mechanisms are based on election terms and which are, consequently, structurally short-sighted. By ‘European constitutionallaw’, we mean in this paper both the primary law of the EU and domestic constitutional documents. 4 In the present paper we are first
This contribution aims to examine how the Hungarian Constitution applies in private relations through judicial activity and how the anti-discrimination legislation influences this tendency. The current codification procedure of the new civil code calls for a thorough theoretical background in order to answer how its provisions relate to the Constitution. After the general overview of the practice of courts and the Constitutional Court, the criticism of scholars developed on the issue will shed light on the weaknesses, but in spite of them, the overall success of the theory of indirect horizontal effect. The paper will also deal with the horizontal effect of a specific constitutional right, namely the right to equal treatment. I examine the fairly new legal instrument, the act on the prohibition of certain forms of discrimination, and demonstrate how this new practice influences the idea of horizontal effect in constitutional law and what implications it has on the new Civil Code afoot. I argue that the act at first sight exists independently from the requirement of horizontal application of fundamental rights, but, in fact, it implicates the necessity to reconsider in its light how the Constitution applies in private relations.
The Constitution comprises general clauses and notions whose meaning it does not specify in detail-and this meaning can be established by Constitutional Court. In the Polish doctrine of Constitutional law, opinions about the legal status of the Preamble are diversified. The dominant view in the contemporary doctrine of Constitutional law is that the Preamble has a normative character. The Constitutional Court has many times drawn upon the provisions of the Preamble in its rulings. The provisions of the Preamble dealing with Constitutional principles and values form a “bridge” between natural law and positivist law, which may be conducive to a fuller protection of human rights in the state, and consequently a better operation of Constitutional democracy. But the higher the frequency of principle- and value-invoking notions in the Constitutional text (usually in the Preamble), the greater and the more real is the authority of those who interpret these notions-and impart sense to them-in conditions of a particular constitutional dispute.
The author deals with an important question of the Hungarian constitutional law, which plays a relevant role during the accession process of a state of the European Union (EU). It means that the question of legal haromization always arises, when a state is going to join the EU. The author focuses on the question, whether the international law-namely the law of the EU-or the national law should be privileged in given cases. The author introduces the possible conflicts between international law and domestic law with the help of several examples. He refers to the numerous solutions of member-states of the EU and also mentions the situation of some would-be member-states, too. The author highlights the point of view that the Community law precedes the constitutions of the member-states. As a result of this the Hungarian constitution has to be modified in order to meet the requirements of the legal harmonization process, which will emerge with the access of Hungary to the EU.
, Magyarország közjoga (Alkotmányjog) [Public law of Hungary (Constitutionallaw)] (Budapest, 1902), 238; Gusztáv Ladik, Közigazgatásunk fejlődése 1867. óta [The development of Hungarian public administration since 1867] (Budapest, 1933), 11. Imre Zlinszky, A
The study analyses the protection of fundamental rights in Hungary. Article 8 paragraph (1) of the Hungarian Constitution is the basis of the protection of fundamental rights. The paper shows how Art. 8 paragraph (1) elvolved and explains how the Constitutional Court formed its content during the almost two decades after the transition. The content of the rule is explained by way of an item-by-item analysis of the terms of this paragraph. The analysis shows that the fact that the protection of fundamental rights is a primary obligation is not merely a declaration, but a regulative principle of constitutional democracy.
The Polish Constitution adopted on 2 April 1997, for the first time after the war, contains a provision dedicated exclusively to protecting national and ethnic minorities, however without a definition of those two categories. The legislator extended the rights of national and ethnic minorities beyond those identified in the Article 35. The extension of such rights also results from international agreements. Thus far there is no statute regulating in a comprehensive and complete manner the situation of national and ethnic minorities (the Constitution does not make its adoption mandatory), the legal regulations concerning these issues are dispersed. The problem of legal definition of the national minority appeared in connection with the initiative of the formal recognition of the Union of People of Silesian Minority. Its application has been rejected by Polish courts for the reason of non-existence of such a minority and for the attempt of abuse of the electoral privilege granted to national minorities. The Supreme Court's position has been confirmed by the Chamber and then by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights. However the 2002 national census revealed a new phenomenon of the Silesian minority: 3% of the inhabitants of the region declared their affinity to Silesian nationality.
In Hungary, the year 2012 brought a significant change in constitutional review. With modifying the competencies of the Constitutional Court, the Basic Law introduced three types of constitutional complaints and abolished actio popularis. Actio popularis was a well-functioning legal instrument in Hungarian law since the political transition of 1989–1990. Up until January 2012 anyone could request the abstract ex post facto constitutional review of a law or regulation. Unlike the former actio popularis, the essence of the new system of constitutional complaints is to have standing requirements for the complainants. Furthermore, new types of complaints are designed to defend constitutionality against personal injuries caused by ordinary courts as well. The article aims to describe actio popularis and constitutional complaints with regard to possible comparison of weaknesses and strong points. The author argues that regarding its effectiveness the new system do not yet provide a complete substitution for actio popularis.
This paper discusses problems related to the incorporation of constitutional rule of law into a pluralistic legal system, primarily in post-communist Hungary. Normative pluralism was characteristic of state socialism. Is this pluralism going to shape the emerging constitution-driven law of post-communism? The paper concludes that although constitutional universalism brought a new dimension to law and in principle has helped to promote the centrality of law in the competitive world of normative orderings, it may in the long run remain an elitist tool, fundamentally ignored or circumvented by sub-legal forms of social interaction.