The high rate of increase of ruling politicians' wealth has been empirically proven many times. However, in the literature it is almost always assumed that politicians grew rich faster due to political rent-seeking or corruption. The aim of this article is to discuss the assumption whether corruption and rent-seeking is indeed the only possible cause, and to present empirical findings undermining the assumption. The results of the analysis of levels and rate of growth of Polish politicians' wealth clearly show that the other explanation is the selection of people exercising authority. Based on statistical analysis of 2024 asset declarations of 689 councillors from Polish voivodeship assemblies from two terms in the period of 2010–2018, the paper demonstrates that the different rates of changes of the value of assets of coalition and opposition councillors are at least partly the effect of the selection bias.
The aim of the paper is to highlight the main characteristics of the recent Hungarian public administration reform, as well as to reveal the inconsistent nature of some of its elements and to describe the connected risks. The starting point of the article is the Magyary Zoltán public administration development programme. The reform steps are compared to the ideal type NPM approach. The Hungarian public administration reform can be characterized by strong centralization and the revitalization of Hungarian anti-liberal traditions at macro level, and by the support of the enhancement of market rules and management at micro level.
One factor that contributes in the size of the shadow economy is the regulation of business activities. This paper provides empirical analysis of the effects of regulatory discretion on the unofficial economy. It adds to the previous findings by gathering evidence from a large data set of 162 countries for the 1999 to 2007 period. Going beyond simple correlation, it uses the Arellano-Bond estimator to investigate the dynamics and causal effects of regulation on the shadow economy. We find that increase in regulation increases the size of the shadow economy.
Authors:Tatjana Horvat, Philipp Mayrleitner, Romana Korez Vide, and Vito Bobek
This paper aims to examine specific cultural attributes which may be favourable to economic development or restrictive to corruptive behaviour. The indicators of GDP growth and GDP per capita, the Human Development Index (HDI), Hofstede's cultural dimensions and the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) were used within a two staged analysis on the sample of selected emerging economies between 1995–2015. The findings of the research outline the complexity of this topic and numerous interrelations among the involved variables. The paper emphasises the importance of understanding the cultural traits of societies and the motives for corruption, to be able to take appropriate measures to promote economic and human development and to combat corruption. Future studies could assess differences within cultural clusters of the emerging economies to allow further insights on a comparative level, increasing the possibility to find answers why different regions develop faster than others.
Authors:I. Kaur, N. Chawla, A.S. Dhatt, and M. Kaur
), and 4 white (D-73-B, D-48-B, PW-731035, and Punjab White) genotypes were grown. Planting was done at a spacing of 15 cm between rows and 7.5 cm between plants. The plants were furrow irrigated at 7–10 days intervals, and watering was stopped a
) aki a Vagyonkezelő Testület tagja, d) 73 (5) A Felügyelő Testület feladatainak ellátása érdekében az Akadémia tisztségviselőitől és az MTA Titkársága vezető beosztású alkalmazottaitól jelentést vagy felvilágosítást kérhet, az Akadémia és az akadémiai