As a legal philosophical overview of the operation of European law, the paper aims at describing the mentality working in it by also answering the query whether the European law itself is to be regarded as the extension of some domestic laws or it offers quite a new and sui generis structure built upon all member states’ laws. In either option, the connection between the European law and the composing national laws recalls the embodiment of post modern clichés, as the former’s actual working (both purposefully and through its by-effects) exerts a destructive impact upon the bounds once erected by the latter’s anchorage in the traditions of legal positivism. In addition, the excellence in efficacious operation of the European law is achieved by transposing the control on its central enactments to autonomous implementation and jurisdiction by its member nations. According to the conclusions of the paper, (1) the (post) positivism as the traditional domestic juristic outlook is inappropriate to any adequate investigation of the reality of European law. As part of the global post modernism itself, the European law stems from a kind of artificial reality construction (as the attempted materialisation of its own virtuality), which is from the outset freed from the captivity of both historical particularities and human experience, i.e., of anything concretely given hic et nunc. At the same time, (2) by its operation the European law dynamises large structures, through which it makes to move that what is chaos itself. For it is the reconstructive human intent solely that may try to arrange its outcome according to some ideal of order posteriorly-without, however, the operation itself (forming its construct and assuring its daily management) striving for anything of order (or ordered state and systemicity). This is the way in which the European law can be an adequate reflection upon the (macro) economic basis to which it forms the superstructure. Accordingly, (3) the whole construct is frameworked (i.e., integrated into one working unit and also mobilised) by an artificially animated dynamism. Concludingly, no national interest can be asserted in it without successful national self-positioning ready to launch it.
The Atlantic civilisation has over the past centuries been composed of two definitely diverging ethoses and social philosophical inspirations, differing also by their very foundations. The contrasts are perhaps most conspicuous today as to be seen in the difference between approaches to life as a struggle and to law as a game within it. No doubt, on the one hand, there prevails the rest of (1) a European Christian tradition, characterised by communal ethos, with provision of rights as counter-balanced by obligations, in which priority is given to the peace of society and a traditional culture of virtues is promoted to both circumvent excesses and acknowledge human rights, with a focus on prevention of and remedy to actual harms. It is such an environment within which homo ludens as a type of the playful human who is at the same time dutiful and carefree-entirely joyful-constitutes a limiting value. If and insofar as struggle appears at all on the scene, it is mostly recognised as a fight for excellence. As a pathologic version, the loneliness of those staying away from participation may lead to psychical disorders which require subconscious re-compensation, the symbolic sanctioning of which was once accomplished by the psycho-analysis. On the other, there has also evolved (2) an Americanised individualistic atomisation of society, expecting order out of chaos, with absolutisation of rights ascribed to individuals, all closed back in loneliness. As an outcome, obligations are circumvented by entitlements, and unrestrained struggle becomes a part of any normal course of life with the deployment of human rights just to neutralise (if not disintegrate) communitycentred standards. “Life is struggle”-the hero of our brave new world enunciates the words as a commonplace with teeth clenched, convinced that life is barely anything but fight against anybody else (as an improved version, hailed as civilisatory advancement as re-actualising-under the pretext of maximising the chances of-the ominous bellum omnium contra omnes, formulated once in early modern England). Starting from the common deployment of some symbolical “cynical acid” in foundation of modern formal law but developing through differentiated ways of how to search for reason and systemicity in law, the conceptual and methodical effect of this very division is shown in the paper within the perspectives for curing malpractice in law and also in the role of ethics in economy.