Abstract
The paper has a dual purpose, one historical and one theoretical. It aims to show, first, that Plotinus' notion of perceptual memory heavily draws on Stoic views insofar as both regard memory as a linguistic phenomenon. Furthermore, it aims to answer two questions, both are intimately connected to the Plotinian thesis of the impassibility of the soul. How could it happen that a present tense perceptual judgment changes into a past tense memory judgment and what explains that our judgments on perceived objects change, and occasionally fade, over time, that is, how can we remember in a way different from sense-perception?
Plotinus' view of memory is quite complex. In the paper, I focus exclusively on the kind of memory that is directly connected to sense-perception, that is, on what is nowadays called perceptual memory. For this reason, I am not going to deal with the question of how far the part of individual soul that has not descended is endowed with memory and what this memory is like, or to what extent the memory of celestial bodies can be analogous to human memory. I shall not discuss memories of thought either and the related problem of whether there is or is not a clear-cut distinction between memory (pertaining to physical objects and events) and recollection (of Forms). My aim is much more moderate; it is to examine perceptual memory as part of the cognitive set-up of incarnate souls. I would like to formulate and prove two claims. One is historical: despite all criticism, Plotinus' theory of memory (and perception in general) seems to have been heavily indebted to Stoic theory. Consequently, if we are to understand his views from a historical perspective it is better to draw on Stoic, not only on Aristotelian and even less Platonic notions. The other is conceptual: if perception and, consequently, memory are judgments, and the part of the soul containing memories is impassible then the two cognitive acts may differ only in tense at best. In many cases, however, the difference extends to other aspects of content as well. But then we are facing two questions. If the soul does not receive influences (πάθη) from the physical world, and perception as a judgment occurs in the soul, then (question 1) how could it happen that a present tense perceptual judgment changes into a past tense memory judgment and (question 2) our judgments on perceived objects change, and occasionally fade, over time, that is, how can we remember in a way different from sense-perception? If ἀπάθεια of the soul means that the soul cannot take in any influences whatsoever from without what explains the change?
I
Zeno, the founder of Stoa, called memory the treasury of representations (SVF I 64 = Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos (abbr. AM) VII 373).1 With this thesis, he formulates the basic condition of memory: in order to be able to remember something, we must have a representation that has come about as a result of sense-perception. Representations are propositional for they are formulated in sentences.2 However, the representation itself is not to be equated with remembering, since it only carries the content of memory, but it is an act. Giving an account of the latter, Plutarch reports that according to them, probably according to the later Stoics, memory is “the comprehension of a proposition (ἄξιωμα) in the past tense, whose present form we have comprehended on the basis of sense-perception” (De soll. an. 961C).3 The account makes it clear that memory is an activity; it is a κατάληψις of a proposition in the past tense. Furthermore, propositions form the content of representations, and therefore it is a small wonder that they turn out to be the content of memory as well.4 It is also important that ἀξιώματα subsist independently of actually being asserted or comprehended.5 The act of memory does not constitute its content except for the tense. Plutarch's description suggests that remembering involves reformulation of a sentence; one in the present tense has to be transformed into another in the past tense. Moreover, if we use the word “comprehension” (κατάληψις) in the technical sense, then we have to admit that this proposition is a singular statement which was previously approved. This may be the reason for Numenius' attribution to the Stoics the claim (Fr. 26, l. 72 Des Places) that having memory amounts to having a δόξα. It is possible to formulate such a thesis only because the representations reside in the ruling part of the soul, due to the rational nature of which all its content is propositional, that is, can be expressed in sentences. The representations produced during sense-perception constitute judgments, on the basis of which we can then formulate new judgments. This is also how experience comes about, which is called the multitude of similar representations. When we put together similar memories, we shall gain experience (Aët. IV 11. 1–4 = SVF II 83 = 39E LS).6 Sense-perception plays an important role in the process because it is the capacity that provides the ground for all kinds of cognition. As a consequence, the representations that provide the content of memory arise directly or indirectly from sense-perception.
But the description using mental terminology is complemented by another type of description.
Since the soul itself is conceived of as corporeal – otherwise, they could not explain the psychophysical interaction – the Stoics were also ready to describe representations as physical effects. According to the definition preserved by Diogenes Laertius (VII 45 = SVF II 53), representation is an impression (τύπωσις) in the soul; Zeno and Cleanthes describe this as a particular physical impression, while his later followers in the school characterize it rather as a modification or qualitative change.7
Given that it is the comprehension of propositions in the past tense, memory is in this respect like sense-perception, which is also sentential in nature, although it does not rule out that as an impression following the wax-model sense-perception preserves a certain kind of pictorial character.8 The similarity shows up in the content as well; the proposition grasped during memory can be matched to the proposition that came up as a representation in the dominant part of the soul as a result of sense-perception. It follows from this that the representation as memory image does not have to portray the sensory object or event in question in the strict sense of the word; it is sufficient if it reports – precisely or less precisely – the properties of the object in the form of a sentence.
“And indeed, if what is perceived is a body, sense-perception would take place in no other way than the way seals are impressed in wax from signet-rings, whether the perceptibles produce imprints into the blood, or into air. And if the imprinting takes place as it would in fluid bodies, as is plausible, it will dissolve just as it would into water, and there will be no question of remembering; while if the impressions are permanent, either there is no way for others to be imprinted, since the previous ones are in occupation, so that there will be no further sense-perceptions, or, if others come into being, the earlier ones will be destroyed; so, either way, there is no possibility of remembering occurring. So, if there is such a thing as remembering, and perceiving one thing after another without the earlier getting in the way, then it is impossible for the soul to be a body.”10
If sense-perception were of a physical nature, then the perceiving body would either be airy (or, possibly, liquid) or solid. If the former is the case, the representations would quickly blur due to the lack of stability, and therefore there would be no memory, and if the latter, there would be no memory either because the representation that arrives later would have to erase the one that was there before. In both cases, there will be problems with the content of the memory. Unstable substrate even deprives memory of short-term reliability, while solid surfaces do not give way to new impressions or, if they do, old impressions will be erased, which renders memory equally impossible. Based on the critique, Plotinus argues that we should not count on any kind of imprint (τύπος) during memory (IV 6. 3. 45–50). Explicit rejection of the wax-model theory (III 6. 2. 39–41; IV 3. 26. 29–32; IV 6. 1. 18–21) fits in with a broader context. Impression is a kind of πάθος, which suggests passivity on behalf of the soul that remembers. However, the moment of passivity, or more precisely acceptance, contradicts the Platonic thesis that the soul is activity. According to this, the remaining impressions indicate the weakness of the soul, because the soul would be passive in this role of receiver, rather than active (IV 6. 2. 6–9; 3. 45–50).
Plotinus' objections are a partial rehearsal of the arguments of Chrysippus, who also found fault with the ideas of the Stoics who preceded him, Zeno and Cleanthes (Sextus, AM VII 228–231, 372 = SVF II 56).11 His arguments focused on the complications involved in the model of imprinting. If representations are really like impressions in sealing wax, implicating dents and bulges, then it is fairly difficult to explain how we can have contradictory representations at the same time. It is absurd to have the representation of a triangular and a quadrangular object at the same time in this way. It is equally nonsense to have multiple representations at the same time, for the soul should receive various innumerable imprints at once. Moreover, in the case of wax, the last impression abolishes the previous ones. For this reason, the application of the wax-model to the account of the generation of representations in the soul would render memory impossible throughout. If, on the other hand, we perceive these as modifications in a less specific sense, considering them as alterations, then the problem might be avoided. Chrysippus shows this through the example of air: while we see or hear different things even at the same time, the air can undergo different changes in parallel. Considering that the soul is also a kind of warm air (πνεῦμα), this analogy can easily be transferred to the cases of sense-perception and memory as well. In explaining the occasional multiplicity of remembering, one might say that the corresponding modifications persist in the soul, no matter how transformable the structure of this warm air is.12 Some modifications may persist longer than others. All of this can also be rephrased into mental terminology: if remembering means grasping and becoming aware of a sentence in the past tense, the present tense version of which was formed from perception, then this sentence changes purely from the point of view of the present and past tenses.13 There can be stable alterations in the soul that correspond to stable representations. At any rate, the stability is only temporary, which explains why some memories fade earlier, some later.
Plotinus' criticism thus shows partial similarity to earlier criticisms and apparently he does not take much notice of the changes linked to the name of Chrysippus.14 As a matter of fact, we must also see that in its fundamental feature, the Plotinian conception revives the thesis of Chrysippus without taking account of the physiological background. Indeed, if we understand sense-perception, and together with it memory, as a linguistic event, judgment (κρίσις) (III 6. 1. 1–4; IV 3. 26. 8; IV 6. 2. 16–18), then we emphasize not only that it is an activity, but also that it is an activity of a rational soul the content of which is partly propositional. Based on perceptual judgments, perceptual memory must be judgmental in nature as well, since nothing indicates any change from this point of view. This is how we can remember of Socrates (V 3. 3. 4–5). In Chrysippus' view, the activity is backed by a physiological description that avoids the pitfalls of earlier assumptions. But the activity of remembering is also of a linguistic nature; it is a kind of judgment-making; more precisely, it involves a transformation of a proposition in the present tense into a proposition in the past tense.
When we try to interpret Plotinus' theory from the point of view of Aristotle's De memoria or Plato, this peculiarity may show up as a radical novelty. The Aristotelian φάντασμα is not emphatically linguistic. This is not to say that it is a pictorial copy of perception, however. Its primary function is to represent the preserved perception (αἴσθημα) in another form.15 Unfortunately, Aristotle owes us a detailed explanation of its nature. In connection with Plato, a passage in the Philebus (38E–39E) may come to mind, where we find an illustration of the cognitive activities of the soul. The protagonist distinguishes between a scribe and a painter. The scribe formulates news into our soul based on sense-perception and memory (probably, this will be the opinion, δόξα), while the painter creates a picture based on the news. They are copies of what the scribe writes down and therefore there is a causal connection between opinion and the paintings in the soul. If the possibility is mentioned at all, then the activity of the scribe can be related to sense-perception and memory.16 Thus memory serves as a basis for the work of the painter which means that memory cannot be a part of the representational capacity (φαντασία). As we shall see, this notion has nothing to do with the memory Plotinus speaks about, which is directly based on sense-perception. According to his view, even at the level of sense-perception, we have to conceive of the cognitive process as a certain judgmental activity. It is a claim that is justified by the immateriality of the soul as well.
On the other hand, it is striking how closely related this view is to Chrysippus' theory. If we understand the act of remembering as a kind of comprehension, the comprehending of a sentence in the past tense, which was originally a sentence in the present tense resulting from sense-perception, then we are making a statement very similar to what Plotinus emphasizes. Both authors insist that memory is a linguistic activity and as such it belongs to the soul. It seems that, on a certain level, they both account for the act of remembering in the same manner. It also seems that the difference is not so crucial in terms of the content of memory either, since according to the Stoic account, representations are the content of the rational part of the soul, which means that they are propositional.
As a result, Plotinus' criticism, which he presumably exercised over Stoic or Stoic-inspired theories on memory, can only be partial. He attacks the physiological descriptions of Stoic theory that draw on the corporeal nature of the soul, while the terminology he employs to describe memory as a mental event shows something different; with a strong emphasis on the linguistic nature of memory, it betrays a close resemblance to the ideas of Chrysippus.
II
If we see the Stoic distinction between the contents (representations) and the act (comprehension) of memory, we might get the impression that, when criticizing the Stoics, Plotinus was arguing for the thesis that memory is nothing but a rehearsal of a perceptual judgment. It cannot be the case, of course, since memory is also subject to alterations, but it still helps us move on to the next topic. Let us start with a few questions. What is the consequence of the judgmental nature of memory?17 If remembering is the same as forming a certain kind of judgment, what is the relationship between remembering as forming a judgment and perception, which in turn is also nothing but forming a judgment? Even if memory is directly attached to perception, the two kinds of judgment do not appear to be the same since they are formulated in different tenses. However, if not, i.e. there is a gap between perception and memory, then it is not only the numerical identity that becomes out of the question, but also the specific nature of the similarity between perceptual and mnemonic judgment has to be clarified. On the other hand, if remembering is a judgment that takes place in an immaterial soul, how can the judgment change? To put it otherwise, if we assume that the judgment that constitutes the perception is true, how can it turn into a false judgment, that is, how can we remember after a while wrongly?
The last problem can be handled in Aristotelian or Stoic theory conveniently. Aristotle can assume that the change corresponding to the φάντασμα in the blood around the heart is itself subject to various changes. In the course of time, the αἴσθημα produced by sense-perception – being a physiological phenomenon – is subject to physiological changes, and the resulting φάντασμα will no longer be identical to it from a physiological point of view, which means that its mental content has also been transformed.18 The Stoic might explain the phenomenon of changing memories with reference to a certain modification of the physical nature of representation, the pneuma, for, although a stable alteration, it can change in time. The change, however, involves modification of content as well. One might also explain the physiological change with reference to a transformation of the specific tension existing in the πνεῦμα, which corresponds to the initial representation.19 However, these types of explanation cannot be available to Plotinus at first sight. In his views, the soul is not only immaterial, but, at the same time, cannot receive affections (ἀπαθής) either. It explains why memory cannot be connected to the physical retention of sense-impressions. For this reason, it is not clear how to explain the involuntary change of judgments in such a soul.
“In fact, for the person who will remember, there will be nothing to stop the percept from being a representation, and remembering and retaining will belong to the capacity of representation, which is a different thing. For this is the point at which sense-perception terminates, and what is seen is present to it when sense-perception is no longer there. And if the representation of what is already absent is in this, it will remember, even if it is present to it for just a short time. But the persons with whom it stays for a short time will have a slight memory of it, whereas if it stays for a long time, people will remember better, with this power being stronger, so that it will not happen that the memory is shaken up and destabilized as a consequence of its being altered. Memory, then, belongs to the capacity of representation, and remembering will be of things of this kind. We shall say that people differ in respect of memory either because their powers for this are in different states, or because they pay attention or do not, or because they possess certain corporeal mixtures or not, and because these alter or do not, and are, in a way, in turmoil. But we can deal with these matters on another occasion.”20
Plotinus locates memory in the capacity for representation.21 As a consequence, memories are representations of things that are no longer present to the soul via sense-perception. Representation relates to sense-perception insofar as the perceptual capacity terminates there. It is not quite clear what is meant by termination here but so much might be said with some certainty that besides the causal primacy of sense-perception, representation may have a role in our becoming aware of perceiving.22 It does not seem, however, that the capacity of representation contains sense-perception. If it were the case, how shall we tell the difference between the two? Sense-perception cannot be a part of representation, for Plotinus claims that the former belongs to the compound of body and soul, whereas memory, part of the representational capacity, does not; it belongs to the soul alone (IV 3. 26. 8–9). Plotinus also argues in IV 3. 29 that the perceptual power cannot be responsible for remembering. Furthermore, if representational activity somehow comprehends the activity of perceiving, how shall we distinguish perceptual judgments from representational judgments? What form does the connection between the two capacities take? Sense-perception is a spontaneous judgment the soul makes in conformity with the effects hitting the sense-organs (III 6. 1. 1–2; IV 4. 23. 36–42). To put it a different way, affections in the sense-organs elicit perceptual judgments. Is there any analogy between perceiving and remembering? Shall we say that perceptual memory works like sense-perception? For sure, the representational capacity has to work with perceptual judgments. They have to serve as the ground for memories that also entail judgments.23 On the other hand, the activity of the representational capacity must resemble ordinary sense-perception, for it is called ‘inner perception’ (IV 8. 8. 10–11).24 It is a kind of perception, then, that focuses on objects already in the soul. These objects in the soul arise as a result of sense-perception. It may also be the reason why it is called συναίσθησις (III 4. 4. 10–11).25 We might get the impression, therefore, that the two capacities are distinct by having separate activities but work in a parallel way.
The text also distinguishes between remembering (μνήμη) and retaining (κατοχή). It is likely that the latter term refers to mere possession.26 It may not qualify μνήμη simply since, in that case, we ought to think that Plotinus equates memory with retention of perceptual experience. As the term κατοχή suggests, retention involves passivity or just a disposition. Plotinus, however, insists that the soul is active and, therefore, memory is more than keeping a storage of perceptual experiences. Consequently, the difference might amount to a distinction between the act of remembering and the retention of a piece of memory, with the implication that we can have memories without actively exercising them.27 If we have in mind that memory is part of the representational capacity, then we can say that the distinction has been made between the retention of a representation and its use in the act of remembering. Furthermore, if we stick to the distinction between sense-perception and representation, we may draw the conclusion that memory is based on representations which are in turn residues of sense-perception. Thus memory performances depend on the retention of representations. We can say that retention has a central role in memory.28 It may also give us a clue for understanding the phenomenon of fading memories.
Before turning to that issue, however, let us dwell on the distinction between representation and sense-perception. They seem to be different activities insofar as representation can act separably from the perceptual power. Still, the way of their activity may be similar to some extent, for representation is called inner sense-perception. If we say so, however, we have to explain why Plotinus calls sense-perception ‘κριτικόν’, thereby distinguishing it from the representational capacity which he called ‘as it were νοερόν’.29 Furthermore, there is an important difference between them for sense-perception is a common function of the composite of body and soul, whereas memory might not belong to the composite being since the soul has already taken in the impression from the senses and either preserved or rejected it (IV 3. 26. 9–12). It suggests not only that the two capacities have a different status but also that they work in a similar way; both produce judgments as a response to initial effects, be they affections or perceptual judgments. For this reason, perhaps, we have to formulate the initial question differently. Does representation rely on perceptual judgments only or also on the respective affections in a specific sense organ which belongs to common sensation (κοινὴ αἴσθησις)?30 If it relies on affections as well, we could explain fading memories with reference to a change in affections. In that case, however, what makes representation such like a νοερόν? Plotinus rejects the presence of any corporeal affection in the soul in general and, consequently, its possibility in the representational capacity as well. If it does not draw on affections, however, how shall we explain the change and occasional fade of memories? What makes memories as judgments change or disappear over time?
Another important formulation of the relation between sense-perception and representation stresses the difference between their objects. One could argue that the objects of representation are images, and they differ from the objects of sense-perception.31 Ordinary sense-perception results in the formation of images that are also called impressions (τύποι) in a specific sense, devoid of direct reference to corporeality (III 6. 1. 8–11).32 They are apprehended by the capacity of representation and may later be recalled as memories (IV 3. 29. 19–26). The judgments that constitute ordinary sense-perception leave an intelligible representation of what is perceived in the soul, and this representation is the object of the capacity of representation.33 As a consequence, representational capacity has no direct access to the affection triggering perceptual judgment. While having many merits, the approach does not seem to explain why memories themselves are subject to change. Changes in memory involve changes in the representational power itself. The intelligible representations that are the objects of the representational capacity are linguistic items in the sense that they are the products of the judgments entailed by sense-perception. As the capacity of representation itself is called ‘νοερόν in a way’ one might expect that it works by means of judgments. This may be one of the reasons why it is called ‘νοερόν in a way’. It implies, however, that it works on the previous judgments produced by sense-perception. If it works on previous judgments, the result of its activity may also consist of judgments. How shall we describe its work? Is it a mere reiteration (except for the change of the present tense judgment into a past tense one) or a reformulation or occasional combination of perceptual judgments? For memories are subject to change and can fade, both options call for similar questions. If the former is the case, how can it initiate changes in content? If the latter, what makes it capable of modifying the content? What kind of causal story are we supposed to tell about such activity? If the capacity for representation draws on intelligible representations provided by sense-perception exclusively and it is free of affections, then how shall we account for the phenomenon of changing memories? Now it seems that it cannot be a simple reiteration of perceptual judgments since the tense must change, which sometimes involves a change in aspect as well; it concerns the way in which an action is presented or regarded with a special emphasis on its internal composition.34 Memories as judgments describe events or state of affairs that happened in the past, whereas perceptual judgments are formulated in the present tense.
“The body is affected and obeys, the soul receives the impression made on the body, or the impression that comes through the body, or the judgment that the soul made on the basis of the affection of the body. So sense-perception of this may be called common function, but it may not be necessary for the corresponding memory to belong to the body-soul compound.” (IV 3. 26. 5–9)35
The text makes two claims, first is that there are possibilities to account for the arousal of sense-perception, either with or without the involvement of impressions on the soul, and second, that, unlike sense-perception memory may not belong to the compound of body and soul; it belongs to the soul only. Here, however, we have to draw attention to the way Plotinus formulates the claim. He does not say straightforwardly that memory does not belong to the composite of body and soul. Instead, he suggests that it may not be necessary (ἄν … οὐκ ἀναγκάζοιτο) for memory to belong to the compound. Of course, the formulation leaves open the possibility that memory, or some part of it, may retain direct contact with the compound. If this is the case, the representational capacity also has some direct contact with the compound. I shall develop this point when discussing the possible sources of changing memories.
The main condition for transforming judgments in the present tense into judgments in the past tense is perception of time.36 Not every kind of memory involves time, for the memory of the intellect in us, linked to recollection, does not need it (IV 3. 25. 31–33). But perceptual memory does. For this reason, an important part of the explanation would be the analysis of Plotinus' account of perceiving time. Unfortunately, there is no such account in the Enneads.37 The best clue is offered in the treatise on eternity and time (III 7), where we read that physical time is posterior to the motions within the soul of the world. The genuine locus of temporal sequence is, therefore, in the motions within the soul (III 7. 13. 30–40). This is not to say, however, that the soul itself is in time. Contrary to the motions of the physical universe, which is in time, soul creates time with its motions and possesses it insofar as it is active (45–46). Because individual souls also have time within (66–67), in order to perceive it, they need a kind of inner perception; they need to perceive the sequential relation between the motions or the parts of motions within. It seems that the representational capacity is capable of performing such a function since it is also called inner perception (IV 8. 8. 10). It may be capable of perceiving not only the content of perceptual judgment but also the judgments themselves as events in the soul. Because these events are motions or changes within the soul and their relation to one another can be simultaneous or sequential, by perceiving the priority of one judgment to another, the representational capacity may get into the position of establishing sequential relations, which may imply perception of time as well. This kind of perception may be a good example of the activity of representation. Perceptual judgment becomes a φάντασμα not by simply keeping its content as it is but by being reformulated so that a new element (past tense) replaces an old one. The replacement has inner, not directly perceptual, sources, which justifies the description of the capacity as οἷον νοερόν. This being said, now we have an answer to question 1, raised at the beginning. If remembering is nothing but making a judgment, then we have to account for two kinds of change. One is common to every memory, including the most accurate ones as well; it is the change of a present tense proposition into a past tense proposition. The other is more specific; some memories can alter, combine with other memories, or simply fade. We have seen that the change common to every memory has an internal source. Perception of time is a kind of inner perception because time is created by the soul and its primary place is within the soul. Individual souls can also apprehend such motions without recurring to external factors. As a consequence, the soul remains impassible when perceiving time. It remains to examine whether the more specific changes are due to internal or external factors.
The passage in IV 3. 29. 22–36 offers an answer to the question of the emergence of the various idiosyncrasies in remembering as well. In addition to the fact that Plotinus clearly attributes perceptual memory to the capacity of representation, in the second half of the text, he also offers a brief account of the causes of individual differences in reliability and duration of memory. They are causes that affect the operation of the representational capacity. He lists three possibilities: the different state of the faculty, the presence or absence of attention, and the nature of the mixture that makes up the body. Just like the condition of the capacity, the presence and absence of attention seem to be an explanation in mental terms. By contrast, the note on bodily mixture seems to emphasize physiological conditions. Before I try to elaborate on these possibilities, two questions are worth distinguishing. What makes some people retain memories longer than others? A slightly different question is this: why do some people remember more accurately than others? To put it otherwise, why is it the case that some people's memories are not as revisionist as others'? Plotinus explicitly discusses the first question only, but his answer might apply to the second question as well.
The condition of the capacity determines the duration of memories. According to his view expressed here – and elsewhere (IV 6. 3) – the answer is that the representational capacity itself is stronger and does not allow the memory to fall out. The key expression is “strengthened soul” (IV 6. 3. 20). We cannot find a detailed explanation, but it probably does not refer to the general condition of the capacity only. At least, that is what we can infer from what we see in the text dedicated to the relationship between perception and memory (IV 6. 3. 19–59). We can read that if the soul strongly turns towards anything, the representation created in this way is more durable and preserves its original content. Representations acquired by means of a perception focused on the object are more vivid and durable than representations coming from random notice. Plotinus illustrates the strong focus on the example of children's behaviour: they concentrate on the given thing and will remember better because of this. The illustration implies that attention does not have to be a fully rational act; children are capable of exercising it without having a full-fledged rational faculty.38 Furthermore, the attention described here is not the activity that is directed inwards.39 Given that he is discussing memory of perceptible objects, Plotinus blames the lack of attention towards external objects for the failure of memory. He lists four types of attention deficit (IV 4. 8. 8–34). They are 1) perceiving things that are fully irrelevant, 2) our reason is wrapped up in something and we do not notice an object even if we are perceiving it, 3) perceiving things that are incidental for our purposes, and 4) in performing an action we grasp it as a whole without paying heed to all the details. Among them, three are equally applicable to children as well.40 On the other hand, attention contributes not only to the quality of individual representations but also to the strength of the capacity in general. Those who are scattered are not able to preserve their memories for a long time and in an unchanged form. Attention tends to be holistic. When reason (διάνοια) grasps an action as a whole and believes that it will be accomplished fully, it would not attend to each detail any longer (IV 4. 8. 30–33). Based on this, it seems that strength refers not only to the general state of the ability but also to the concentrated nature of its operation. Strengthening the soul means that we are engaged in a wholesale activity. Exercises that promote the recovery of memory also strengthen the soul (IV 6. 3. 29–30). Sometimes, mnemonic exercises serve the general purpose of strengthening the capacity in general, but sometimes they have a more specific goal, which is to strengthen the capacity with respect to a particular object.41 With all of this, we get an explanation of what is meant by the first two possibilities. The representational capacity has a general condition, which is clearly manifested in the way it works. It is important to see that both the general state of representational capacity and attention can be characterized by the word “strong” without having to refer to the effect of some physical substrate.
We cannot do this when referring to a physical mixture. Of course, this short remark of Plotinus does not in itself oblige us to believe that he would really allow a physical mixture to affect a faculty of the soul. He criticized the Stoic notion of mixture to this effect.42 One might think that he raises a traditional possibility, which he then dismisses entirely. It is unlikely to be true, however. Appropriate mixture of the body as a condition for good memory is mentioned elsewhere, too.43 It cannot be an isolated slip. In a part of the great treatise on the problems of the soul (IV 3–5), on speaking of emotions, he notes that they are influenced to a great extent by bodily states and operations. For example, anger is caused by bile or blood (IV 4. 28. 38–39). Once the perception has taken place, the ability to represent makes the soul partake of the state of such a body (40–42); although belonging to the body, the emotional state can possibly take the mind with it. As I see it, there is no need to deal with the question that anger and other emotions are not phenomena of the actual soul but movements of a soul-trace (functions associated with the fact that the soul has taken on a body). True, both desire and sense-perception belong to the compound of body and soul, but they largely determine the content of perceptual memory. They do it in two ways. One is banal; sense-perception is the ground for perceptual memory. The other is more interesting; the change in memory may be due to conditions in the mixture of the body or to the emotions and desires that are tied to body. What is important for present purposes is the relationship between the representational ability active during perceptual remembering and the physical state. As we have seen, Plotinus insists that as the seat of perceptual memory, the representational capacity is not in direct contact with the body.
This is the claim we have to qualify if we are to understand Plotinus' move. At some point we read that the capacity for representation does not own its object but instead enters a state corresponding to what it sees (IV 4. 3.7–8). Given that remembering is an activity of the representational capacity, its state also affects the quality of remembering. It affects both how far back and how accurately we can remember. However, this state can also be influenced by the state of the body. If this is so, then the thesis that the soul does not receive bodily influences must be qualified in relation to perceptual memory. While Plotinus insists that remembering is making a judgment that takes place in the soul (not in the soul-trace) and memory is not an imprint, he accepts that this mental activity is also influenced by physical factors. How is it possible?
One, admittedly Aristotelian, approach might be to state that we can explain the deterioration of memory by saying that the representational capacity has a direct contact with the bodily makeup of the sense-organs, or the central sense-organ, the heart. But it cannot have such a contact, according to Plotinus, because it belongs to the soul exclusively. Furthermore, it differs from the perceptual power which has such a contact. Deterioration of the sense-organs affects the perceptual power only, if it does at all. As a consequence, the remarks on bodily blend indicate only that the grip of soul on body weakens.44 It is certainly the case, but the approach does not offer a causal story of the phenomenon. One might even surmise that priority is assigned to the soul. However, it does not explain why the soul loses its grip on the body. One might say that due to its eternal nature, the soul is not subject to ageing, and therefore it is hard to see what makes it change the judgments in the representational capacity. It is hard to see why memory judgment changes over time. Alternatively, one might take the remarks on the role of the bodily mixture at face value. It means that there is a causal chain in which the primary element is the condition of the body, and certain changes in the representational capacity are due to the movements in bodily organs. As the assumption seems to run against the doctrine according to which soul is ἀπαθής, one has to find some explanation that justifies it. To see the problem more clearly, either one has to claim that when Plotinus is putting perceptual memory into the soul, not into the compound of body and soul, he talks about memory in a qualified sense, or he keeps perceptual memory in the soul, in the representational capacity, but admits that there can be a kind of causal connection between sense-organs and the psychic capacity that allows for such impressions.
“But we do say this about the representation which one could strictly call representation, that which is stirred up by the affections from the body. For being empty of food and drink, and in turn being full, moulds the representations, so to speak, and one who is full of semen has different representations, and [they differ] according to each of the qualities of fluids in the body;” (VI 8. 3. 10–17)45
The key element in the description is that bodily states can modify or perhaps even form representations.46 Whichever case may come to be true, in Plotinus' account representational capacity is influenced by bodily states. The influence is qualified since we read “moulds the representations, so to speak” (οἷον ἀναπλάττουσι). Just like in the case of τύπος in III 6. 1. 8–11, the qualification is meant to emphasize the immaterial nature of the interaction. One might assume that the form of influence is cognitive; it leads to changing judgments. Because the content of the representational capacity is judgmental bodily conditions are responsible for making new judgments or modifying old ones. Be that as it may, however, there is a causal connection between bodily and purely psychic factors. Bodily states can even hinder memories (IV 3. 26. 50).47 The can bring about oblivion, whereas purification of such states may lead to the renewal of memory. Affections of the body have an impact on the way we formulate judgments in the representational capacity.48 As a result of the impact, our judgments in the representational capacity will reflect our desires and emotional states. In order to be free, we have to get rid of bodily affections. To put it otherwise, impassibility is an ethical aim.49 Here we can understand the cautious formulation in IV 3. 26. 9, where Plotinus claims that it may not be necessary (ἄν … οὐκ ἀναγκάζοιτο) for memory to belong to the compound. It will be subject to the influences coming from the compound if we do not do everything we can to avoid it. Even if perceptual memory is firmly settled in the soul, not in the compound, which means that we do not need bodily organs to exercise it, it is exposed to bodily processes. Consequently, we are not entitled to say that the soul as a whole is incapable of receiving impacts from the body, even if the impact is of an immaterial nature. In our case, the representational capacity is by nature subject to such influences. Thus, we cannot leave the ἀπάθεια-thesis unqualified for two reasons. Even if we admit that, in certain cases, the attention is attracted towards bodily conditions, hereby creating the feeling of pain, for instance (IV 4. 19. 23–28), we owe an explanation as to why such an attraction prevails. What explains the move of the soul? Or, connected to it, why can desires modify the judgments in the representational capacity? Secondly, the claim that the general mixture of the body affects our memory seems to rule out offhand that the genuine (κυρίως) representational capacity is free of affections tout court. Memory belongs to the soul, not to the compound of body and soul, which implies that certain segments of the soul cannot be free of affections unconditionally. This is the answer to question 2. A qualified version of the thesis may explain that, although perceptual memory belongs to the representational capacity, influences from the body on memory can be decisive.
In order to sort out the way perceptual memory is subject to bodily influences, we have to distinguish between bodily motions underlying perceptual experience and bodily states or motions that have a role in modifying memory judgments. The former cannot modify memory judgments directly. They furnish the perceptual power with the material on which it can make judgments.50 As a consequence, even if it has no direct contact with the affections in the sense-organs that induce perceptual judgments, memory has a direct link to bodily states of other kinds. They can determine, not only its way of functioning but its content as well. If bodily conditions apply our memory can be swift and accurate; if not, it may be inaccurate and dull. They can be quite general, such as the overall condition of the body, the “mixture of the body”, or more specific, such as the modifications that may arise in certain circumstances. They can be held responsible for the revisionism of perceptual memories and, ultimately, for their fading.
Funding information
The paper was written by the financial aid of NKFIH (Project OTKA-123839).
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Attila Hangai for discussing Plotinus' notion of memory with me. His suggestions and criticism have made me rethink many important points. I also thank Ágoston Guba for his insightful suggestions. Needless to say, all shortcomings are mine.
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μνήμη θησαυρισμὸς οὖσα φαντασιῶν. Sextus Empiricus claims that the view seems to have been shared by Cleanthes as well. See also Sextus Empiricus Πυῤῥώνειοι ὑποτυπώσεις (abbr. PH) II 70.
See, e.g., Sextus, AM VIII 70. It is debated whether all perceptual representations are sentential in form or their content comes in two forms, propositional and perceptual, the latter prefiguring emotions and characterizing amateur representations. The case for a purely sentential form of content was made recently by Shogry (2019). I have sympathies with his view because in the Stoic view memory is clearly sentential, as we shall see it presently.
μνήμην δὲ κατάληψιν ἀξιώματος παρεληλυθότος [scil. ὁριζόμενοι], οὗ τὸ παρὸν ἐξ αἰσθήσεως κατελήφθη. The use of the term κατάληψις does not have to commit us to think that memory consists of true judgments for an ἀξίωμα can be false as well. For the Stoic notion emphasizing both the capacity for and the act of remembering, see Ierodiakonou (2007). In rendering ἀξίωμα as proposition, as I do it in the text, I follow Hülser (1988), who translates it as Aussage, e.g., at fr. 695. However, we have to be alert to the difference between Stoic and modern notions, see Bobzien (1999) esp. 93, n. 48, and Ierodiakonou (2006) esp. 509–513. For the meaning of ἀξίωμα as an incorporeal ‘proposition-like item’ with which representations are correlated, see Brennan (2003) esp. 260–262.
On ἀξίωμα, see also Diogenes Laertius VII 65 who mentions that it can be false or true, or a complete state of affairs (πρᾶγμα) that can be asserted or denied. See also Sextus, PH II 104 (it is a complete λεκτόν) and Stob. II 88.
See Hülser (2022) esp. 66.
ὅταν δὲ ὁμοειδεῖς πολλαὶ μνῆμαι γένωνται, τότε φαμὲν ἔχειν ἐμπειρίαν· ἐμπειρία γάρ ἐστι τὸ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν φαντασιῶν πλῆθος. See also Cicero, Acad. II 20–22, 30–31.
Pictorial not in the sense that impressions themselves are pictorial, genuine likenesses of external things, but that they convey information of the external world in such a form that we are able to perceive it in a pictorial way. It applies to sense-perception as well, see Calcidius, Waszink (1975) 220 (= SVF I 138, II 879). Non-rational animals also have complex sensory impressions with ‘quasi-concepts’ serving to identify something as food, for instance, see Brittain (2002) esp. 263–265. They can entertain phantasms or figments that may exceed the content directly available through sense-perception. The ruling part of their soul is not rational but natural (see Calcidius, Waszink (1975) 233 = SVF II 879). It does not rule out that the perceptual content is pictorial.
Plutarch, De comm. not. 1084A–B (= SVF II 848), Alexander of Aphrodisias, De anima 68.10–21, Mantissa § 10 and Sextus, PH III 188 (= SVF II 96). The similarity to Plotinus' critique has been pointed out by Ierodiakonou (2007) 55–58.
IV 7. 6. 37–48. Καὶ μὴν σώματος ὄντος τοῦ αἰσθανομένου οὐκ ἂν ἄλλον τρόπον γένοιτο τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ οἷον ἐν κηρῶι ἐνσημανθεῖσαι ἀπὸ δακτυλίων σφραγῖδες, εἴτ᾽ οὖν εἰς αἷμα, εἴτ᾽ οὖν εἰς ἀέρα τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐνσημαινομένων. Καὶ εἰ μὲν ὡς ἐν σώμασιν ὑγροῖς, ὅπερ καὶ εὔλογον, ὥσπερ εἰς ὕδωρ συγχυθήσεται, καὶ οὐκ ἔσται μνήμη· εἰ δὲ μένουσιν οἱ τύποι, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλους ἐνσημαίνεσθαι ἐκείνων κατεχόντων, ὥστε ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις οὐκ ἔσονται, ἢ γινομένων ἄλλων ἐκεῖνοι οἱ πρότεροι ἀπολοῦνται· ὥστε οὐδὲν ἔσται μνημονεύειν. Εἰ δὲ ἔστι τὸ μνημονεύειν καὶ ἄλλων αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐπ᾽ ἄλλοις οὐκ ἐμποδιζόντων τῶν πρόσθεν, ἀδύνατον τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα εἶναι. Translation from Gerson (2018) slightly modified.
The early Stoic views have been preserved, e.g., in Diogenes Laertius VII 45 (= SVF II 53) Sextus, AM VII 228–231 (SVF I 58, 484) and Philo of Alexandria, Quod deus sit immut. 42–43 (= SVF II 458).
Sextus' report on the debate between the Stoics has been discussed by Hangai (2022) esp. 344–346. He emphasises that Chrysippus' arguments presuppose the indivisibility of the ἡγεμονικόν; impressions modify it as a whole.
It goes along with the claim that representation is not an image or likeness similar to what is perceived, see Ierodiakonou (2007) 57. If this is the case, memories cannot be mental pictures of external objects either.
On this, see Ierodiakonou (2007) 57–58. Interestingly enough, there is a reference in IV 7. 6. 40 to the air but the argument does not take the consequences of such modification into account. I owe the reference to Ágoston Guba.
The similarity between the roles of picture (ζῷον) and representation in Mem. 1, 450b20–25 does not imply that the latter is a kind of pictorial copy. On the non-pictorial nature of φάντασμα, see King (2009) 57–60, and his remarks on 450b20–25 in the introduction of King (2004) 43. For arguments against image-theory in Aristotle, see Caston (2021); they seem to apply to Stoic notions, too (see 205, n. 31).
It is one kind of opinion. On the possibility of two kinds of opinion at play in the dialogue, see Delcomminette (2006) 382.
In Plotinus' view, as representations, memories must entail judgments, as has been emphasized by King (2009) 183.
See De memoria 1, 449a31–450b1. In De anima III 8, 423a9–10 φαντάσματα are without matter, which means that they are without the matter that the percepts have, see King (2004) 71–72.
Chrysippus' example of modifications in the air (Sextus, AM VII 228–231 = SVF II 56) explains not only relative stability but also the possibility of change after a while.
Ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύσει τῶι μνημονεύσοντι τὸ αἴσθημα φάντασμα εἶναι, καὶ τῶι φανταστικῶι ἄλλωι ὄντι τὴν μνήμην καὶ κατοχὴν ὑπάρχειν· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν, εἰς ὃ λήγει ἡ αἴσθησις, καὶ μηκέτι οὔσης τούτωι πάρεστι τὸ ὅραμα. Εἰ οὖν παρὰ τούτωι τοῦ ἀπόντος ἤδη ἡ φαντασία, μνημονεύει ἤδη, κἂν ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγον παρῆι. Ὧι δὴ εἰ μὲν ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγον παραμένοι, ὀλίγη ἡ μνήμη, ἐπὶ πολὺ δέ, μᾶλλον μνημονικοὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης οὔσης ἰσχυροτέρας, ὡς μὴ ῥαιδίως τρεπομένης ἐφεῖσθαι ἀποσεισθεῖσαν τὴν μνήμην. Τοῦ φανταστικοῦ ἄρα ἡ μνήμη, καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν τῶν τοιούτων ἔσται. Διαφόρως δ᾽ ἔχειν πρὸς μνήμας φήσομεν ἢ ταῖς δυνάμεσιν αὐτῆς διαφόρως ἐχούσαις ἢ ταῖς προσέξεσιν ἢ μή, ἢ καὶ σωματικαῖς κράσεσιν ἐνούσαις καὶ μή, καὶ ἀλλοιούσαις καὶ μή, καὶ οἷον θορυβούσαις. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἑτέρωθι. Translation from Gerson (2018), slightly modified. The reference in the last sentence may be to IV 6. 3, the treatise devoted to memory specifically.
See also IV 3. 30. 1–5. On the representational power as the seat of perceptual awareness, see Warren (1966) and Hutchinson (2018) 73–74. Emilsson (1988) 111 assumes that there is no sharp distinction between perception and representation. His claim has been contested by King (2009) 173–175, who shows that the representative power is separate from perception, both in actuality and in the function of representing concepts. He also points out the peculiar character of Plotinus' arguments for subsumption of memory under the representational capacity.
For the distinct character of genuine sense-perception and representation, see Emilsson (1988) 111, who argues that the unity of sensation is due to the capacity of sense-perception itself.
On discussing the whole perceptual process as a kind of activity of making judgments we have to have in mind that discursive reason (διάνοια) is also involved here (see V 3. 2). At first sight, Plotinus' description of the role of the two capacities might seem incoherent. For a clarification of the involvement of διάνοια, see Lavaud (2006). In his view (p. 44), the contradiction disappears if one admits that discursive reason is nothing other than what completes perception; it closes the process of apprehending the sensible. On V 3. 2, emphasizing the heritage of the wax-block analogy, see Chiaradonna (2012) esp. 204–206.
See V 1. 12. 1–15. It is important to keep in mind that in this passage the term ‘inner perception’ does not necessarily refer to the seat of consciousness, rather it refers to a cognitive activity directed towards objects within the soul. Although memory is central (IV 3. 26. 42–47), Plotinus' account of the inner sense as a seat of consciousness is more complex, as it has been indicated by Magrin (2015), who also shows that the account amalgamates Stoic and Peripatetic (Alexander of Aphrodisias) elements. On the role of internal sensation in apprehending the arousal of desires, see Gritti (2005) esp. 262–263.
As has been emphasized by Brisson (2006) esp. 22. Elsewhere (IV 4. 8. 16–30) συναίσθησις in the sense of awareness is said to be one of its functions.
On the difference, see King (2009) 174–175.
It echoes Alexander's distinction of the two layers of representation in De anima 68. 10–21. I owe the reference to Attila Hangai.
On the notion of κατοχή, see Taormina (2010). She suggests that Plotinus elaborated two notions of memory, as a disposition and as a voluntary exercise of representational content. On her view, κατοχή in IV 3. 29. 24 stands for the Aristotelian ἕξις. For historical parallels, see also Taormina (2022) Annexe I.
IV 3. 23. 31–32: αἰσθητικὸν γὰρ κριτικόν πως, καὶ φανταστικὸν οἷον νοερόν. The Plotinian notion of κρίσις in sense-perception has been examined by Emilsson (1988) 121–124, who shows that it signifies not sensory discrimination but judgment of fact to which truth and falsity apply. The thesis has been supported by Magrin (2010) esp. 283–294.
On common sensation, see I 1. 9. 10–12. It may well be the capacity Aristotle described, see Aubry (2004) 261; Helmig (2012) 189. By contrast, Emilsson (1988) 166–167 claims that the term refers to the perception of the compound of body and soul. This being said, however, we have to admit that every sense-perception is common since they all belong to the compound. Or, alternatively, we were compelled to say that there is a kind of sense-perception that does not belong to the compound. Furthermore, it would commit us to claim that Plotinus did not take into account the complex layers of the perceptual process, which, historically speaking, would be strange.
See Emilsson (1988) 110–111.
For a similar use of the term, see IV 6. 3. 20, 26–27, 45, 48. For a figurative use of the term, see Fleet (1995) 76–77.
Intelligible representation does not have to an innate content as it is actualized by sense-perception. Against such innatism, see van den Berg (2010) esp. 174, who argues that λόγοι are criteria against which sensory information is judged.
The description of verbal aspect is taken from Emde Boas–Rijksbaron–Huitink–Bakker (2022) 33.4 (p. 405).
τοῦ μὲν σώματος, πάσχοντος καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντος, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς παραδεχομένης τὴν τύπωσιν τὴν τοῦ σώματος, ἢ τὴν διὰ τοῦ τοῦ σώματος, ἢ τὴν κρίσιν, ἣν ἐποιήσατο ἐκ τοῦ παθήματος τοῦ σώματος· οὗ δὴ ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις οὕτω κοινὸν ἔργον λέγοιτο ἄν, ἡ δὲ μνήμη οὐκ ἀναγκάζοιτο τοῦ κοινοῦ. Translation from Gerson (2018), slightly modified.
The thesis has been formulated by Aristotle, De mem. 1, 449b27–30, although he seems to apply it to every memory. I owe the reference to Attila Hangai.
As it has also been noted by King (2009) 182, n. 768.
For a distinction between rational and non-rational form of attention, as well as for its relevance in ethics, see Brittain (2003) esp. 235–236.
Besides προσοχή he also uses ἐναπέρεισις (IV 4. 1. 26), but it refers to the activity of our intellect.
The exception is the case when the rational soul is wrapped up in something and therefore the person does not notice anything outside although her perceptual power is at work (IV 4. 8. 14–16).
For historical parallels, see Taormina's commentary (2022) who notes the importance of mnemonic exercise and memorization in the rhetorical tradition.
See IV 7. 82. 1–22 with the analysis by Chiaradonna (2005).
IV 3. 7. 25; 26. 12–13. He alludes to it in IV 6. 3. 53–54 when saying that memory fades in old age; it may be due to the change in bodily mixture, see also the note in Dillon–Blumenthal (2015) 293–294.
See, e.g., Kalligas (2023) 158.
ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡμεῖς τὴν μὲν φαντασίαν, ἥν ἄν τις καὶ φαντασίαν κυρίως εἴποι, τὴν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τῶν παθημάτων ἐγειρομένην (καὶ γὰρ κενώσεις σίτων καὶ ποτὼν φαντασίας οἷον ἀναπλάττουσι καὶ πληρώσεις αὖ καὶ μεστός τις σπέρματος ἄλλα φαντάζεται καὶ καθ’ ἑκάστας ποιότητας ὑγρῶν τῶν ἐν σώματι). Translation from Gerson (2018), slightly modified. The φαντασία κυρίως is contrasted with the higher forms of representation (cf. IV 3. 31). For a detailed account, see Corrigan–Turner (2017) 175–177.
It is the only occurrence of the verb ἀναπλάττειν in Plotinus (see Sleeman–Pollet [1980]) and therefore we cannot decide whether Plotinus speaks about reshaping a formerly existing representation or about forming a new one out of the elements of other representations, or he allows for both. For the ambiguity, see the entry ἀναπλάσσω and its cognates in LSJ.
On the passage, see Kalligas (2023) 70. But, whatever the word πάθημα in line 56 may refer to (memory or oblivion), this affection belongs to the soul (see, e.g., the translation by Brisson (2005). Due to their inherent instability, bodily states do not produce stable memories. This is why Plotinus thinks (IV 3. 26. 55–56) that memory belongs to the soul. But it does not compel us to give up the claim that the representational capacity is subject to bodily impacts, even if the impacts themselves cannot give rise to stable states in that part of the soul. On this point, I owe much to the discussion with Ágoston Guba.
On the passage, see also Hutchinson (2018) 74–75.
On freedom of affections as an ethical aim, see Noble (2016) esp. 235, with reference to III 6. 5. One might add IV 3. 24. 20 where we read that souls that have bodies can be exposed to bodily punishment.
This may be taken as an argument against innatism strictly speaking (that all notions making up knowledge in the soul are preformed), see Noble (2016) 246 who argues that Plotinus' point cannot be that a soul-part does not acquire cognitive content from a source external to it. See also van den Berg (2010) 174.
