The study deals with theoretical questions of the Hungarian privatization law. It clarifies the differences between the economic and legal concept of privatization, the various interpretations of privatization. The Hungarian privatization was the earliest and at the same time-after the German-the quickest completed privatization in the former socialist countries. It reviews the so-called spontaneous privatization between 1988–1990, and the privatization legislature of 1992 and 1995 as well. As a conclusion the study deals with the evaluation of the privatization law, and with the consequences of privatization with regards to social politics.
Corruption is linked with the issue
of clientelism. This establishes a wide understanding of that phenomenon. This
wide context and understanding of corruption is simplified by the recognition
of the patron-client system, accompanying corruption or even identified with
it. Clientelism may be of personal or mass character, and consists of mutual
provision of services, without the need to lay out funds for achieving common
goals. Socio-economic transformation as profound and thorough reform of the
system and institutions promotes corruption practices (the process of transfer
of resources from public to private sector progressed swiftly). Clientelism is
linked with the phenomenon of crony capitalism, which is treated as synonymous
to corruption or favoring corruption. Corruption provides a means for
maintaining and the development of client networks. Patron-client relations are
of secondary nature in some societies; in other societies they substantially
influence the shape of the political and economic system, as well as social
structure. Such relations may transgress the borders between classes,
professional groups, organizations, family relations. Where liberal-democratic
parliamentarism coincides with the absence of an educated civil society, the
civil service of the state, the domination of political parties and pressure
groups is present, which favor clientelistic corruption, influencing the
development of private sector and formation of capital. Political parties
distribute and decide upon thousands of positions. They organize their own
client communities. Still, typical clientelistic societies are rather not
common. If they were, in the long run they would cause loss of the competitive
edge of the economy on the global market. The dynamics of economy indicates
that the factors which paralyze economic development have not dominated the
economic system in Poland as yet, and that system maintains its autonomy. This
does not imply, however, the activation of long-term growth factors and the
elimination of what is called lost opportunity costs in the economy.
This paper investigates the relationship between economic growth in Poland and a few metrics of fiscal policy: budget deficit relative to GDP, the structure of public debt, education expenditures, and public consumption. We prove that with constant values of parameters of fiscal policy, over time the economy converges to the balanced growth path which is unique and globally asymptotically stable.
Having calibrated the model with statistical data, we demonstrate that in the period of 2000–2016 economic growth in Poland was driven primarily by rapid improvement in the level of human capital (at a rate of 5.4% per annum), and secondarily due to the accumulation of capital (2.7% annually). If recent trends in fiscal policy are continued, the Polish economy will converge to the balanced growth path with GDP growing at 3.7%. This rate may be boosted, if fiscal policy is appropriately adjusted, for example by permanent reduction in budget deficit. We also analyse the effects of changes in the financing structure of public debt. Finally, we present several scenarios of increasing public and private spending on education.