered Pro Marcello in the senate, which was both oratio suasoria and gratiarum actio for the pardon granted to Marcellus, by which Caesar wanted to assure the senate of his benevolence and wanted to show off his power by his autocratic gesture. Pro Ligario delivered in 46 has been considered a classical example of deprecatio by both the antique and modern literature, and in historical terms it is not a less noteworthy work since from the period following the civil war Pro Marcello, having been delivered in early autumn of 46 in the senate, is Cicero’s first oration made on the Forum, that is, before the general public, in which praising Caesar’s clementia he seemingly legitimised dictatorship. First, we describe the historical background of the oratio and the process of the proceedings (I.); then, we examine the issue if the proceedings against Ligarius can be considered a real criminal trial. (II.) After the analysis of the genre of the speech, deprecatio (III.) we analyse the appearance of Caesar’s clementia in Pro Ligario. (IV.) Finally, we focus on the means of style of irony, and highlight an interesting element of the Caesar-Cicero relation and how the orator voices his conviction that he considers the dictator’s power and clementia illegitimate. (V.)
Lex Baiuvariorum is Bavaria’s most important and earliest source in terms of legal history. This paper deals with the history of the creation of Lex Baiuvariorum. More specifically, dwelling on the issues of dating of Lex Baiuvariorum (I), possible connect ions between the content of the narrative in the Prologus and the process of making the code of laws (II), significance of the first two titles of the code in terms of dating (III) and problems arising with regard to the process of editing Lex Baiuvariorum (IV).
Interpretation based on maxims of legal logic occupies an honourable place among the possible methods of legal interpretation; this being done most frequently using basic concepts originating from the classical period of Roman law, which faciliate orientation among contradictory decrees and help to clarify the meaning of legal rules. The following principles belong hereby, widely known in Modestinus's formulation but dating from the period of the leges XII tabularum: "lex posterior derogat legi priori",the Papinian "lex specialis derogat legi generali", and the "lex primaria derogat legi subsidiariae". It is a basic interpretive principle, that the legal rule should be interpreted in its integrity, not by extracting certain parts of it. The following the letter of the law often leads to its evasion. During the interpretation one should take into account the legislator's intention. If this is doubtful, the more lenient solution should be preferred. All these ideas can be traced back into a highly philosophical, Celsian principle, which is-also widely accepted in contemporary legal thinking. It-declares the vocation of the Law to implement Justice, according to which "ius est ars boni et aequi", the Law is an art of the Good and the Just. Out of these, the procedure called in fraudem legis is connected to the statement that enforcing the letter of the law often leads to inequity contradictory with the spirit of the law, i. e. injustice. Cicero also quotes this proverbium, already widely spread in the age of the Republic, which remained in use in his formulation until today: "summum ius summa iniuria", i. e. the utmost enforcement of the law leads to the greatest injustice. The present paper has a modest aim. It does not offer a general survey, but rather an introspection into the problem. First it enumerates the occurences of this proverb in the sources of Roman literature (I.), then it sketches the development and semantic changes of the concept of interpretatio (II.), next it investigates the meaning of summum ius in the relation of the ars boni et aequi principle and the concept of Justice in legal sources and Cicero's works (III.), in the end it will consider the further reaching consequences of this proverbium in Adagia by Erasmus of Rotterdam, one of the most important humanists (IV.).
When scrutinizing the concept of authority, presenting the basic definition of auctoritas, the capacity of increase and augmentation, Hannah Arendt appositely quotes the relevant passage by Cicero, according to which the task of founding the state, the human community, as well as the preservation of what has already been founded, highly resembles the function of the numen, the divine operation (Cicero, De re publica 1, 7. "Neque enim est ulla res in qua propius ad deorum numen virtus accedat humana, quam civitatis aut condere novas aut conservare conditas."); and in connection with this, she states that, from this aspect, the Romans regarded religious and political activity as being almost identical. The paper will examine various aspects of the numen, one of the most important phenomena of Roman religion (I.), its etymology (II.), the institution of the triumphus, a phenomenon seeming to be relevant from this point of view (III.), then the concept of numen Augusti, incorporating these elements of the religious sphere into the legitimation of power. (IV.)
The idiom of the scales of justiceis commonly known and widely used. Iustitia can frequently be seen in different representations holding scales in her hand. The scales as a means or a symbol of justice (justness) or the administration of justice can be encountered in various places in Greek literature, one of its earliest instances being the Homeric Hermes' Hymn (Dikés talanta). According to these loci Zeus holds the scales of Diké, that is to say, the scales of justice in his hand. In the Iliad (23, 109-213) one may come across a scene presented in context, thus suitable for being more amply analysed, in which Zeus is pronouncing justice over the heroes using a pair of scales. In search of the meaning of Dikés talanta, this study tries to clarify the concept of law and justice (justness) in Homeric epic (I.), then by a structural (II.) and comparative analysis (III.) of certain lines of the weighing scene, decisive in the combat of Achilles and Hector, it formulates a few remarks on the origin and meaning of the concept of the scales of justice. One cannot claim that this idea of Egyptian religion had been transferred in its entirety into Greek thinking, but it is not surprising, as one can barely encounter an unaltered Egyptian borrowing in Greek mythological thinking. Nonetheless, some Egyptian influence, possibly with Cretan transmission, can be detected in the development of the Greek versions of psykhostasia and kerostasia. Pictorial as well as textual manifestations of such influence can be found on the one hand in vase-paintings, and on the other hand-undergoing a specific alteration of aspect in the form of kerostasia-in Homer, who paved the way for the scales of justice of Zeus and Iuppiter to become the symbol of Diké and Iustitia, and subsequently of the administration of justice itself.