Keynesian policy was quite successful in the post-war decades in Western Europe, but by the late 1960s lost its efficiency due to changes in conditions rather than its mistaken logic. The lesson from the first global crisis erupting in early 1970s and also from the subsequent several crises since then is that the increasing crisis propensity of the world economy is rooted in its inherent disequilibria stemming from deep inequalities, asymmetrical interdependencies and disintegrated socio-economic structures. In view of the failure of the prevailing methods of crisis management, particularly those undifferentiated, antisocial austerity measures corresponding to a neo-liberal monetarist concept which neglects this lesson, many economists prefer the Keynesian recipe. However, since global crises need global solution, and the spread of conspicuous consumption modify the demand constraint, its application must be adjusted to reality, and requires some global governance which may pave the way for a global oeco-social market economy.
The sovereign debt crisis in Greece represents a very interesting case in which the Greek government succeeded in transforming domestic fiscal deficit problem, overspending and fear of free market reforms into a European challenge consistent with justifiable concerns about the sustainability of the euro-project and its likely future. In this paper, the roots of the crisis and the way of addressing it are discussed. In particular the features, drawbacks, missed opportunities and pitfalls of the €110 billion EU/IMF rescue package granted to Greece are examined. It is argued that the government’s focus on taxation rather than on politically costly privatization and cutbacks in the public sector undermined economic activity in the country, decreased the government’s revenue, and spawned disincentives for investment, without generating growth and without improving competitiveness. In brief, rather than contributing to economic recovery, the opposite was achieved as a result of the measures implemented by the government.
Authors:István Székely, Werner Roeger, and Jan In’ t Veld
This paper uses a multi-region DSGE model with collateral constrained households and residential investment to examine the effectiveness of fiscal policy stimulus measures in a credit crisis. The paper explores alternative scenarios which differ by the type of budgetary measure, their length, the degree of monetary accommodation and the level of international coordination. In particular we provide estimates for New EU Member States where we take into account two aspects. First, debt denomination in foreign currency and second, higher nominal interest rates, which makes it less likely that the Central Bank is restricted by the zero bound and will consequently not accommodate a fiscal stimulus. We also compare our results to other recent results obtained in the literature on fiscal policy which generally do not consider credit constrained households.
The first part of analysis draws out homogenous clusters of countries out of the 27 EU states based on their business cycle synchronicities with the euro area (EA) 12, quantified by correlations of cycles between the 27 countries’ GDP components and the EA12’s GDP1. The purpose is to compare the obtained country groupings with the countries that have adopted the euro in practice. This exercise is performed using fuzzy cluster analysis and is carried out for pre- and post-euro periods. Knowing that the recent global and euro zone crisis might impact the post-euro findings, the analysis for the post-euro period is done with and without the crisis period. In the second part of the analysis, a discriminant technique is applied to the clustering findings to ascertain the GDP component whose cycle synchronicity contributes most to the partitioning obtained in the cluster analysis. In a nutshell, findings indicate a significant divergence within EU27 and EA12 in the post-euro period and that business cycle symmetry concerning the GDP component of capital investment as a more significant determinant to country partitions.
Chinese infrastructural projects like the “Belt & Road Initiative” or the “Chinese 16 + 1 Initiative” are trapped in geopolitical narratives. Geopolitical concepts dressed in scientific robes make the logic of warfare begin to prevail over the logic of cooperation. As a consequence, something that was to be an opportunity for less developed countries, becomes the axis of conflict between the great powers. In this paper, I identify the logic of warfare as an underlining characteristic of geopolitical reasoning and show why it is incompatible with economic approach. I also argue that geopolitical concepts are not scientific theories, but rather self-fulfilling prophecies. This theoretical background allows to detect the biggest obstacles related to many Chinese initiatives, and also indicates some necessary means to neutralize geopolitical narratives.
One of the most often committed mistakes in economic reasoning is the supposition about the continuity of economic processes. However, what dominates in reality is a process of permanent changes, which sometimes proceed in a cascading manner rather than linearly. It must be acknowledged that the capitalist market economy by its very nature is involved in periodical crises. They must occur from time to time, yet the magnitude of the recent crisis is a result of inappropriate institutions and wrong macroeconomic policies based on neoliberalism. While the underlying causes of the crisis and the ways out of it at the era of interdependent global economy is discussed vividly in countless books and papers, yet it ought to be clear that the world is moving from one crisis to another. Thus, one must consider not only the economics of crisis, but also a kind of crisis of economics. There is a need for a New Pragmatism, based on the better understanding of economics as science, describing the economy as a system of forces and flows which contantly give feedback and influence each other.
Reactor neutron activation analysis of antimony, indium and cadmium in high-purity tin is interfered with by nuclear reactions
on the tin matrix. For a number of interfering reactions the cross-sections were determined. The following results were obtained:122Sn(n,γ)123mSn:σth=0.145 barn, I=0.79 barn;122Sn(n,γ)113Sn:σth=0.52, I=25.4 barn;112Sn(n, 2n)111Sn:
diameter 20 mm. Inside the tube there was a thin filament 50 mm long along the tube axis. Parallel to it there was a thermocouple 5 mm away from the tube axis. The filament had 1.42 × 10 −1 mm diameter and an electrical resistance R f = 4.2 Ω, which was