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2001 folyamán néhány szociológus és vezető szociális munkás a Fővárosi Közigazgatási Hivatal megbízásából mintegy negyven budapesti szociális intézménynél folytatott módszertani ellenőrzést. Ezeket az intézményeket nonprofit szervezetek, vállalkozók, egyházak és önkormányzatok tartják fenn. A tapasztalatok alapján megállapítható, hogy gyakorlatilag befejeződött a fővárosban működő szociális ellátó intézmények igaz­gatásrendészeti megalapozása, és jelentősen előrehaladt a professzionalizálódás. A módszertani munka további fázisában szükséges a módszertan fejlesztése és az ellenőrzések, felülvizsgálatok metodológiájának kimunkálása is.

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I consider the application of János Kornai’s soft budget constraint (SBC) concept to the state capitalist economy. I argue that interaction of SBC with agency problems within the government bureaucracy helps explaining a major feature of state capitalism – failure to privatize underperforming state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Bureaucrats supervising the failing SOEs prefer to keep them afloat and gamble for resurrection; in contrast, privatization would involve recognizing the loss, which would result in acknowledging the bureaucrat’s failure that is disincentivized by the state. This endogenously emerging preferential treatment of state-owned firms creates a competitive advantage against private firms; this explains why in state capitalism privatization may result in lower rather than higher productivity and therefore remain unpopular.

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Abstract  

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the relationship between bureaucracy and research performance within Public Research Bodies. The research methodology is applied on a sample of 100 interviewed belonging to 11 institutes of National Research Council of Italy. The main finding is that within Italian Public Research Council there is academic bureaucratization that reduces performance and efficiency of institutes. In fact, institutes have two organizational behaviours: high bureaucracy — low performance and low bureaucracy - high performance. These bureaucratic tendencies are also present in other countries and particularly: the public research labs have an academic bureaucratization because of administrative burden necessary to the governance of the structures, whereas the universities have mainly an administrative bureaucratization generated by the increase of administrative staff in comparison with researchers and faculty.

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The article is based on Aaron Wildavsky's famous model of culture to interpret responsibility. In this model (1) fatalism leads to universal irresponsibility; (2) an individualistic culture values personal responsibility; (3) hierarchical cultures produce hierarchical responsibility; and (4) egalitarian culture generates collective responsibility. The author argues that the only acceptable form of responsibility is the personal one. A higher autonomy of public servants implies a greater degree of accountability and also responsibility. This new type of personal responsibility does not separate public servants into two categories: politicians with responsibility and bureaucrats without it. Personal responsibility presupposes persons who are able to make decisions and can find the balance between their self-interest and a public interest.

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Scientific observers as well politicians have noted for a long time that European integration is a process led by the elites but supported much less enthusiastically by the public at large. The first part of this paper documents systematically and for the first time how pervasive the split between elites and citizens has become over the last decades; the rejection of the “Constitution for Europe” by clear majorities of the French and Dutch voters in 2005 was only the last and most spectacular event in this regard. The paper proposes two theses which help to explain this split: (1) European integration has brought and still brings many advantages to the powerful elites involved, the political, economic and new “Eurocratic” elites; (2) for the population at large, the gains from integration are much less obvious; significant subsections of the populations in different EU member countries have been affected negatively by integration. These theses are documented by empirical evidence from many different sources: Data about the origins, careers and privileges of European politicians and bureaucrats; historical and contemporary data about the role of economic interests and the successful strategies of economic elites concerning integration; statistical data about the socioeconomic development of the EU and “Euroland” compared to other large advanced countries and macro-regions of the world; and survey data about the perceptions and evaluations of European integration both among the elites and the populations in the different member states.

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Acta Oeconomica
Authors: Miklós Somai and Zsuzsánna Biedermann

This paper reviews the deeper societal and economic reasons behind the British choice of leaving the European Union. We address the detailed results of the referendum and the long-standing sceptical British attitude towards European integration; next, we analyse the net budgetary contribution that changed enormously after the Eastern Enlargement. It is argued that the rise in the immigrantnative ratio had a significant impact on employee’s pay level in certain areas, therefore pro-Brexit campaigners highlighted migration as one of the major problems arising from EU membership. Increasing income and wealth inequalities and a growing anti-elite sentiment in British society, coupled with the negative image of Brussels bureaucrats and a British approach to the rule of law that is fundamentally different from the continental one, also contributed to the final result of the referendum. Our analysis ends with a glimpse into the close future, emphasising that the future of British-EU relations depends wholly on the pragmatism and wisdom of the negotiating parties.

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This paper examines the cross-pollination of the neo-Marxist critique of real existing socialism with the critical practices of the radical stream of the East European neo-avant-garde, and examines the extent to which the imprint of debates over the radical overhaul of the socialist system can be detected in the practices of artists and curators. Artistic affinities with the neo-Marxist debates that flared across the Eastern Bloc can be identified in a shared willingness to question authority, a subversive attitude to canonical thinking and a new interest in the role of an individual in socialist society. Considered also is the shift over the course of the 1970s from a belief in the possibility of a reformed socialism, to one of resignation, cynicism and frustration towards party bureaucracy, in which even the bureaucrats had stopped believing in the official ideology. This change in attitudes towards socialism is detected both in the change in tone in the writings of dissident theorists and in the approach of artists who could no longer muster the neo-avant-garde enthusiasm for the utopian desire to transform the world. The difficult paths taken by those, who sought to recover the radicalism in Marxist thought from under the blanket of state bureaucracy may also be viewed as a valuable source for contemporary social criticism of the post-communist order by a new generation of theorists and artists.

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Halvetis dans l’aire balkanique de la fin du XV e siècle à nos jours . Leyde. Fleischer, C. H. (1986): Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire. The Historian Mustafa Âlî (1541–1600) . Princeton

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. Fleischer, C. H. (1986): Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire. The Historian Mustafa Âli (1541–1600) . Princeton. Fleet, K. (1999): European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman State. The Merchants of Genoa

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. S. — Geraint, J. — Kaufmann, D. — Schankerman, M. A. (2000): Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture: How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies. World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 2312

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