International development cooperation has experienced large changes in recent years. One spectacular issue is the emergence of new donors, which are playing a more significant role than ever. China, India, Brazil, Russia, and the Arab countries — together with other emerging countries — support developing countries, though their activity is highly criticized by ‘traditional’ donors. The paper aims to analyse the behaviour of emerging donors with reflection on the question whether the additional resources complement or substitute the aid flows from traditional donors. The investigation shows that emerging donors do not behave as traditional donors and their aid allocation is determined by political and economic factors rather than the needs of the recipient countries. However, the statistical analysis reflects on the fact that in some cases emerging donors do behave similarly as traditional donors. Altogether, it is not proven that the additional resources complement existing aid flows.
The paper examines how flows of foreign aid have reacted to events of democratisation in developing countries. Using a panel dataset of 136 aid-receiving countries between 1980 and 2009, aid allocation regressions reveal that Western donors in general have tended to react to visible, major democratic transitions by increasing aid to the partner country, but no significant increases can be identified in the case of countries introducing smaller democratic reforms. The increases in aid flows are not sustained over time, implying that donors do not provide long-term support to nascent democracies. Also, democratisations in Sub-Saharan Africa do not seem to have been rewarded with higher levels of aid.
This paper summarizes some results of a wider research on foreign aid that was conducted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 2010. It seeks to describe the impressions and feelings of Palestinian aid beneficiaries as well as the roles and functions they attached to foreign aid. To capture and measure local perceptions on Western assistance a series of individual in depth interviews and few focus group interviews were conducted in the Palestinian territories. The interview transcripts were processed by content analysis. As research results show — from the perspective of aid beneficiaries — foreign aid is more related to human dignity than to any economic development. All this implies that frustration with the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict inevitably embraces the donor policies and practices too.
In this article the effects of government infrastructure investment in a small open economy environment are analysed. Apart from enhancing the country’s output directly, government spending on capital — modelled here as development of public infrastructure — creates positive externalities in the production process of the private sector. Short- and long-run effects of ambitious development programs, depending on the source of financing (transfers or loans from abroad), are addressed. The empirical relevance of the quantitative conclusions to be derived from the present stylised form of the model is admittedly limited. However, the qualitative conclusions can add some new insights and contribute to the lively debate on the expected effects of government investments and EU transfers on macroeconomic development.
Recently, the middle-income trap (MIT) has gained considerable attention – besides European countries, several African, Asian, and Latin-American developing countries are also affected. Many countries have remained in the middle-income bracket for decades, whilst only a few have advanced to high-income status. Felipe et al. in 2012 showed that an annual growth rate of at least 3.5 and 4.7% sustained for a period of 14 and 28 years is required respectively for upper-middle-income and lower-middle-income countries to escape the MIT. Economic growth is influenced by several factors including foreign aid received. Thus, in this study, we aim to answer the question of how aid affects economic growth in middle-income countries and whether aid may contribute to escaping the MIT. Focusing on the countries that have remained in the middle-income group between 1990 and 2017, our analysis confirms that aid contributes to economic growth; however, the impact is positive in the upper-middle-income countries and negative in the lower-middle-income countries. Aid is therefore, likely to be more effective in helping the upper-middle income countries to escape the MIT but not the lower-middle income countries.
The Greek financial crisis that erupted in 2010 was possibly cured after 8 years in 2018. It has been extraordinary in its social cost and its cost to European taxpayers. The causes of this failure are multiple. The main burden lies with consecutive Greek governments that did not carry out the necessary fiscal adjustment and reforms. In their lack of urgency they were strongly supported by American economists, especially Paul Krugman, who opposed austerity and instead called for fiscal stimulus, ignoring the need for financial stability. Much of this discussion was devoted to the benefits or harm of the Eurozone, which eventually hardly mattered. The crisis resolution was complicated by the European Union wanting to play a big role but not knowing how and weakening the traditional role of the International Monetary Fund. The key lessons are back to basics: A government needs to act hard and fast to resolve a severe financial crisis. The IMF is the best leader for financial stabilization. Early and fast fiscal adjustment brings about early financial stabilization, more structural reforms and early and higher growth.
This article attempts to offer a picture of the state of the economic reform in Ukraine in the summer of 2015, assessing what has been done. It offers a periodisation of Ukraine’s economic policy since its independence in 1991, suggesting that Ukraine has seen three periods of significant reform and this is by far the most important. The main cause of Ukraine’s current economic decline is Russian warfare. The present situation differs greatly from that after the Orange Revolution in late 2004. These reform efforts are more far-reaching than earlier attempts, especially in the energy and banking sectors. Finally, four risks to the present reform wave are discussed. The four big risks to this reform wave lie in Russian warfare, insufficient international funding, lagging reforms in the judicial sector, and the wearing out of the coalition because of economic hardship.
In the early and mid-2000s, the prospect of EU accession and the global boom facilitated rapid economic recovery and boosted economic and institutional reforms in the Western Balkan region. The global financial crisis of 2007–2009 and the European crisis of 2010–2013 slowed the pace of economic growth and amplified high unemployment in the region. In addition, various unresolved legacies from past conflicts slowed the pace of reform and progress towards EU accession.
The European Commission’s February 2018 communication sets an indicative deadline (2025) for the two most advanced candidates – Serbia’s and Montenegro’s admission to the EU. This could incentivise all Western Balkan countries, including those candidates that have not yet started membership negotiations (Macedonia and Albania) and those waiting for candidate status (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo), to remove domestic political obstacles to EU accession, solve conflicts with neighbours, speed up reforms and accelerate economic growth.