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1 Introduction Under the new Fundamental Law of Hungary, which, like the 1989 Constitution, places the rule of law at the centre of the constitutional order, 1 the constraints
By creating the Basic Law of Hungary, ‘rule of law’ becomes one of the most frequently used expressions in the Hungarian constitutional law. That is why this paper puts the focus on analyzing the achievements of the ‘rule of law revolution’ and at the same times the role of the Hungarian Constitutional Court in this process.Theories criticising the current Hungarian routine of the ‘rule of law’ are also taken into consideration. According to the title of this paper rule of law, division of powers and constitutionalism are shown on legal and political background. In this aspect the essay also pay attention to the activism and role of the Hungarian Constitutional Court by analyzing its related decisions. Since 1990 (establishment of the Court) the Constitutional Court was the flagship of the Hungarian legal constitutionalism by enforcing the conception of ‘rule of law’ in its decisions. As the integral part of ‘rule of law’ the principle of ‘division of powers’ was affirmed in the decisions of the Court, though it was not defined in the Constitution. The Hungarian Constitutional Court on the basis of their decisions followed the traditional idea of the ‘division of powers’, at the same time the latest trend-according to more and more branches of powers are discovered-was not accepted.According to this paper it is an intriguing task to find the solution for the conflict between political and legal constitutionalism after 2010. The Hungarian Constitutional Court played unique role in it by deciding the referred cases.The paper tries to dissolve the main constitutional conflict in the system of separation of powers by the interpretation of the fourth amendment of the Basic Law. The principle of ‘rule of law’ was established in a constitutional frame, in which the Constitutional Court is able to review the amendments from procedural point of view. The focus is also put on the future of the principle of ‘rule of law’, in this matter the Constitutional Court has special responsibility, and constitutional obligation to rule on the constitutionality of the cases brought before.
) Bingham , T. , The Rule of Law (Penguin 2010 ) Birmontienė , T. , ‘ Žmogaus teisių raida ir perspektyvos Lietuvoje ’ ( 2000 ) 5 Jurisprudencija. Teisinės
This article examines the development and particular nature of the rule of law in the European Union against the background of the wider legal and political theoretical debate on the principle. It hence analyses the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU and the Treaty revisions on the rule of law. It argues that the principle has developed greatly since the first mention of it in the case law of the Court and contends that the principle has a particular focus in the EU on judicial protection in light of human rights. Nonetheless it is hard to apply the dichotomies running through the debates in legal and political theory to the development of the principle in the EU; an idiosyncratic mix of features seems to emerge. Moreover, this article also takes the case study of the external dimension of migration control to assess the current challenges to the rule of law in the EU. It thereby uncovers ways of working in the EU that are hard to reconcile with the rule of law requirements.
1 INTRODUCTION The Rule of Law principle has been interpreted as part of the common constitutional traditions of the Member States since the first days of the European Union’s formation. 1 This stems from their participation in the European
Property reparation programs undertaken in Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the communist regimes fail to fulfill ‘the promises of the rule of law’. Reparation schemes do not have an exclusively reparative nature, moreover, reparation was deliberately linked with structural reform, and due to this duality, the scheme features a mixed distributive-reparative character. This resulted in two troublesome aspects: on one hand, there is no evidence of a compelling argument, which justifies the mitigation of past property deprivations at large. On the other hand, it can not be satisfactorily demonstrated why property-related injustices enjoy a privileged status when it comes to reparations, in comparison to other types of losses. Further, bearing in mind the Hayekian objection towards distributive justice, even those who had been placed in an equal situation—i.e. all suffered past property injustices—are not offered an objectively equal opportunity to claim redress. Due to the fact that the schemes addressed reparations—at least in part—from a distributive perspective (which resulted in an attempt to create a substantive equality between victims), the result that they achieved was objective inequality, as everyone was entitled to reparation between the same limitations, while everyone suffered losses of different extent. These differences in treatment between various former owners are mostly arbitrary, and in certain cases deliberately introduced so as to produce inequalities, and thereby meet the Hayekian concerns as far as they produce results that conflict with the idea of the rule of law. The analyzed provisions of the reparation schemes lead in practice to the creation of winners and losers of reparations, to a breach of the idea of formal equality before the law. In the conditions in which reparation schemes fall short from a thick conception of the rule of law (justice, rights or objective equality) it worth investigating, whether requirements of a thin reading-focusing on foreseability, clarity and consistency—are still met by post-communist property redistribution. Unfortunately at least under three aspects—valuation, time limits and probation—the reparation schemes’ provisions are not beyond criticism. The complexity of tasks that transition societies had to face is obvious and uncontested. Transitional law, according to Teitel, is a sui generis paradigm, a vehicle of social, political and ideological transformation. The amendments to the rule of law ideal, justifiable in the context of transition can go as far as—for example—to allow governments to decide upon the concrete form of the reparation, the type of wrongs it want to address, the period in time intended to be covered. But they may not create winners and losers; they may not distinguish between those placed in the same situation.
Nations of Central and Eastern Europe in the near past have all faced the same dilemma: how can they manage international encouragement to adopt atlantic patterns in promise of ready-made routes with immediate success, in a way also promoting the paths of organic development, relying on own resources and potentialities that can only be gained from tradition? Or, otherwise speaking, is it feasible at all to rush forward by rapidly learning all the responses others elaborated elsewhere at a past time? Or are they expected themselves to become Sisyphus bearing his own way, at the price of suffering and bitter disillusionment? The question was not raised by each country individually in the region as not much time was left for pondering in the rapid drift of events. Anyhow, cost-free solutions adopted from without may easily lead to adverse results, far away from expectations for the time being. The principles of free market, democracy and parliamentarism-with rule of law and human rights in the background-are usually believed to offer a kind of panacea curing the basic ills in the contemporary world. Generalised experience notwithstanding, social science has to be given the chance to record-if found so-that the same staff may not work at some places where it has just recently been transplanted as it is used to work amidst its natural surrounding in the western hemisphera, not with the same cost/benefit ratio at the least. For that reason, scholarship in Central and Eastern Europe is growingly aware of the fact that what it can provide is by far not marginal feedback but the very first testing and teasing proof on social embeddedness of some ideas and ideals, deservedly fundamental for the atlantic world. Realistically speaking, not even western social development is separable from the economic reserves of the development actually run. Or, operation of any societal complexity requires resources in both social organisation and material production.
A diktatúra utáni átmenetnek két modellje alakult ki: totális legyőzetés katonai ellenőrzéssel, melynek során a múlt kontinuitását megtörik, hogy az eddig folytatott gyakorlat újraszerveződését megakadályozzák, miközben a társadalomnak a demokráciára történő újraneveléséről intézményes formában gondoskodnak (ez történt a II. világháború után), vagy bizonyos időponttól kezdve egyszerűen egy addigra már teljes fegyverzetében kiépített jogállamiságnak a puszta kinyilvánításával és könyörtelen kikényszerítésével járnak el (mint a kommunizmus bukása után újraépülő államokban). Felfogását illetően a jogállamiság szintén kétféle lehet: mai nyugat-európai–atlanti – kolonizáló – változatában kategorikusan abszolút s kimerítően kodifikált követelmények halmaza (azaz absztrakt-univerzalizáló) ez, miközben teoretikus rekonstrukciója szerint más nem lehet, mint pusztán egy tiszteletreméltó eszmény, amelyet adott formájában/formáiban valamikor valahol valakik saját átérzett, konkrét történelmi kihívásaikra válaszul önnön múltbéli feltételeik közt magukból kiszenvedtek (tehát olyan, aminek történelmi hic et nunc partikularitását eleve vállalták). Lényegi üzenete a jogállamiságnak eszerint az egymással ütköző értékek közt az éthoszának megfelelő egyensúlyozás művészete és mestersége; olyan törekvés, amely sohasem zárul le és ér véget. Örökös tanulási folyamatot feltételez, mert új kihívások folyvást felmerülve folyvást új válaszokat kényszerítenek ki, új összefüggésekben mutatva a jogállami igény kiegyenlítő arculatát. Következésképpen a jogátvitelek vezérlésében szintén különbség teendő egyfelől a cirkuszi idomár, másfelől a kertész magatartásmintája között: az egyiknek egyetlen célja, hogy saját külső akaratot kényszerítsen rá tárgyára, míg a másik csakis tárgya eredendő természetére ügyel empátiával, hogy segítse az abban rejlő tulajdonságok jó irányban való kibontakozását. A globalizáló kényszer irányok jellemzője, hogy a múlt jognihilizálását saját jogimportja fetisizálásával váltja fel. Ez destruktív mind önmagában, mind továbbgyűrűző hatásában. Merthogy növeli a célországoknak merő mintakövetéstől való függőségérzetét, egyúttal rombolva saját felelősségvállalásukat, ami nélkül sikeres újraépülés aligha képzelhető.
A tanulmány Kulcsár Kálmán akadémikus, volt igazságügyi miniszter és kanadai nagykövet tudományfejlesztő és államszervező munkásságának méltatása után annak a szerepnek kereteit, tartalmi összetevőit és eszközrendszerét vázolja, amelyek révén a magyar alkotmányos jogállam korszakunk folyamatai közepette a fenntartható fejlődést szolgálhatja. Az alkotmányos keretek továbbfejlesztése érdekében a szerző számos javaslatot fogalmaz meg újabb alapelvek, emberi és polgári alapjogok, tilalmak és kötelességek alkotmányi értékké nyilvánítására, valamint a magyar állam szervezetének és működési rendjének fejlesztésére.
. Heuschling , L. , État de droit, Rechtsstaat, Rule of Law (Dalloz 2002 ). Heuschling , L. , ‘ Le regard d’un comparatiste: l’État de droit dans et au-delà des
