Corporate governance has become increasingly important in developed and developing countries just after a series of corporate scandals and failures in a number of countries. Corporate governance structure is often viewed as a means of corporate success despite prior studies reveal mixed, somewhere conflicting and ambiguous, and somewhere no relationship between governance structure and performance. This study empirically investigates the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance of listed banking companies in Bangladesh by using two multiple regression models. The study reveals that a good number of companies do not comply with the regulatory requirements indicating remarkable shortfall in corporate governance practice. The companies are run by the professional managers having no duality and no ownership interest for which they are compensated by high remuneration to curb agency conflict. Apart from some inconsistent relationship between some corporate variables, the corporate governance mechanisms do not appear to have significant relationship with financial performances. The findings reveal an insignificant negative impact or somewhere no impact of independent directors and non-independent non-executive directors on the level of performance that strongly support the concept that the managers are essentially worthy of trust and earn returns for the owners as claimed by stewardship theory. The study provides support for the view that while much emphasis on corporate governance mechanisms is necessary to safeguard the interest of stakeholders; corporate governance on its own, as a set of codes or standards for corporate conformance, cannot make a company successful. Companies need to balance corporate governance mechanisms with performance by adopting strategic decision and risk management with the efficient utilization of the organization ’s resources.
The rapid institutional changes taking place today, including the emergence and global spread of new institutions bring to the fore the question of how new institutions develop. From the 1990s onwards, a new technical term has begun to spread in the literature: institutional entrepreneurship, reflecting the revaluation of people’s activity in institutional change. The aim of the paper is to answer the questions regarding this kind of entrepreneurship. How does institutional entrepreneurship emerge, how can we interpret and define this phenomenon? What kind of driving forces are behind it? How does it work in the real economy? The novelty of the paper is in addressing institutional entrepreneurship as the result of a special ability and activity of actors to combine different, already known elements for building up new institutions. The study introduces the characteristics of institutional entrepreneurship, using the example of the sharing economy, by contrasting sharing as an alternative to conventional market solutions. The paper also demonstrates how the institutional entrepreneurship of sharing changes its socio-economic environment, from mobilization of unused resources through perception of ownership to the increase of the growth potential of the economy.
. This unit is called the Board of Directors. Modern corporate governance theory is based on the seminal study of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that forms the foundation of the agencytheory. In practice, two fundamental corporate governance models can be
References from accounting doctoral course syllabi are used to construct a data base. Some type of syllabus in the areas of financial accounting, research methodology, behavioral accounting, managerial accounting, and information economics and agency theory was obtained from 49 schools. Syllabi references are used to rank accounting departments based on the author's place of employment and institution from which the doctorate was earned.
We analyze the determinants of capital structure and its choice by small and medium-sized enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe from 2002 to 2007. We test the relevance of the three main theories: the Static Trade-off Theory, the Pecking Order Theory, and the Agency Theory, which have been derived primarily for developed markets, because our knowledge on their validity for emerging European countries is limited. We confirm the positive impact of size and asset tangibility on the leverage, while rejecting both the positive impact of profitability and tax, as well as the negative impact of business risk and non-debt tax shields. We report that SMEs behave homogeneously, and the relevant capital structure determinants show remarkable steadiness. Our results show a special time varying behaviour, in which the relevant determinants become stronger, while most of the country-specific factors present weakening effects. We argue that firms of the CEE countries remarkably converged their financial decision-making procedure to that of developed countries through the investigated period. The relevance of the Trade-off Theory is weak, as firms respect a one-sided upper threshold rather than converging to a fixed target on both sides, while they are not indifferent to the hierarchy of financing alternatives.