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Merging asymptotic expansions are established for the distribution functions of suitably centered and normed linear combinations of winnings in a full sequence of generalized St. Petersburg games, where a linear combination is viewed as the share of any one of n cooperative gamblers who play with a pooling strategy. The expansions are given in terms of Fourier-Stieltjes transforms and are constructed from suitably chosen members of the classes of subsequential semistable infinitely divisible asymptotic distributions for the total winnings of the n players and from their pooling strategy, where the classes themselves are determined by the two parameters of the game. For all values of the tail parameter, the expansions yield best possible rates of uniform merge. Surprisingly, it turns out that for a subclass of strategies, not containing the averaging uniform strategy, our merging approximations reduce to asymptotic expansions of the usual type, derived from a proper limiting distribution. The Fourier-Stieltjes transforms are shown to be numerically invertible in general and it is also demonstrated that the merging expansions provide excellent approximations even for very small n.

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Summary General linear combinations of independent winnings in generalized \St~Petersburg games are interpreted as individual gains that result from pooling strategies of different cooperative players. A weak law of large numbers is proved for all such combinations, along with some almost sure results for the smallest and largest accumulation points, and a considerable body of earlier literature is fitted into this cooperative framework. Corresponding weak laws are also established, both conditionally and unconditionally, for random pooling strategies.

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