The global crisis of 2007–2009 can be viewed as three interdependent and mutually reinforcing crises: a financial crisis, a liquidity crisis, and a crisis in the real economy. The ten East European countries that are now EU members were hit first by the global liquidity crisis, then by dramatic declines in capital inflows and plunging demand for their exports. Different impacts among the ten are explained by such factors as their exchange rate regimes, the extent to which households found it advantageous to rely on foreign-currency loans and the appropriateness of fiscal and monetary policies prior to the crisis. Since Western Europe’s recovery and growth are likely to be slow, in the future East European countries will have to rely relatively more on internally-generated sources of productivity growth and enhanced global competitiveness.
Looking back to the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, Hungary was among the first countries to be forced to make use of financial assistance from the EU and the IMF. The government, the MNB (the central bank of Hungary) as well as the domestic and foreign analysts cited the high public debt and the volume of unsecured foreign-currency loans as the main reasons for the crises. Though these were real weaknesses, this diagnosis was false as much as the following treatment. First and foremost, it was the inadequate level of foreign exchange reserves that made Hungary to request outside financial assistance.
The excessive fiscal tightening urged by the MNB only led to deepening of the crises. In general, the macropolicy – both fiscal and monetary policy – before, during and after the crises turned out to be painfully pro-cyclical. Due to the lack of sufficient reserves, the MNB became virtually powerless to intervene and could only watch from the side-lines as events unfolded. The orthodox mind-set after replenishing the forex reserves prevented it from implementing a broad scale of unconventional measures to ease the crises. The fiscal authority lost its capacity long before to reduce the severity of the crises. Thus, the excessive and incorrect structure of fiscal correction coupled with an unjustified orthodox monetary policy, the contraction of the Hungarian economy went much beyond the inevitable amount.
. — Chmielewski, T. — Niedxwiedzimska, J.N. (2007): Substitution between Domestic and ForeignCurrencyLoans in Central Europe. Do Central Banks Matter? MPRA Paper , 6759, University Library of Munich, Germany
( Fritz – Prates 2014 ). Similarly, when the foreigncurrencyloan crisis occurred during the AFC in 1997, Korean banks and the locally established branches of foreign banks rapidly increased short-term foreign currency liabilities from 2005 to 2007