The protracted sovereign debt crisis within the Eurozone has given rise to new policy questions. In a paradoxical way, the dilemmas confronting the contemporary EU/EMU reformers are similar to those which Socialist planners faced 30–40 years ago. This will be illustrated by two examples: the inherent contradictions of ex ante coordination, and the difficulties in hardening the soft budget constraint mechanism. Deep and far-reaching reforms are not possible without a consensus among those experts who have the ear of the elected leaders. This condition is not fulfilled today, due to the lack of consensus on the diagnosis.
The article introduces the different interpretations of corporate governance, and presents its developments in Central and Eastern Europe. After analysing historical backgrounds, the author discusses the socialist era's corporate governance methods. Regarding transition to market economy, new processes of the region are presented, outlining the influence of different Western models. Finally a chapter on Hungarian corporate governance analyses the legal and practical developments in the country from the roots to date.
agriculture in 1950s and forceful Stalinist-style industrialisation (‘The Great Leap Forward’ of 1958–1959). Economic and political transition in CEE and FSU, which started in 1989, was also caused by a deep crisis of centrally plannedeconomies (CPEs), which
Authors:Can Huang, Celeste Amorim Varum, and Joaquim Borges Gouveia
In 1985 China began the reform of its Science & Technology (S&T) sector inherited from the planned economy. To disclose the
impact of the drawn-out reform on the efficiency of the whole sector, we measure the scientific productivity of China's S&T
institutes. The analysis is based on R&D input and output data at the country aggregate and provincial level. We utilize Polynomial
Distributed Lag model to uncover the structure of the lag between R&D input and output. The findings reveal that the growth
rate of scientific productivity of China's S&T institutes has been negative since the 1990s.
The collapse of one-party dictatorship and centrally planned economy based on state ownership opened up the pathways for the formation of different postsocialist systems. Among other variants in a certain number of postsocialist states, democratic capitalism could emerge. Recently the system of postsocialist capitalism has been going through the process of regression leading to a distorted and defective democracy and capitalism in some postsocialist countries. This essay reviews the literature on the relationship of democracy and capitalism in order to contribute to the creation of a theoretical framework for the analysis of the regression of postsocialist democratic capitalism. In the paper the argument is made that for the explanation of the regression of democratic capitalism, the structural analysis of postsocialist democratization and marketization should be supplemented with a theory that reflects on the role of political actors, the role of political parties, party competition in this process.
This article is intended to give a short synopsis on the history of the Hungarian privatization, which has not been fully finished yet, but the most important aims however have been accomplished. As this issue is rather a complex one, having also legal and economic nature, one cannot avoid providing a short historical introduction from legal and economic aspects. Therefore the author also outlines the most significant elements of the changes in the system of the Hungarian ownership at the beginning of the 1990s, which can be featured as the transaction from planned economy into market-economy. After the introduction the author describes the most important steps of the Hungarian privatization, which can be summed up as follows: (i) stage of spontaneous privatization (1985-1989); (ii) stage of state-controlled privatization (1990); (iii) stage of state-"directed" privatization (1990-1991); (iv) stage of privatization under the SPA/-programmes (1991-1992); (v) stage of self-privatization (1992-1995); (vi) the "third" regulation of privatization, strategic privatization (1995-). The author also pays attention to the analysis of the relevant legal rules, which are or used to be in effect regulating privatization. The author also highlights that the law of Hungarian privatization cannot be thoroughly studied without taking into consideration the economic goals and economic characteristics of Hungary, as well.