Over the past few decades, the complex process of globalization has dissolved the traditional concept of state sovereignty and neutralized the clear distinction between national and international law. Thus, legal scholarship has formulate alternative conceptual schemes to frame the fragmentation of the new global legal order. In the paper, I focus on the two typically antithetical approaches of legal pluralism and global constitutionalism. Legal pluralism emphasizes the diversity and the multiplicity of the global legal realm, while global constitutionalism is traditionally related to concepts of unity and hierarchy, whose paradigmatic reference is the state. The aim of the inquiry is to establish a theoretical basis and provide the conceptual tools to reconcile the two opposite approaches, first describing the main traits of each model, and then hypothesizing a hybrid model of plural constitutionalism. In the end, I will raise the question, from a constitutional but open point of view, whether it is really worth continuing to adopt a constitutional prospect. Alternative models (the GAL approach, for instance) may provide more suitable solutions for the complexity of the global legal world. However, a multiple model that attempts to reconcile different approaches, in correspondence to the multiplicity of the current global society, could be the best option.
creation of order, ordo, in individual civilizations, they referred to it as legal ethnology . Newfound interest in legalpluralism , as a development in recent decades, does not differ greatly from its predecessors. Historical and contemporary
This article focuses on the issue of the relationship between constitutional recognition and constitutional imposition of identity. The Canadian state in its constitutional document describes itself as a liberal democracy governing a pluralist society. It also recognizes Aboriginal rights as constitutive. The first two elements have met with considerable success in terms of aligning state and citizen identity. This suggests that neutral constitutional identities or identities that respect individual diversity can be imposed successfully through the democratic process. However, these are not effective in meeting decolonizing objectives, which must instead be pursued through respecting Indigenous self-governance.
This paper discusses problems related to the incorporation of constitutional rule of law into a pluralistic legal system, primarily in post-communist Hungary. Normative pluralism was characteristic of state socialism. Is this pluralism going to shape the emerging constitution-driven law of post-communism? The paper concludes that although constitutional universalism brought a new dimension to law and in principle has helped to promote the centrality of law in the competitive world of normative orderings, it may in the long run remain an elitist tool, fundamentally ignored or circumvented by sub-legal forms of social interaction.
As a legal philosophical overview of the operation of European law, the paper aims at describing the mentality working in it by also answering the query whether the European law itself is to be regarded as the extension of some domestic laws or it offers quite a new and sui generis structure built upon all member states’ laws. In either option, the connection between the European law and the composing national laws recalls the embodiment of post modern clichés, as the former’s actual working (both purposefully and through its by-effects) exerts a destructive impact upon the bounds once erected by the latter’s anchorage in the traditions of legal positivism. In addition, the excellence in efficacious operation of the European law is achieved by transposing the control on its central enactments to autonomous implementation and jurisdiction by its member nations. According to the conclusions of the paper, (1) the (post) positivism as the traditional domestic juristic outlook is inappropriate to any adequate investigation of the reality of European law. As part of the global post modernism itself, the European law stems from a kind of artificial reality construction (as the attempted materialisation of its own virtuality), which is from the outset freed from the captivity of both historical particularities and human experience, i.e., of anything concretely given hic et nunc. At the same time, (2) by its operation the European law dynamises large structures, through which it makes to move that what is chaos itself. For it is the reconstructive human intent solely that may try to arrange its outcome according to some ideal of order posteriorly-without, however, the operation itself (forming its construct and assuring its daily management) striving for anything of order (or ordered state and systemicity). This is the way in which the European law can be an adequate reflection upon the (macro) economic basis to which it forms the superstructure. Accordingly, (3) the whole construct is frameworked (i.e., integrated into one working unit and also mobilised) by an artificially animated dynamism. Concludingly, no national interest can be asserted in it without successful national self-positioning ready to launch it.
Megvilágítandó különbség áll fenn a jogi néprajz és a jogi
antropológia között, továbbá az utóbbi és a jogi etnológia s a jogi
pluralizmus, valamint a bennszülött jogok kutatása közt. Az első három tárgya
alapjában a nem jogi diszciplínák jogi vonatkozásaiból__
reference to the existence of the categories of “above” and “below” as evidence of the existence of legalpluralism, which he describes as “legal folkways,” and “substitutes for state law” (
Tárkány Szücs 1981 :820).