This article combines a rational choice framework with an analysis of contemporary European Union institutions to elucidate the causes of Grexit and Brexit. It shows that the sustainability of the EU in part or whole in “normal” times depends on member compatibility and coercive adaptation. If members share the same values, including a common vision of transnational governance and a commitment to mutual support (solidarity), the EU should be able to stick together through thick and thin. If, on the contrary, members hold incompatible outlooks on the distribution of transnational powers and solidarity, then the EU will be vulnerable to dismemberment. The EU today is prone to disunion because its members no longer share a common view of mutually acceptable transnational government and policy; powerful members insist upon bending recalcitrant members to their will (coercive adaptation), and participants hold contradictory attitudes towards solidarity on a variety of issues. Winston Churchill and Robert Schuman in the late 1940s hoped that their post-war Europe project would be something more than a “single market”; that it would become the cornerstone of European peace. They appreciated the value of cooperative economy, but considered material benefits icing on the cake. Brexit and Grexit are best seen in this larger perspective underscoring the wisdom of conciliation.
Recent enthusiasms have emphasised particularly ideas of “learning organisations”, calling attention both to the ways organisations learn and to the possibilities for improving organisational intelligence through increasing the rate and precision of learning. These enthusiasms have often encouraged the too easy assumption that learning processes necessarily lead to organisational improvement. The usefulness of learning as an instrument of organisational intelligence has to be demonstrated, not assumed. Adaptive processes such as learning are not guaranteed to reach or sustain a global maximum on an outcome surface. In order for proposals for “learning organisations” to be more than vague wishes for improvement, learning must be defined in terms of some specific process and the conditions under which that process does or does not lead to improvement must be established. This essay is built around six simple propositions, a kind of catechism for consideration of learning as an instrument of intelligence.
. Rosefield , S. ( 2016 ): Grexit and Brexit: Rational Choice, Compatibility and Coercive Adaptation . Acta Oeconomica , 66 ( S1 ): 79 – 93 . de Santis , R. – Favero , C
– Pesendorfer 2008 ). Of course, RPT and rational choice theory have been criticized for many years from various perspectives ( Sen 1973 , 1977 , 1993 ; Hausman 2008 , 2012 ; Herfeld 2020 ). Moreover, currently, there is no single and universal conception
theory related to Shefrin – Thaler (1988) . BLCH is characterised as a critical enrichment of LCH for factors of households’ savings. The BLCH model originates in psychology and replaces the rational choice assumed by earlier models with an effort of
. ‒ Kliemt , H. ( 2011 ): Rational Choice Models in Economic Policy Advice . Jahrbuch für normative und institutionelle Grundfragen der Ökonomik , 10 : 243 ‒ 262
47 68 Berger, J. — Offe, C. (1982): Functionalism vs. Rational Choice? Some Questions concerning the Rationality of Choosing One or the Other. Theory and Society 11(4): 521
conclusions are received as unquestioned fact, the more their predictions appear confirmed by” practice ( Hay 2004 : 59, on rational choice models). 5.6 Management Two themes and meta
of Chicago Press . Danchev , S. ( 2016 ): Was Bentham a Primitive Rational Choice Theory Predecessor? . European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 23 ( 2 ): 297 – 322 . 10.1080/09672567.2014.916728 Dierksmeier , C. – Pirson , M
dare to say it because she does not look at economic heterodoxy. References Alexandrova , A. ( 2006 ): Connecting Rational Choice Models to the Real World . Philosophy of the Social Sciences , 36 ( 2 ): 173 – 192 . 10.1177/0048393106287210 Apostel