Introduction

Migration, be it labor migration or displacement resulting from extreme poverty, environmental emergency, persecution due to political turbulence, conquest or war, is the most ubiquitous aspect of globalization indisputably challenging the power of the state to control its population (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999). Human mobility is of course organized and coordinated across space and time, since it presupposes major infrastructures of transportation, communication technologies, and institutions of regulation. In spite of any attempts at regulation, mobility predominantly involves cost, risk, uncertainty, and precarity, in several cases, human exploitation (from the pre-modern slave trade to contemporary human trafficking), trauma, and bereavement. Contemporary forms of migration regulation comprise international agreements and legal frameworks providing for definitions and categorizations of mobility (Long, 2013) and domestic policies including border controls, as well as systematization and digitalization of asylum and migration policy. In the European context, mobility discourses tend to be reserved for the legitimized intra-European “free movement” of skilled workers, whereas migration discourses are triggered when describing mobility of third country nationals (TCNs; van Ostaijen, 2017).

As a matter of fact, recent migratory flows reaching the European region correspond to a rather small segment of the overall displaced population, since 84% of the refugees worldwide remain in developing countries (Panizzon & van Riemsdijk, 2018). Nevertheless, migration and the refugee issue challenge dramatically the foundation principles of the European Union (EU) political and social integration model, putting the notion of solidarity among European states under question. Countries at the Mediterranean frontiers, particularly Italy and Greece, are confronted with massive inflows of migrants and asylum seekers wishing to move to the prosperous European North. At the same time, refortification of borders, especially on the part of some EU states, entrap these populations during transition, thus “leaving asylum seekers in limbo” (Brekke & Brochmann, 2014).

This article discusses governance strategies activated in Europe aiming to monitor migration and refugee flows. Drawing upon the findings of an international research project (Council of Europe [CoE], 2018) that has been conducted in six countries (Bulgaria, Greece Hungary, Montenegro, Poland, and Romania), it will focus on policies aiming at the educational inclusion of asylum seekers in Greece (Zambeta et al., 2017). A central point to be made is that migrant policy is an essential component of the wider social policy, thus representing the type of welfare provision in each particular state. Moreover, it will be argued that, apart from the wider EU immigration and asylum policies, such as the successive Dublin regulations, which of course constitute major parameters governing mobility, welfare state traditions, and systems act as steering mechanisms to mobility, directing, and redirecting flows, as they foster motives for improved life conditions.

Furthermore, refugee education policies will be examined in selected European countries, with a particular focus in Greece as a frontier and gateway to Europe. The article argues that education, as a central component of the welfare state policies, plays a pivotal role in governing migration flows in twofold ways: first, facilitating, accelerating, or securing mobility strategies on the part of asylum seekers; second, attracting young and promising labor force on the part of the aging European countries.

Governing Mobility and the Refugee Flows in European Contexts

Recent migration and refugee flows challenge dramatically European unification policies. Attempts to address the refugee crisis as a pan-European issue have been confronted with growing ethno-nationalism in almost all European countries, but most notably in the countries of the so-called Visegrad group (The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia), which have refused to receive even a small number of refugees in their territory. Following persistent xenophobic attitudes in Hungary, denial of entry with the use of police is continuously reported in the border with Serbia (ibid). The iron fence in Röszke is presented as safeguarding the security of local population (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights [FRA], 2018b), but it questions the human condition and violates human rights. Similarly, asylum seekers are refused entry in the Polish borders with Belarus and Ukraine, while identification procedures end up in detention of people reported as violence victims (ibid). Border protection and closure on the part of the Visegrad group have created a deep rift within EU member states with serious implications for the frontier countries, such as Greece and Italy. In March 2016, the EU at an attempt to moderate immigration flows concluded an agreement with Turkey (European Union: Council of the European Union, 2016), which is the main route of immigration, particularly from Syria to Europe. This agreement has, periodically and partly, restrained flows, while it provided for a framework of refugee legal relocation to central and Northern Europe. The above agreement, however, has been proved exceedingly sensitive to the political tensions in the area, thus allowing a humanitarian issue to be subjected to the expediency of geopolitical dynamics and interests.

Since 2013, following the Dublin III EU regulations, the 28 EU member states (as well as Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Lichtenstein) should be bound to apply the same fundamental principles regarding asylum application, on granting international protection status, relocation, and deportation policy. According to the Dublin regulation, only one country shall be responsible to examine an asylum seeker’s application, while persons are to be returned to the first country where they submitted their initial application. This principle imposes a disproportionally higher burden to European frontier countries, and particularly to Italy and Greece, which are the main gateways to Europe for people coming from Africa and Asia. Moreover, the Dublin regulation ignores the real preferences of refugees for relocation. As a matter of fact, living conditions, labor market, and integration policies prevailing in different EU countries develop incentives to refugees to move on in the North seeking for better life chances (Brekke & Brochmann, 2014). As it is demonstrated in a comparative study of asylum policy in Europe (Nonchev & Tagarov, 2012), there are considerable discrepancies in the way European countries grant protection to asylum seekers, in some cases applications are pending over many years, while legal aid to applicants remains poor in several reception centers (FRA, 2018a, 2018b). Asylum is more likely to be granted in cases of family reunification and to violence victims, especially those from Syria. According to the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) Afghani people are less likely to acquire refugee status and in several cases are deported (FRA, 2018a, p. 14). In principle, according to Article 24(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child, children less than 18 years of age coming from countries non-providing safe environment are granted special protection, while any decision related to asylum and immigration procedures should take into account the best interests of the child. Unaccompanied children are entitled to international protection and guardianship. Several national bodies and NGOs are active in refugees’ settlement and integration, which nevertheless presents weaknesses even in the most advanced systems of social protection, such as Sweden (ibid).

The extent to which refugee and migration policies are part of the wider social policy could be seen as a controversial issue, especially challenged from a perspective that confines citizenship rights to national identity. Social policy is defined as an institutional form of social solidarity, compatible with a free market economy, which aims at the elimination of the most repulsive forms of inequality through redistribution of income (Sakellaropoulos, 2018; Stassinopoulou, 1996). Thus, the welfare state represents a collective investment, which facilitates and regulates access to the limited resources of a certain polity in the form of social services (Marshall, 1950). Solidarity and equity represent major political values that legitimize social policy at the national level, while simultaneously signify a society’s principles and potential for social integration. These values should bind modern states to include immigration in their social policies. Nonetheless, contemporary immigration and refugee flows seeking settlement in Europe have pushed European welfare regimes to their limits. Reception and integration policies are key governance mechanisms for monitoring immigration flows. As it happens, social attitudes and integration policies regarding refugees vary significantly (e.g., concerning access to citizenship, labor market integration policies, health care, housing, and education), thus revealing genuine structural differences among European states. Some of these significant differences could be understood as representative of the way the three ideal types of welfare regimes, as defined by Esping-Andersen (1990), respond to challenges arising from the refugee issue. Although contemporary states can partly share characteristics of all three types of welfare provision, some enduring elements of their political tradition as defined by Esping-Andersen could be identified in several social policies (see, e.g., gender policies in Bambra, 2007) as well as in their strategies on governing mobility.

The UK, for instance, as an ideal type of a liberal welfare regime, indeed adopts a laissez-faire and market-oriented system of newly arrived migrants’ integration. It has been argued that, for the most part of the 20th century, the UK has developed an image of a tolerant society, with altruistic sentiments toward refugees and a rather receptive asylum policy. The superiority of the host, implicit in the notion of compassion toward “people in need,” has been challenged by critical interculturalism in the 1990s (Pinson, Arnot, & Candappa, 2010; Rutter & Jones, 1998). Recent migration flows have stirred up anti-immigration rhetoric and populist discourses of criminalization of asylum seekers. In the turn of the 21st century, border controls have been tightened, while welfare provision for asylum seekers has been drastically restricted, a fact with significant implications to child poverty and human rights in general (Pinson et al., 2010). The uncertainty of inclusion prospect that this model implies at the same time acts as a moderator of refugee flows. Since 2010, and despite pro-Brexit rhetoric, the UK has actually received relatively smaller numbers of asylum applications compared to those of other Northern European countries, while it follows a rather decentralized and market-oriented approach to migrant integration, especially in England and Northern Ireland. Scotland, by contrast, follows a paradigm of nationally regulated integration policy (Scholten et al., 2017), thus seeking for convergence with Scandinavian rather than English welfare policies.

On the other end of the spectrum, Sweden, despite devolution policies that have relativized general regulation over the past three decades, remains a social democratic political culture of welfare provision, thus enabling a centrally coordinated policy regarding asylum seekers’ integration in employment, housing, and social care. Focus on quality as well as equity and universality of treatment are crucial elements of this approach, hence underpinning a receptive attitude toward mobility. In 2016, Sweden was the host of 12.4% of the overall asylum seekers in the EU (Scholten et al., 2017, p. 32). As a result of decentralization policies introduced in the 1980s, migrant policy is subjected to multilevel governance at the national and local level, sometimes followed by skepticism regarding their efficiency. Civic integration and language courses are offered at the reception centers, while several other schemes have been introduced since 2010 involving growing centralization, New Public Management approaches, and shifting responsibilities to the private sector. Civic introduction courses are a requirement for access to special social benefits. Housing policy is largely based on municipal responsibility and various multiple schemes, including free choice of accommodation for those who can afford to pay. Social integration is a primary concern of Public Employment Services, which attempt to match refugees’ profiles with local labor markets’ needs, thus linking accommodation to employment (ibid). Emergency healthcare, including special attention on trauma treatment (FRA, 2017), is universally provided for all asylum seekers, while children are entitled to free healthcare. Access to education is guaranteed similarly to that of nationals, despite on a voluntary basis.

Norway is on the same track concerning welfare state policies, a fact significantly affecting migrant integration strategies. Reception centers are coordinated by a central authority, while secondary integration programs include guaranteed housing and obligatory educational courses on language and job training. Attendees receive a reimbursement, which is higher than the basic welfare benefit. All legal residents have access to a wide array of social rights (Brekke & Brochmann, 2014, p. 149).

Germany applies a rather conservative model of welfare provision and adopts a regulated integration strategy for refugees based on assimilation policies and labor market inclusion of skilled labor. Over the past 5 years, Germany has been the largest receiver of refugees in Europe and has developed specific policies regarding reception and integration of immigrants. The extended industrial sector of the robust German economy seems willing to absorb highly skilled labor, a fact that acts as a selective mechanism among immigrants. The 2016 National Integration Act has consolidated the previously differentiated migrant policies among the federal states. Accession to labor market for asylum seekers is performed via apprenticeship, a field with a long-standing tradition in the country’s education and labor market policy. Premium healthcare of an emergency nature is generally provided, while employment is a precondition for public health insurance. Civic integration courses referring to German language and knowledge about German society are available to refugees and asylum seekers after a 6-month stay in the country. A variety of provisions at the regional level regulate entitlement to housing and education (Scholten et al., 2017).

Although Northern European countries govern mobility through general EU immigration policy (such as the Dublin III and the EU–Turkey agreements) coupled with their internal migrant integration policies, Southern countries are confronted with the reality of daily waves of new arrivals. Mediterranean countries, Greece and Italy in particular, actually become the embankment of migration flow to the north. However, arrivals in Spain are also on the rise.

The Mediterranean states are not part of the Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare systems, while they are described as relatively immature welfare regimes compared to those of the North (Arts & Gellissen, 2001). Southern European countries are considered as sharing some common structural characteristics, such as a persistent gray economy and a peculiar coexistence of traditional social networks with a rather weak public welfare provision (Ferrera, 2005; Zambeta & Kolofoussi, 2014). Hence, without a solid social safety net and amidst a deep economic crisis, Greece was confronted with unprecedented influx of asylum seekers.

Immigration Policies and the Contemporary Migration Influx in Greece

Following the residual character of welfare state provision, immigration policy in Greece has been quite ambivalent and inconsistent. The first wave of immigration took place in the 1920s, after the Balkan wars, when Greece received more than 1.4 million refugees from the Balkans and especially Asia Minor, as a result of the Lausanne Treaty. Later, in the 1950s, around 350,000 people migrated to Greece from Istanbul. These inflows were mainly of Greek origin and were relatively easily integrated, a fact related to Greek foreign policy intents at the time, as well as with the positive impact these populations actually had on the economy and commerce. The weak industrial sector of the Greek economy did not encourage immigration. On the contrary, significant parts of Greek population emigrated to the USA, Germany, and Australia, especially around the mid-20th century. This trend was contained in the 1970s, after the oil crisis, when migration policy was tightened in several European states (Triandafyllidou, 2013). Moreover, Greek accession to the EU, in 1981, signaled a more favorable economic situation in the country.

The second wave of immigration is to a large extent irregular migration that took place after 1989, when Greece received large numbers of migrants, mainly from the former Soviet Union and central–eastern European countries, a trend later followed by inflows from Southern Asia, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The largest share of this influx came from Albania. Significant sectors of the Greek economy that are labor intensive, such as construction, agriculture, tourism, as well as housework and domestic care of children and the older adults, and sectors largely participating in the gray economy offered employment opportunities to undocumented migrants (Lazaridis, 1996; Lymberaki, 2011; Triandafyllidou, 2009; Triandafyllidou & Veikou, 2002). This influx has genuinely contributed to the growth of the country’s GDP, which in turn facilitated the inclusion of Greece to the European Monetary Union in 2002. The Greek state has presented reluctance in dealing with this undocumented labor. The main policies focused on border controls and regularization measures, while naturalization and citizenship became part of the agenda only in mid 2000s. The number of registered immigrants holding a valid permit varies among different years, a fact that could be related to the mobility of this population. The highest number is reported in 2009 with 600,000 legal permits (Triandafyllidou, 2013, pp. 7–8). The economic crisis experienced in Greece since 2010 impacts data regarding migration, presenting a constant tendency of decrease in registered migrants, not necessarily because they have left the country, but possibly because they cannot satisfy the legal requirements on social insurance contributions, due to the growth of unemployment that disproportionally affects migrants.

The third and most recent wave of migration influx took place in 2010s, while the peak was in 2015. The main points of entry shift from the Northern borders of Greece to the Greek–Turkish border and the Aegean Sea. A large part of this inflow result from armed conflict in the Middle East. Based on the Dublin regulations, “hotspots” located in the Greek islands act as reception and identification centers for the newcomers who are legally defined as asylum seekers till their application is processed by the Asylum Service. According to the Greek authorities (Ministry of Digital Policy, Telecommunications and Information [MDPTI], 2018a), in 2018, Greece hosted 55,000 asylum seekers. Moreover, data from the Ministry of Migration Policy (2019) indicate that the number of asylum applications has dramatically increased within the past 5 years (Table 1). The vast majority of asylum seekers are male (68%), while 82% of the overall applicants are less than 35 years old. In January 2019, 5,339 unaccompanied minors were hosted in Greece.

The largest share of applicants come from Syria (almost 30%), followed by Afghanistan (14.2%), Pakistan (12.4%), Iraq (11.4%), and Albania (4.5%). However, applications of Syrians present the highest recognition rates, whereas those from Albania and Pakistan have extremely low recognition rate. In total, in the period from 2013 to January 2019, 30,584 people were granted asylum in Greece, whereas 5,046 were granted subsidiary protection (Table 2).

Decisions on inadmissible cases at the first instance procedures of the Greek Asylum Service are due to applications that come under the “safe third country principle,” due to acceptance by another Member State of the Dublin regulation procedure and relocation of the applicant at another Member State of the Dublin agreement or for other procedural reasons (subsequent repeated applications or administrative reasons). The notion of “refugee” predominates in the contemporary political discourse and tends to overshadow that of immigrants. Categorization of applicants as refugees, who are entitled to asylum or international protection, or migrants, is of course a major governance strategy for controlling mobility flows. Moreover, it depicts the pitfalls and inadequacies of migrant integration policies, since migrants do not enjoy the privileges entitled to refugees (Long, 2013, Kapsalis, 2018).

Greece is mainly a transit country, since most of the asylum seekers wish to move to other European countries (mostly in Germany, France, The Netherlands, and Sweden). However, the rise of asylum applications in Greece since 2017 demonstrates a possible change in this trend, which might indicate the refugee’s preference to terminate a long period of uncertainty and precarious mobility (Xypolytas, 2018). Countries that abide by the Dublin agreement participate in the relocation program, thus accepting to host certain numbers of asylum seekers that have entered EU through Greece. As it happens, relocation mainly refers to refugees coming from Syria. Family unification is a major principle governing relocation strategy.

While reception and identification centers have been established in the islands, longer-term accommodation centers are dispersed on the mainland. Nonetheless, overcrowded and in some cases inhumane conditions are reported in some of these centers, especially on the islands (FRA, 2018a). Apart from the emergency reception structures, housing policy is developed in collaboration among the Ministry of Migration, the UNHCR, and the municipalities (MDPTI, 2018a, 2018b). Unaccompanied children are accommodated in special structures run by NGOs, but these only partly cover existing needs. Emergency healthcare is offered by civil society organizations as well as by public health institutions. All children have been vaccinated according to the Ministry of Health, while education is generally provided on the mainland (ibid).

However, quality of reception and migrants’ integration remains a debated issue. The “Migrant Integration Policy Index” (MIPEX) is a tool assessing integration of migrants across European states as well as in some states outside Europe (such as Australia, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Japan, and the USA). It measures parameters considered as key components of migrant integration: access to citizenship rights, residence permit, labor market integration, political participation, anti-discrimination policies, family reunion policy, education, and healthcare. In 2014, Greece was ranked 17th out of the 38 countries participating in the MIPEX assessment of migrant integration policies (Anagnostou, 2016, p. 38). Greece was among the countries that are unfavorable to granting citizenship, even to second-generation migrants, slightly unfavorable with regard to educational integration and healthcare provision, half-way favorable in encouraging family reunion, and slightly favorable regarding anti-discrimination policies, (MIPEX, 2015). Although these indicators are quantitative, they are indicative in reflecting the social condition of migrants in the country. However, it should be noted that complicated social phenomena such as that of migrant integration could not be attributed to single causes and particular political measures. Hence, a deeper understanding of the issue presupposes assessment of the quality of integration measures that are promoted at the local level, both in metropolitan areas and in traditional neighborhoods (Anagnostou, 2016). Nonetheless, it is argued that although migration policy has been “employment-centered,” which means that regularization, long residence permits, and legalization have been based on registered employment, provision for equal rights in employment and public insurance is rather poor (Kapsalis, 2018). The notorious case of forced migrant labor in the agricultural sector that was brought against the ECHR (the case “Chowdhury and Others vs. Greece”), referring to Bangladeshi migrants who in 2012–2013 were subjected to compulsory work in strawberry fields in Manolada, under the supervision of armed guards, manifests the continuum between trafficking and inhumane labor relations and underlines the lack of a coherent migrant integration policy.

In Greece, the legal framework related to migrants’ citizenship status has a history of progress and retrogression. First- and second-generation immigrants who live and work in the country, paying social insurance benefits for more than 20 years, still do not enjoy full Greek citizenship rights. The radically favorable framework that was introduced in 2010 was repealed in 2013 by the Council of State (the supreme administrative court), as violating the constitution, since it was considered as not guaranteeing the applicant’s genuine bond with Greek culture (Anagnostou, 2016, p. 27). A more favorable legal framework regarding the acquirement of Greek citizenship was reintroduced in 2015 (Law 4332/2015), by taking into account the Council of States reservations and recommendations. The new legal framework (a) gives Greek citizenship to children of TCNs who have been born in Greece, (b) allows children of TCNs who have attended Greek school for at least 6 years of secondary education (or 9 years of primary and secondary education) to ask for Greek citizenship, and (c) gives the opportunity for naturalization to TCNs that live in the country for at least 7 consecutive years.

Social attitudes toward refugee and migration influx over the past years vary from an explosion of social activism and NGO involvement in first aid and humanitarian activities to xenophobic and racist discourse and reactions. Traditional narratives of “hospitality” (philoxenia) as social representation of “Greekness” and bottom-up humanitarian reactions of solidarity have been consolidated through EU and governmental formulations in a “patriotism of solidarity” as a new trait of national identity (Papataxiarchis, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c). On the other hand, anti-immigrant rhetoric and violent reactions on the part of extremist Right groups (such as the Golden Dawn political party) have relativized this embellished national icon. The rise of this “uncivil society” in Greece (Sotiropoulos, 2017, p. 123), i.e., the rise of far right groups adopting hate speech against immigrants, has been associated by some analysts (Triandafyllidou, 2013) with the breakout of the economic crisis in 2010, a fact that resulted in the entrance of the Nazi party of Golden Dawn in the parliament in 2012, for the first time in the country’s recent political history, after getting 6.97% of the electorate. However, other analysts attribute the rise of extreme Right to its capacity to capitalize the delegitimization of traditional political parties through its uncivil social activism and undertake the role of an antisystemic political agency (Ellinas, 2015). Immigration in particular is constructed as a problematic, politically dangerous, unexpected, and uncontrollable situation that represents a threat to national unity and cohesion (Kapsalis, 2018). Golden Dawn, using a military structure, Nazi symbols, and “Blood and Honour” slogans and music, encapsulates this xenophobic and racist discourse developing hit squads that perform hate crimes against immigrants and other social groups, which do not adhere to its populist nationalist ideology, such as leftist activists and homosexuals (Wodak, 2015, p. 197). Hence, reported refoulement at the Greek–Turkish borders (FRA, 2018a) is a policy related to both internal political tensions and wider EU governance of mobility, yet with critical repercussions for human rights.

Migrant and “Refugee” Education Policies

Educational provision for refugee children is both a human right and a social and political challenge. Following the universal, inalienable, and indivisible character of human rights recognized by the international treaties ratified by European states (i.e., the 1949 UN Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the 1989 UN Convention on The Rights of the Child), European states are bound to guarantee access to education to all children residing in them. In 2016, the European Commission adopted the Action Plan on the integration of third country nationals, in which Member States are encouraged to provide language learning and prevent educational segregation, which ensure that teachers have the appropriate skills to manage diversity, to promote the recruitment of teachers with a migrant background, to promote the participation of migrants’ children in early childhood education and care, and to assess, validate, and recognize skills and qualifications of TCNs (European Commission, 2016).

According to Article 14 of the Reception Conditions Directive,³ asylum-seeking minors shall be granted the same access to the education system as nationals and this access should not be postponed more than 3 months from the date on which the application for international protection was lodged by or on behalf of the minor. Moreover, preparatory classes, including language classes, shall be provided to minors where it is necessary to facilitate their access to and participation in the education system.

Nevertheless, since migrant flows and asylum seeking are not recent phenomena in Europe, the issue of refugee education, in certain states more so than in others, has been present for several decades (Rutter & Jones, 1998). As a matter of fact, the degree to which special educational policies for newcomers have been adopted by European states presents vast divergences across states. According to one of the largest European studies on refugees’ educational integration, that is the INTEGRACE project, which studied educational provision for refugee and asylum-seeking children in 32 countries, integration strategies in European states depend on four factors: (a) the number of refugees in each country, (b) the history of their settlement, (c) whether the host country is a transit or a destination country, and (d) the political will of elites (Krasteva, 2012). Moreover, access to and quality of education for migrant populations is largely affected by systemic factors, such as key migrant and education policies in the host country (Bartlett, 2015). Since integration is genuinely related to access to the labor market as well as to the social and cultural heritage of a certain policy, according to our analysis, a distinctive parameter influencing refugee integration policies is the structural characteristics of welfare provision and tradition in each national context.

The Case of Greece

Concluding Points: Mobility Governance and Education

Global governance of mobility is enacted at multiple levels, at the international level through economic aid, international agreements, and cooperation, at the national level through border control and internal migration policy and at the local level through migrant integration policies. At the European front, apart from the Dublin regulation, the EU–Turkey agreement and the FRONTEX, which act as international modes for surveillance of mobility, state migration policies perform an essential role in governing, and directing migration flows. This article has argued that European welfare systems respond differently to mobility, a fact that genuinely affects contemporary refugee movements. Migration policy across European states reflects different traditions in social care provided to immigrants, such as in first aid facilities, emergency accommodation, and health care, and especially in longer-term provisions regarding social benefits, housing, employment, and education policies. These policies tend to govern flows toward countries represented as more favorable to migrant integration, thus shaping a tendency of “welfare mobility” to the prosperous European North. Simultaneously, residual welfare states at the European frontiers, such as Greece, are struggling with vast numbers of entrapped transit migrants, due to fortification of borders and tightening of asylum procedures. The inauguration of common policies, such as the European Qualifications Passport, enacts a rather limited, yet uniformal recognition of refugees’ qualifications, enhancing the transferability of skilled migrants.

Education, as a critical component of social policy, mediates in the wider migrant integration strategies, fostered both on the part of the state and migrant groups themselves. The ways in which European education systems respond to challenges stemming from migration flows are inexorably associated with the typology of their welfare states. Discourses on hospitality and social solidarity to refugees as “persons in need” coexist with border closure strategies, classification and selection of immigrants, and economic aspirations of European countries. The main challenge in refugee education is the emergent tension between the goal of integration and practices of segregation. Dilemmas, such as that of “submersion” to mainstream schools or gradual transition through reception structures, which unavoidably become forms of segregation, are constantly present. On the other hand, education has a vital role in selection, consolidation, and integration of skills in the advanced European economies. Labor-importing countries, in particular, adopt a systematic education and training policy, using multiple schemes, including apprenticeship, to recruit skilled labor among immigrants. Despite xenophobic political discourses proclaimed in several European states, the young and highly motivated migrant flows can have a positive contribution to the economies of the aging European societies.

Nonetheless, migrants and asylum seekers are by no means passive recipients in global mobility. They are active agents developing strategies for their future life chances. Education, apart from being a goal per se serving a fundamental human right, is also a means for securing mobility. First, school attendance indicates commitment to integration in the host country, a case positively assessed by asylum authorities. Second, since any decision regarding minors should consider the best interests of the child, according to international treaties, a minor’s school attendance secures the whole family’s non-refoulement, as this would infringe with the minor’s educational rights and their right to family life. Third, educational priorities and options, especially with regard to language learning, are part of relocation strategy. It is quite indicative the fact that German language courses were very popular among asylum seekers residing in Greek refugee accommodation centers, while certain students aspiring to relocation did not seem equally motivated to learn either Greek or English in RSARE. By contrast, students who did not anticipate relocation were more interested to learn Greek.

Migration and the presence of refugees in European societies reassert fundamental political dilemmas regarding the notion of solidarity among European states, representations of European integration, and the quality of democracy European societies are engaged to.

About the Authors

EZ (PhD) is an Associate Professor of Comparative Education and Education Policy at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. Her main research interests include policy analysis in education focusing on issues of Globalization and Democratic Governance. She has published books and articles on education politics in the Greek and European education systems. Her most important publications include the 2005 WYB of Education “Globalisation and Nationalism in Education,” co-edited with David Coulby, and “Religion and Education” (in Greek).

YP is a PhD candidate at the Department of Early Childhood Education of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. She holds a (Joint) MA in “Education and Human Rights” of the National and Kapodistrian University and the Institute of Education, University of London. She has worked in research projects on human rights in education, focusing on violence in schools and the inclusion of minorities in education. Her publications concern the role of gender in school violence and the struggle for recognition of gendered and sexual minorities. Her current research project includes youth participating in queer subcultures in contemporary Athens.

The authors take full responsibility for the integrity of the data and the accuracy of the analysis.

Ethics

The study was carried out in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and the ethical guidelines of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens.