literature, I map, present and analyse the existing indicators quantifying China's progress in its modernisation endeavour, such as the industrial and technological specialisation, sophistication of exports, reduction of technological dependence, innovation
part, Section 2 provides literature review and theoretical background for the research. In Section 3 , I explain the empirical approach, survey design, how I measure pro-social behaviour and social capital and report descriptive statistics of the
rational individual accept an amnesty and pay past dues? How can the existing literature explain why tax evaders may find it worthwhile to take advantage of the TAPs? Leonard – Zeckhauser (1987) argued in favour of TAPs that some people obtain and no one
Authors:Jorge de Andrés-Sánchez, Ángel Belzunegui-Eraso and Francesc Valls-Fonayet
optimal number of clusters. As Wang – Zhang (2007) showed, this topic has generated a great deal of attention in the literature. In this paper, we use two indices to validate the number of clusters. The first one uses only the MLs of the elements and is
-communist transition in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (in 1989–1991) and former Soviet Union (FSU) (1991–1992). In the 1990s and early 2000s, the comparison of both transition experiences was a popular topic in economic literature and often the subject of hot
We look at the soft budget constraint literature in the context of the state-led restructuring of state-owned enterprises (SOE) in which institutions are both regulators charged with constraining SOE restructuring outcomes and part owners of the SOEs concerned. Such institutional agents constitute a set of what we term “owner—regulators (OR)”. These economic agents may have political problems as regulators — as suggested by the Chicago School approach to economic regulation. They can also have ownership problems — here defined by literature on the theory of the firm and on vertical structure. In this light the incentives associated with the imposition of hard budget constraints may be by themselves insufficient to radically change owner—regulator behaviour. If the implementation of such constraints does not take into account the factors highlighted by this paper, hard budget constraints are likely to be either counterproductive or irrelevant.