Authors:Yang Zhi, Zhang Meiying, Lin Baohe, Han Yan, Mu Aping, Zhang Qing, and Xu Xiaobao
Monoclonal antibody 3H11 was labelled with99mTc by modified Schwartz method. The antibody was incubated in a glass test tube at room temperature for 30min with a 1000-fold molar excess of 2-mercaptoethanol. The mean labelling efficiency of 3H11 with99mTc was more than 95%. The immuonreactivity of99mTc-3H11 was more than 80% by ELISA's method. Competetion results in vitro and HPLC analysis showed that99mTc was combined at the high affinity sites of antibody. The biodistribution in nude mice bearing 823 gastric cancer xenograpfts showed that the radioactivity in tumor at 24h postinjection was the highest except for that in kidney. The tumor uptake was 8.98±2.42% i.d/g. The ratio of tumor to blood was over 1.5 and that of tumor to liver was more than 2.5 at 24h post-injection. The tumor was clearly imaged at 22h postinjection. The inital clinical results showed that99mTc-3H11 was stable in vivo and was good located at the lesion sites.
Authors:C. Santiago, A. R. Arnaiz, L. Lorente, J. M. Arrieta, and M. A. Martinez
The thermal behaviour of collidinium decatungstate with twoN,N-dimethylformamide (DMF) crystallization molecules was studied by thermogravimetry. The kinetic parameters for the first stage of the thermal decomposition were established from isothermal and nonisothermal mass-change studies. The chemical reaction in this step is the loss of DMF: as confirmed by1H NMR.
The purpose of social co-ordination mechanisms is to co-ordinate the activities of individuals and organisations specialised in the distribution of work. The paper reviews five basic types of mechanisms: market, bureaucratic, ethical, aggressive and co-operative co-ordination. Today’s world operates on the basis of a duality: international cooperation is based on nation states, in which the public administrations work according to bureaucratic coordination. However, the increasingly globalised market responds to the logic of market coordination. The article argues that in terms of understanding the working of public administration, the various coordination mechanisms are of crucial importance, especially where various mechanisms meet, such as the relationship between nation states and multinational corporations.
The paper examines the requirements of an effective and legitimized democratic political system in the process of transition. The analysis and the conclusions are based on the Hungarian experience, which can carefully be applied to all Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Special focus is given to the relationship of legal certainty and the efficiency of the democratic system, to the tension between legalism and managerialism and to the characteristics of civil society organizations. In the conclusion special features of the transitional countries are pointed out.
The aim of the paper is to highlight the main characteristics of the recent Hungarian public administration reform, as well as to reveal the inconsistent nature of some of its elements and to describe the connected risks. The starting point of the article is the Magyary Zoltán public administration development programme. The reform steps are compared to the ideal type NPM approach. The Hungarian public administration reform can be characterized by strong centralization and the revitalization of Hungarian anti-liberal traditions at macro level, and by the support of the enhancement of market rules and management at micro level.
Since the crisis of 2007–2009, sovereignty, government and politics are on the agenda of social sciences and of international policy platforms, most recently in Davos. This is a departure from anti-statist, free-tradist visions of global market development in the 1980s and 1990s when sovereignty was simply associated with freedom of action of economic actors (most significantly, global corporations and banks) and governance simply referred to technical rules serving the ends of these actors posed in terms of dictates of the market. This paper points to societal dislocations (e.g. income discrepancies, unemployment) incumbent on global market development and to a time lag in which these made themselves felt in the developed and developing world. It argues that the developing world experienced the disillusionment with markets in the latter part of 1990s and early 2000s and sought solutions in effective governments, putting them in the service of reaping the benefits of global market expansion for individual regions. It meant non-liberal ways of governing markets, distancing from abstract formulations of individual rights, turning the ‘rule of law’ into living law deeply rooted in societal concerns not limited to commercial actors but including those of both blue-collar and white collar workers, of migrant populations, and women. At issue is an introduction of politics, of political agency and initiatives. The developed world rejected what is labeled as an ‘autocratic turn’; and is lost for a solution to market woes, except for further measures to maximize gains by major commercial actors, as in the case of the Greek crisis.
We look at the soft budget constraint literature in the context of the state-led restructuring of state-owned enterprises (SOE) in which institutions are both regulators charged with constraining SOE restructuring outcomes and part owners of the SOEs concerned. Such institutional agents constitute a set of what we term “owner—regulators (OR)”. These economic agents may have political problems as regulators — as suggested by the Chicago School approach to economic regulation. They can also have ownership problems — here defined by literature on the theory of the firm and on vertical structure. In this light the incentives associated with the imposition of hard budget constraints may be by themselves insufficient to radically change owner—regulator behaviour. If the implementation of such constraints does not take into account the factors highlighted by this paper, hard budget constraints are likely to be either counterproductive or irrelevant.
Oil-abundant countries, Iran, Iraq and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries try to improve democratic institutions and to manage their chronically big governments, while experiencing decreased world oil prices. These countries pursue open door policies. Most of the foreign revenues of the region stem from oil and gas exports. Thus, how to manage the production and exports of fossil resources is of great importance. This study aims to analyse the effects of quality of democracy, government size, and the degree of openness in explaining depletion of reserves between 1985 and 2015. After testing for panel unit root and co-integration, a panel data model was estimated considering random effects. The results indicate that democratisation and political stability causes higher depletion of oil. In addition, government size affects depletion in a non-linear form, so that oil production is maximised, when government expenditure accounts for nearly 14% of GDP, on average. Furthermore, trade openness positively impacts on the oil depletion. In this case study, higher oil depletion follows strengthening democratic foundations, resizing the public sector, expanding politico-economic ties with trade partners, and applying the modern technology in the upstream oil industries.
Authors:E. Macarena Hernández-Salmerón and Carlos Usabiaga
This paper deals with the effects of political decentralisation on economic growth in Spain, an issue that has generated heated debates in recent decades. Our analysis of the last three and a half decades, a period characterised by the weak narrowing of the income per capita gap within regions, does not offer conclusive results on convergence and points to the importance of alternative factors. Several proxies were used to capture the decentralisation process. We also studied some potential interactions between decentralisation and other variables. All in all, our empirical evidence shows robustly that transferring more responsibilities to subnational governments does not significantly affect growth in any sense.
Institutional quality is commonly cited as a reason that investment infl ows still vary across European countries, despite their economic stabilization following the tumultuous years in the early 1990s. This article tests empirically whether institutional quality has any bearing on the level of investment infl ows into selected groups of European countries. The role of institutions is assessed using Economic Freedom indices from the Heritage Foundation. We construct a panel dataset from 2000–2015 for 35 European countries to apply a fixed-effects and generalized method of moments model framework in the regression benchmark with the metrics from the Heritage Foundation. Results show that although institutional quality has some impact on the level of investment, it is less significant than expected and far less than suggested by the existing theoretical literature. Macroeconomic fundamentals matter more than do institutional factors.