Keynesian policy was quite successful in the post-war decades in Western Europe, but by the late 1960s lost its efficiency due to changes in conditions rather than its mistaken logic. The lesson from the first global crisis erupting in early 1970s and also from the subsequent several crises since then is that the increasing crisis propensity of the world economy is rooted in its inherent disequilibria stemming from deep inequalities, asymmetrical interdependencies and disintegrated socio-economic structures. In view of the failure of the prevailing methods of crisis management, particularly those undifferentiated, antisocial austerity measures corresponding to a neo-liberal monetarist concept which neglects this lesson, many economists prefer the Keynesian recipe. However, since global crises need global solution, and the spread of conspicuous consumption modify the demand constraint, its application must be adjusted to reality, and requires some global governance which may pave the way for a global oeco-social market economy.
The euro crisis and its lessons are still not a closed chapter for economists and policy makers. The challenge to find the most appropriate ways to prevent intra-area imbalances is still on the top of the agenda. Nominal adjustment (internal devaluation) remains one of the most critical aspects of this debate. Many are indeed interested in whether austerity measures in several countries “made sense.” But much more is at stake here than evaluating the past. The true question is whether the eurozone can rely on nominal adjustment to align internal economic fluctuations. This paper contributes to the answer by investigating the size of price changes and their impacts on output and trade in the wake of the euro crisis. Selecting the most appropriate variables to measure competitive outcomes, the basic idea of “expansionary contraction” is tested. We rely on a comprehensive panel of all Eurozone member states in the post-crisis years (2010–2017). The results suggest that flexible price levels cannot be taken for granted, and a link to competitiveness is not self-evident, either. Other channels of adjustment may prove to be more important, but scaling them up will ultimately require a sound consensus on the future architecture of the euro.
Authors:João Carlos Lopes, José Carlos Coelho, and Vítor Escária
the crisis period, as self-employed workers avoided better the austeritymeasures imposed by the Troika in 2011–2013. Fig. 15. Evolution of wage share, labour productivity and average labour compensation: Business Services – 1995/2015 5 Wage
. , ‘Striking Down AusterityMeasures: Crisis Jurisprudence in Europe’ , Int’l , J. Const. L , Blog. ( 2013 ) http://www.iconnectblog.com/2013/06/striking-down-austerity-measures-crisis-jurisprudence-in-europe/ accessed 04 November 2019 . Alajos Kiss v
) concerning the austeritymeasures leading to pay cuts for civil servants, including the judiciary. One of the first attempts was made to invoke Art. 2 TEU (the EU’s values) in light of the EU Member States’ obligation to guarantee and respect the independence
accompanied by the austeritymeasures, on the grounds that budget deficit and sovereign debt, partially ballooned by bank bailouts, might be reduced by proceeds from sales revenues. 29 Here again, quiet forms appeared like selling subsidiaries or minority
asking the compatibility of national legislation with the Charter. The national courts failed to show that the respective legislations were in fact adopted as austeritymeasures in the framework of an EU financial assistance program to Romania. 61