This paper discusses the different models of appointment applied for constitutional judges in Europe, taking into consideration also the appointment procedure of the two European regional courts. It offers an account and a comparative analysis of the three appointment models: the split, the collaborative and the parliamentary model, discussing their practical application and shortcomings. In particular, the paper deals with the question of how to avoid standstills in the different appointment procedures and with the publicity of these procedures. The author concludes with a proposal for the Hungarian Constitutional Court, arguing that the split model is the one that ensures better that the composition of the Court expresses a balance between the branches of government.
adjudication, this meant that the traditional, unwritten convention on the appointmentofjudges has been dropped and political actors tried use the Court as means for settling political disputes. Consequently, the Court’s approach to constitutional conflict
undermined the rule of law: lack of publication and non-compliance with the Constitutional Tribunal's rulings concerning the appointmentofjudges, series of legislative changes impeding the organization of the Constitutional Tribunal and deficiency in the